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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The transition to parenthood is often one of the most significant milestones in 
people’s life course. It is therefore no surprise that fields of academic research and 
the public debate attach great importance to parenthood and children. Children are 
generally acknowledged as goods of primary importance for both their parents and 
the whole society. Firstly, they are actively involved in constructing and organising 
the lives of their parents (Hagestad and Call, 2007). And secondly, they guarantee 
the existence of a society, to the extent that shifting from high to low fertility has 
an aggregate effect on the dynamics of the entire population (Bloom et al., 2010). 
In line with this role of meaning makers and of social reproduction there is a rich 
body of the literature on fertility and families (Balbo, Billari and Mills, 2018). 
Major attention has been directed at analysing matters related with fertility decline.  
The discussion on low- and lowest-low fertility (Billari and Kohler 2004; 
Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002) – defined as levels of total fertility below 
replacement level or below 1.3l, respectively – has indeed long dominated 
academic dialogues about fertility in advanced countries. This growing body of 
empirical research has especially focused on analysing the drivers leading to 
delayed transitions to parenthood and to smaller families, as well as on the possible 
consequences of these processes on the aggregate fertility decline. However, while 
many scholars have investigated below-replacement fertility dynamics (e.g., Dalla 
Zuanna, 2001; Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009; Morgan and Taylor, 
2006; Sobotka, 2004), relatively little attention has been traditionally given to the 
rising phenomenon of childlessness. 
While scientific research has focused on the circumstances that lead women to 
opt for fewer children with the ultimate goal of identifying what fosters or rather 
hinders fertility, conditions that lead to childlessness have been less thoroughly 
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analysed and entered the scientific debate more recently. Having overlooked the 
childless part of the population for a long time, the current debate suffers several 
lacunae about dynamics related to population and family formation. First, this 
selective inattention toward childless people (Veevers, 1972) led to some degree of 
agreement in the sociological and demographic literature that all women in western 
European countries want a child, and that all women will have one in their life (De 
Sandre et al, 1997; Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa, 2003). Empirical evidence, 
conversely, has shown that not all women become mothers (Houseknecht, 1987; 
Tanturri and Mencarini, 2008). Indeed, not only an increased proportion of women 
and men opts to rear fewer children today than in the past, but also the share of the 
population without children is on the rise in the majority of western and non-
western European countries (Sobotka, 2017). Second, the idea that all women in 
their life desire to become mothers implicitly supports the argument that the 
transition to parenthood is evenly distributed in the population. On the contrary, 
sociological research has documented how this life course transition is far from 
equally distributed, and fertility changes significantly in relation to micro-, meso- 
and macro-level dimensions of the social structure (Balbo, Billari and Mills, 2018). 
Third, the relative scant attention that research has been paying to childlessness is 
shown by the existing measures of the phenomenon. Aggregate measures of total 
population, fertility rates, or mean age at first birth are readily available for most of 
European countries, but the same is not true for childlessness. Social scientists, as 
well as international organisations and agencies only recently started to provide 
statistics about the proportion of people living without children in a country. This 
lack of statistics that make possible to reconstruct childlessness over long periods 
of time is partly attributed to the complexity of the reasons behind being childless, 
as well as to the poor quality of available data, but is also an example of how simple 
questions related to childlessness have not yet been appropriately addressed. More 
to this point, much has been said about what holds people back from having large 
families and what lead people to have children later, whereas relatively little is 
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known about the factors determining childlessness. As a result, childlessness 
remains a matter for further enquiry in both academia and the public debates. 
In this dissertation I focus specifically on the experience of childlessness. 
Namely, I will deal with the drivers and consequences that distinguish the life of 
childless individuals from that of parents. In particular, this thesis is structured to 
mirror each phase of a hypothetical individual lifecycle. It starts by analysing 
intentions to be childless and their realizations (Chapter 2). It then goes on to 
investigate the individual and contextual determinants of childlessness (Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4). Last it considers the consequences that childlessness might induce 
in adulthood and later life (Chapter 5). 
This is done by combining demographic and sociological perspectives. 
Demographers and sociologists have analysed the phenomenon from different 
perspectives, focusing on distinctive analytical components. For example, the 
primary interest of demographers has long been quantifying the prevalence of 
childlessness at the population level (Lappegård, 2000; Rowland, 2007; Sobotka, 
2004b; 2017), whereas sociologists have been concentrating more on the 
consequences of childlessness at the individual level. Namely, special attention has 
been addressed to the detrimental implications of a lack of children on an 
individual’s life (Dykstra and Keizer, 2009) and to the adaptive strategies of people 
without children (Adloff, 2009; Hurd, 2009).  
Possibly as a consequence of the different focus of different disciplines, not 
only the reasons leading more people to childlessness among the younger cohorts 
remained unexplained, but also the theoretical framework for studying 
childlessness has remained underdeveloped compared to that on fertility. Fertility 
and childlessness have indeed long been perceived as equivalent phenomena 
(Poston and Trent, 1982; Rowland, 2007), but the evidence of a low and declining 
correlation between fertility and childlessness rates (Sobotka, 2017) suggests that 
they increasingly follow different and specific logics. The first three empirical 
chapters of the thesis build on this evidence and analyse the determinants of 
childlessness asking first, whether and to what extent childlessness is chosen by 
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individuals (Chapter 2) and, second, what factors shape the social stratification of 
childlessness and how these factors change over time (Chapter 3) and across 
contexts (Chapter 4). 
Before delving into such matters, Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
conditions that characterise childlessness. It charts the history of childlessness 
definitions used in empirical research in order to distinguish heterogeneity behind 
it. I show that childlessness is not unprecedented in the history of Europe, but the 
lack of children in modern societies is likely to be characterised by different social 
and individual determinants as compared to pre-modern times. I then discuss how 
few theories have been advanced to explain determinants behind childlessness, and 
propose avenues for their understanding by critically focussing on the explanations 
that existing literature provides about childbearing. In so doing, the strong 
criticisms of the theories of New Home Economics (Becker, 1991) and Second 
Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe, 1995; Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986; 
Van de Kaa, 1987) underpin the discussion on how the on-going transformation of 
gender roles and gender structures needs to be considered when trying to 
incorporate the two perspectives into a comprehensive framework. At the heart of 
the proposed perspective is an idea drawn from the concepts of gender equity and 
gender equality (McDonald, 2000a, 2000b, 2013). Namely, to explain the increase 
in childlessness we must consider the influence of both ideational factors 
(pertaining to gender equity) as well as material conditions (pertaining to gender 
equality), and put both in relation to the normative and structural context in which 
people choose or not to remain childless.  
It emerges from the chapter that several questions about childlessness still 
loom, especially when it comes to the reasons that underlie the recent peak of 
childlessness and to the distinction between the motives behind having zero rather 
than just fewer children. In particular, the recent increase in childlessness rates has 
been interpreted as a result of involuntary childlessness due to fertility 
postponement, or of voluntary childlessness due to individual’s choice (Tanturri 
and Mencarini, 2008; Nicoletti and Tanturri, 2008). Most of the literature has 
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focused on childlessness as a result of conditions external to the individual rather 
than on childlessness as an active, individual choice. Chapter 2 zooms in on this 
dichotomy. I consider whether people intend to be childless, and track the 
persistence and realisation of these intentions over life course time. I investigate the 
leading social and cultural factors underlying the choice of being childless for men 
and women living in European countries, as well as the conditions associated with 
the stability and realisation of childlessness intentions in the short term. The 
analysis makes it possible to contribute both to the specific literature about 
voluntary childlessness and to the broader research on the link between fertility 
intentions and behaviour. On the one hand, it shows how social pressure and 
attitudes toward parenthood matter more than economic conditions in affecting 
voluntary childlessness. On the other hand, it shows how short-term intentions seem 
to be a better predictor of future behaviour in the case of childlessness than in the 
case of parenthood, highlighting the need to adopt a dynamic perspective rather 
than a static one when studying individuals’ fertility intentions and their 
determinants. 
Further, the chapter also indicates how intentions to be childless are more 
reversible over the life course as compared to intentions to have children. For this 
reason, the following two chapters focus on the status of childlessness at the end of 
reproductive life. Besides moving on to a more objective dimension of 
childlessness, these chapters highlight the dynamic character of social phenomena, 
as well as their institutional and cultural dimension. On the one hand, my objective 
is to analyse the evolution of the social determinants of childlessness over time. On 
the other, my goal is to address how the heterogeneity in terms of institutions and 
cultural norms influences the levels and distribution of childlessness among 
different social groups.  
In line with this, Chapter 3 addresses the issue of the changed costs and value 
of children over recent decades to provide an explanation for the increasing rate of 
childlessness among women. Accordingly, I consider how women’s participation 
in tertiary education is related to the spread of childlessness in nine European 
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countries, by analysing how the propensity to be childless has changed over time 
and across groups of women with different educational levels. The chapter makes 
a significant contribution to the literature by documenting differences in the 
probability of childlessness and women’s educational levels across European 
contexts and over time. Results that the educational gradient of childlessness 
persists over time and that childlessness has generally risen among all educational 
groups, thus providing evidence against the assumption that the increase in 
women’s educational attainment is related, univocally, to increased childlessness.  
It also emerges from the chapter that a substantial portion of the variance in the 
probability of remaining childless is unexplained by individual characteristics. This 
further motivates the study of childlessness in relation to institutional, structural 
and normative dimensions that might condition individual behaviour. Chapter 4 is 
dedicated to these specific aspects and examines how the propensity to be childless 
across different socio-economic groups of women depends on macro-level 
conditions that support gender egalitarian relations, both in terms of institutional 
settings that sustain gender equality and in terms of normative conditions 
characterised by comparatively high levels of gender egalitarianism. On the one 
side, I am interested at understanding which groups of women benefit most from 
contexts supporting equal gender relations. On the other, I am also interested in 
addressing the extent to which the effect of policies and institutional arrangement 
relates to the broader normative context in which policies are implemented. I show 
that longer and better-paid parental leaves, as well as gender egalitarian societies 
associate to a lower propensity to be childless across all social strata, thus 
suggesting that a significant component of childlessness also emerges from women 
who face considerable constraints on motherhood. Besides, the role of institutional 
characteristics in affecting the probability of remaining childless varies according 
to the broader normative context. Namely, it is stronger in gender egalitarian 
contexts, and weaker in countries with traditional gender norms. Including these 
institutional and normative factors at the macro-level, one can also test if available 
theories, rather focused on micro-level factors, can adequately capture what is 
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distinctive of the emergence of childlessness vis-à-vis that of low fertility. Overall, 
the paper contributes to the literature on childlessness in several ways. First, the 
analysis of the micro-level determinants of childlessness is integrated by an analysis 
of macro-level determinants associated with childlessness from a comparative 
perspective. Second, the analysis provides a comparison of the determinants of 
childlessness with the determinants to have few children, and in this way makes it 
possible to understand whether the mechanisms driving the choice of being 
childless differ from the mechanisms driving the choice of having few children. 
Third, we account for childlessness differentials across European societies over a 
relatively long period of time. 
Studying childlessness is not only relevant because of the gap identified in the 
socio-demographical literature, but also because understanding the drivers involved 
offers a way to interpret the possible effects that being childless has on the life of 
individuals. All in all, studying childlessness is not limited to a mere academic 
exercise, but is embedded in practical issues that concern the future of populations 
and the wellbeing of individuals. In the face of the constraints associated with 
childlessness, analysing the consequences of lacking children is particularly 
relevant in view of the rising proportion of childless people in an ageing population. 
Chapter 5 offers a perspective on this, asking what consequences lifetime 
childlessness brings to individuals particularly with respect to their subjective 
wellbeing. I examine whether childless people suffer from worse wellbeing 
conditions than parents, focussing on social and emotional loneliness. Overall, I 
show that the presence of children matters for loneliness in mid and later life, as 
parents are overall less lonely than childless. However, the consequences of 
childlessness also depend on how people came to childlessness, and parents who 
lost contacts with their children are lonelier than parents who meet often their 
children. 
 
There are three lessons emerging from this dissertation.  
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The first is that the lack of children is related to a wide range of factors, and 
factors not just ideational or economic in nature. On the one hand, the second 
chapter highlights how part of the phenomenon of childlessness is related to 
individual values and social norms. It emerges how the development and realisation 
of an intention to remain childless are related, both among men and women, to 
having attitudes that are in contrast with parenthood and perceiving less social 
pressure to become parents from significant others. On the other hand, results from 
the third and fourth chapters highlight the critical role of structural opportunities 
and constraints. Institutional and normative arrangements set different constraints 
for childbearing across specific social categories. However, taken alone, the context 
provides little explanation, which adds evidence to the necessity of considering in 
combination the influence of cultural, economics and policy factors when analysing 
fertility-related behaviour.  
The second lesson is that the social determinants of childlessness have not 
changed much over recent decades. Chapter 3 shows how there is a general 
“persistence of persistent inequality” (Shavit, Yaish and Haim, 2007) of 
educational attainment in relation to childlessness. Namely, I show how there is a 
general persistent educational gap in relation to childlessness, which has not 
significantly reduced over time neither in relation to the spreading of post-
materialist values that are supposed to nurture individual self-realisation in societies 
nor in relation to policies aimed at reducing costs of motherhood over time. On the 
contrary, inequalities related to childlessness endure over time, as it emerges from 
the continuing educational gap in childlessness that is present over the past two 
decades across European countries.  
The third lesson is that there is still ample space to add nuance on issues related 
with childlessness. Building on evidence on the unequal distribution of 
childlessness across educational groups, one can speculate that there will be fewer 
children born from mothers with a high level of education, and more children born 
from mothers with a relatively lower educational attainment. As the human capital 
of mother is related to that of their children, which is further linked to children’s 
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socio-economic position in society, future research could shed light on whether the 
expansion of the childless population translates to increased socio-economic 
inequalities at the individual and the societal levels.  
Another example that emerges from previous analyses is that having a stable 
partnership is part of the decision-making process concerning being a parent rather 
than childless. However, it emerges that childlessness is related to, but different 
from singleness, being a decision that is also made within the couple. The scope of 
my study was limited to the analysis of individuals, but future research should also 
shed light on within couple dynamics. These dynamics should be studied not only 
to understand how much the absence of children is related to the lack of access to a 
(stable) relationship, but also to analyse the overall importance of having and the 
role that the fertility intentions of the partner play in the couple. The understanding 
of how partners reciprocally shape their preferences within the couple and how 
conflicting preferences concerning future fertility are coped with could highlight 
gender-related bargaining powers. Moreover, how partner shapes reciprocally their 
fertility itnentions and behavio in relation to life courses could illuminate about how 
costs for children are coped at the couple level. Also, how much the stability or 
instability of couples is affected by the absence of children represent ground for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER I. 
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING CHILDLESSNESS 
 
 
 
 
 
Brief summary 
Childlessness represents a challenging topic in the field of family sociology and 
socio-demography, which potentially can help to set out fundamental ideas about 
new family forms and new family households in Europe, as well as changed social 
meaning of parenthood. However, socio-demographic studies of fertility and family 
have largely focused on parents, whereas the childless have generally been 
overlooked. In this chapter I reconstructs the theoretical debate around 
childlessness, providing the basis to the whole thesis regarding the socio-economic 
drivers and consequences of a life without children. The main theoretical 
perspectives that can be applied to understanding the changed composition of the 
childless population are discussed, together with the possible new causes that might 
bring the youngest cohorts of women to opt for childlessness. Several definitions of 
childlessness are offered. On the one hand, they illustrate the difficulty of 
quantifying the phenomenon. On the other hand, they show how opting for one 
definition rather than another makes it possible to capture some information, but 
at the cost of losing other information. I describe the U-shaped trend of 
childlessness and introduce the basis of the research questions that drive this work, 
addressed at studying the changed causes that characterise the second peak in the 
childless levels and the consequences of not having children in an individual life. 
Overall, the chapter provides a tool for answering questions about childlessness 
raised throughout the thesis.  
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1. Defining and Measuring Childlessness 
 
 
The lack of fertility in demography and sociology has been studied as such 
since the early 1970s when fertility was already declining in the majority of Western 
European countries, and scholars were mainly interested in providing a definition 
and operativization of the phenomenon of childlessness.  
In historical demography, childlessness has often been inspected as sterility, 
which led childlessness to be frequently intended and discussed as a synonym of 
infertility. Nevertheless, even if childlessness appears to be readily observable as 
the general condition of the absence of children (Houseknecht, 1987), it is linked 
with several problems of data collection and definitions. Measuring childlessness 
is indeed difficult not only because data sources for accurately measuring it are 
relatively scarce, but also because the reasons behind childlessness are very 
complex, and the dichotomous discrimination between people with and without 
children ignores many ways of being childless (Sobotka, 2017).  
To the extent that the condition of childlessness is far from being homogeneous 
and that the motivations leading people not to have children are different and 
complex both at a theoretical and an operative level, an increasing effort has gone 
into the identification of different types of childlessness. Poston and Trent (1982), 
and Houseknecht (1987) were among the first to break down this non-
discriminatory classification by introducing the distinction between people who do 
not experience parenthood due to external constraints and people for whom the lack 
of a child is the result of an intentional and active choice, i.e. distinguishing between 
involuntary childlessness and voluntary childlessness. Since then, scholars have 
frequently used this typology, although distinguishing between someone who is 
infertile but would like to be a parent and someone who does not have children and 
does not want any constitutes a challenge. Voluntary childlessness is indeed 
difficult to measure because it is difficult to measure the concept of voluntariness: 
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people might rationalize the lack of children ex-post, thus declaring that the lack of 
children was a choice even though it was not so initially. Therefore, even in the 
presence of the best retrospective data to measure voluntariness, the bias due to ex-
post rationalization might lead to an underestimation of the condition of involuntary 
childlessness and to an over-estimation of voluntary childlessness. Furthermore, 
childlessness is complemented by other conditions that do not pertain solely to the 
concept of voluntary or involuntary childlessness.  
Theoretically, the way in which an involuntary condition of childlessness arises 
might include both natural sterility and social sterility, which designate either the 
lack of children due to the inability to conceive or to induce in conception (Martin, 
2015) or the lack of children due to living conditions that are incompatible with 
raising a child, e.g. the inability to sustain the cost of children (Baudin, De la Croix, 
and Gobbi, 2017). This last aspect enlightens how the distinction between social 
and natural sterility as sub-types of involuntary childlessness is inaccurate, since 
the boundaries between social sterility and voluntary childlessness are blurred: 
reasons behind social sterility, e.g. poor living conditions or inadequate housing for 
raising a child, might indeed be an expression of a temporary voluntary condition 
of childlessness. Research has shown how people change their mind easily, and 
how fertility desires and fertility intentions fluctuate very much over time (Ní 
Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan, 2003). Hence, 
someone who wants a child today might not want one in later life, and vice versa 
someone who does not want children today might desire children later in life. Still, 
someone who wants children might postpone the having a child until it is no longer 
possible and someone who cannot have children might adopt or make use of 
assisted reproduction technologies and have a child later in life. Some authors have, 
therefore, placed the emphasis on the timing of the decision toward childlessness 
and introduced the distinction between early articulators, who decide to be 
childless very early in life, and postponers, who remain childless after a series of 
childbearing delays (Callan, 1984; Houseknecht, 1979). Whatever definition is 
used, the distinction between types of childlessness is questionable and, without 
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drawing on theoretical assumptions, it is almost impossible to determine whether 
someone should be considered as childless by choice or childless by constraints. 
Nevertheless, although we do not know the real reasons, the various motivations 
for being childless belong to these two categories of involuntary and voluntary 
childlessness. 
Given these aspects, it is more reasonable to consider childlessness not as a 
status achieved once and for all, but as an intention and a condition that can change 
during the reproductive lives of individuals. In other words, it is most likely that the 
decision of being childless is not taken by complete and definite reasoning, but 
rather by accident or by circumstances, at least until it is still possible to conceive 
a child.  
Considering how difficult is to fully distinguish childless conditions, several 
authors have suggested the existence of a continuum of childlessness (Albertini and 
Kohli, 2017; Berrington, 2017; Letherby, 2002). At the one end of this continuum, 
there are those people who are naturally sterile, whereas on the other end are 
grouped those people who decide firmly not to have children (Houseknecht, 1987). 
In the middle of the two extremes positions that range from primary sterility to 
voluntary childlessness lie all the possibilities that might lead someone to be 
without children. In the strongest form of this argument, Albertini and Kohli (2017) 
sustain the childless status to be a continuum not only between involuntary and 
voluntary childlessness, but also between parenthood and voluntary childlessness, 
and conceptualise childlessness as the opposite endpoint to parenthood. 
The variety of childless conditions that lies in the middle is considerable and 
distinguishing one type of childlessness from another has become increasingly 
complex, also because motivations often overlap. Moreover, given the impossibility 
of identifying the real reasons for actual childlessness from childlessness in the 
data, the conceptual definition of childlessness often differs from the operational 
definitions that studies adopt when dealing with such a phenomenon. Given these 
limitations, one among the most common ways to overcome these obstacles has 
been to analyse the proportion of childless people at different period over their 
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lifecycle. In this regard, literature refers to Definitive childlessness when the status 
of childlessness is measured at the end of the reproductive period. Given the 
different biological limit between men and women, definitive childless is a 
measurement that is traditionally applied only for studying childlessness among 
women, by setting to 45-49 the age group to distinguish whether the condition of 
childlessness is transitory or permanent.  
 
 
2. The growth and rise of childlessness in Europe 
 
 
A very common assumption is that contemporary high childlessness rates 
constitute a novelty. To the contrary, the large number of childless women among 
cohorts born before the middle of the 20th century shows how the actual levels of 
childlessness are similar to the past ones. For instance, between the 1500s and 
1750s, in several villages in Britain, France and the Netherlands, more than one out 
of five women were without children at the end of their lives (Chrastil, 2017). 
Therefore, notwithstanding the recent surge, childlessness is not entirely 
unprecedented in Europe.  
However, at a time when childlessness has become increasingly common in 
Western European countries, the reasons why men and women are not having 
children might have become progressively heterogeneous and complex. Therefore, 
notwithstanding diffused childlessness is not entirely unprecedented in Europe, the 
determinants behind past and present childlessness are likely to be different. 
The childlessness trends remained at rather high and increasingly increasing 
levels among the cohorts of women born between the 1800s and 1900s, up to a peak 
among the cohorts of women born in the first decades of the twentieth century. The 
share of childless women at the beginning of the 20th century stood at around 20-
25% in several Western, and Nordic European countries. Southern contexts also 
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reported high levels, where before 1915 more than one over four women were 
childless in Spain and Portugal (Beaujouan et al., 2017; Sobotka, 2017).  
Before the end of the 1800s, marriage was anything but a universalistic model: 
people did not always get married, and those who did, tended to do so in old age, 
mainly due to economic constraints. Being childless was, therefore, a relatively 
widespread condition, mainly linked to the lack of access to marriage or precarious 
living conditions (Toulemon, 1966). What changes in the following years is not 
only the total of people without children, rather the characteristics of childlessness. 
Unlike what it had been up to that time, the peaks of childlessness that were 
registered among the cohorts born at the turn of the two centuries occurred above 
all among married couples, a rather uncommon occurrence before the end of the 
nineteenth century(Coontz, 2004). This result of a widespread condition of 
childlessness within marriage reflects both the effects of the Great Depression, on 
the one hand, and the effects of the First World War on the other. The great 
economic and financial crisis that shook the world economy in the late twenties had 
recessive effects not only on the economic side but also on the side of family 
formation, leading many couples to postpone the moment of birth of unwanted 
children. The Great Depression did not have a direct impact on childlessness 
(Morgan, 1991), but the cohort reproductive behaviours born in the early 1900s 
were also conditioned by the advent of the First World War, which had a combined 
effect to that of the Great Depression. Couples who had previously postponed the 
birth of their children found themselves unable to carry out their childbearing, so 
remaining childless (Borrie, 1944). 
In relation to the post-world war II baby boom in the years that followed, there 
was an overall decline in the rate of childlessness, and a low point was reached 
among the cohorts of women born around the first half of the 1940s (Toulemon, 
1996). Notwithstanding country specificities – e.g. Southern Europe and West 
Germany were lagging behind the events taking place (Gonzalez and Jurado-
Guerrero, 2007; Rowland, 2007) – this downtrend was diffused on a generalised 
basis. Still, the minimum levels of childlessness reached were very different: in the 
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Nordic Countries, the share of childless women ranged from 8% to 15%, while in 
Western Europe it was around 10-12%. The lowest-low point occurred in German-
speaking and Southern European countries, where the rate of childlessness reached 
10%.  
After this all-time low, childlessness started to rise again. The probability of 
being childless for cohorts of women born in the 1960s has been reported to be 
around 14.5% on average in Europe, and around 20% for women born in the 1970s 
(Sobotka, 2017). Still, this average point comes together with country specificities, 
as well as differentials across social groups, and childlessness in some regions 
seems to be levelling off to lower or higher level. For example, Germany, 
Switzerland and Italy are the countries with the highest scores of childless women, 
23.1%, 20.9% and 19.8% respectively, while the former socialist countries 
represent the context in which childlessness is much rarer (Chapter 2, but see also 
Beaujouan, Brzozowska, and Zeman 2016 for Switzerland; Kreyenfeld and 
Konietzka 2017 for Germany). Moreover, if in the majority of contexts, 
childlessness appears to be settled or increased, there are some countries in which 
childlessness has decreased, for example passing in Switzerland from 22% for the 
cohort of women born in the mid-1960s to 19% for the women born in the early 
1970s (Beaujouan et al., 2017; Sobotka, 2017).  
Overall, this pattern shows how the trend of childlessness has been following 
a u-shaped pattern: starting from high childless levels among the cohorts born in 
the early 20th century, a sharp decline followed across the cohorts born before the 
1950s and, after having reached this all-time low, the number of women without 
children began to increase again, with a steady increase in the most recent cohorts 
born after the Second World War (Miettinen et al., 2015; Rowland, 2007; Sobotka, 
2010).  
The considerable changes in European generational behaviour have been 
mentioned as reasons for this resurging increasing trend, in relation to a diminished 
nuptiality of younger adults, declining birth rates (Livi Bacci, 2015).  
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2.1. Characteristics of the second peak of childlessness 
 
The development of childlessness over a long period allows drawing some 
considerations. Notwithstanding parenthood is increasingly viewed in public 
discourse as a moral and social imperative, empirical research shows that not all 
people have children, neither they all had children in the past. On the contrary, the 
history of European populations shows how the proportion of people without 
children was also significant in the past. This further means that the decline of the 
importance of motherhood and fatherhood, which has been described as a recent 
phenomenon (Ariès, 1980), should be questioned. Third, although childless levels 
nowadays appear to be similar to the levels of childlessness in the past, the 
individual and social determinants of it were different.  
Therefore, although childlessness does not represent a new phenomenon per 
se, it has new characteristics compared to the past. The high rate of childlessness 
for women born at the turn of the 20th century was mainly connected with what 
have been defined as traditional causes such as exclusion from marriage and 
permanent sterility, and to a lesser extent entering marriage late in life (Mencarini 
and Tanturri, 2006). In pre-industrial western Europe, men and women could end 
their life without children for several reasons, most of which were related to 
involuntary circumstances. First of all, war and poverty not only introduced 
malnutrition and precarious living conditions, but also a gender imbalance due to 
higher mortality rates of males on the one side and a postponement mechanism on 
the other (Rowland, 2007). The chances of finding a stable partner decreased 
widespread during, married women remained more often widowed without the 
possibility to marrying again, and some couples postponed the birth of the child to 
better time until it was too late (Baudin, De La Croix and Gobbi, 2017). Moreover, 
a higher incidence of disease and pregnancy-related infection are also among the 
most common cause of infertility in developing countries (Kreyenfeld et al., 2010).  
New causes have since then been proposed in the literature to explaining rising 
childlessness, such as new systems of preferences, different attitudes to gender and 
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family, as well as social, economic, and cultural changes (Van De Kaa, 1987; 
Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015; Tanturri et al., 2015). 
On the one side, contemporary childlessness become less and less related to 
poverty and economic adversity. The diffusion of contraception and other effective 
methods of birth control in the 1960s gave women greater power and control over 
motherhood. With better education and improved career opportunities, women 
gained economic independence and delayed marriage and fertility (Becker, 1981b; 
Blossfeld and De Rose, 1992; Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991). On the basis of this 
evidence, contemporary childlessness has been regarded more as the result of new 
individual preferences alternative to motherhood and new structural conditions, and 
not only a matter of fate. 
On the other side, the timing of entry into marriage and into parenthood have 
also been affected by new sets of constraints. The increasing demands of education 
and new economic and career aspirations for both men and women are commonly 
linked to a delayed family formation. Those who intend to have a family now face 
different obstacles than in the past when deciding whether to have children, which 
do not always allow individual preferences toward fertility to be fully expressed. 
For example, in Southern European countries, family and work policies barely keep 
up with the new demands and changed values related to the family. Furthermore, 
research shows how the intended family size is still larger than the actual family 
size (Harknett and Hartnett, 2014).  
 
 
3. Theoretical perspectives: fertility and childlessness 
 
 
Few theories have been advanced to explain definitive childlessness and the 
research is largely dominated by empirical findings. Most of previous empirical 
studies have explored and examined the consequences of childlessness on the life 
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of individuals, whereas less attention has been paid to explain how and why 
childlessness – both voluntary and involuntary – occurs and what factors affect it. 
However, these results shed light on some mechanisms of why people are without 
children. 
In the work stream of determinants, research on childlessness mainly describes 
the individual reasons given by people who are childless, or shift the focus by 
collating the childless and parents. Among the first group, qualitative exploratory 
studies investigate the “vocabularies of motives” or “accounts” for the decision not 
to parent. Very often this research collects narratives of women who identify 
themselves as being voluntarily childless (Blackstone and Stewart, 2012; Tanturri 
and Mencarini, 2008). Gender differences in the motivations for voluntary 
childlessness have been also explored, including male perspectives in the analysis 
(see Houseknecht 1987; Park, 2005). Among the second group, factors associated 
with a more general childless status are explored, often contrasting childless people 
and parents with regard to several personal and psychological traits (e.g., Bloom 
and Pebley, 1982; Keizer, Dykstra, and Jansen, 2008; Koropeckyj-Cox, Romano, 
and Moras, 2007; Sobotka, 2010; Tanturri and Mencarini, 2008). The empirical 
research tended somehow to be part in the analysis of voluntary childlessness by 
means of qualitative studies on the one hand, and in involuntary or definitive 
childlessness by means of survey interviews on the other. In both the cases, 
speaking about mechanisms leading to zero parity is complex. In the first case, 
individual motivations might be representative of the real reasons for being 
childless, but the social construction of actions, as well as subsequent mechanisms 
of ex-post rationalisation in fertility-related behaviour (Westoff and Ryder, 1977), 
might suggest a misleading interpretation. In the light of research showing social 
sanctioning of people without children also in post-industrial economies (Dykstra 
and Hagestad, 2007), this reconstruction of a sanctionable action as a socially 
accepted narrative seems particularly relevant. This social sanctioning associated 
with childlessness, enlightens how there is a loss of the meaning of the real reasons 
for childlessness. In the second case, the problem lies in the fact that studies 
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observing how the individual characteristics associated with the propensity to be 
childless have changed over time are relatively rare and they often lack theoretical 
backing, thus leading to a blurred understanding of the different mechanisms that 
drive to zero or lower-order parity. For these reasons, the study of childlessness 
offers extensive room for theoretical investigations on how the complex 
phenomenon of childlessness can be explained. This section discusses some 
theories that might represent a background in this direction, and represents, 
therefore, a key for understanding the present study. The theories will be presented 
by grouping them into two macro perspectives, differentiating between theories that 
are framed in an economic or a cultural perspective. For each, the discussion will 
cover fundamental conception and their potential contribution to explaining 
definitive childlessness. Whenever possible, empirical studies that can be framed 
with those theories will be reviewed.  
Research on childbearing has been strongly influenced by two main theoretical 
frameworks: New Home Economics (NHE; Becker, 1981a, 1994), which takes a 
structuralist perspective, and the Second Demographic Transition concept (SDT; 
Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986; Van de Kaa, 1987), which represents a 
culturalist perspective. Around these perspectives, several alternative explanations 
have been suggested, representing in the majority of the cases a correction or an 
improvement of the statements and mechanisms described by the two. Although 
not explicitly referring to childlessness, the theories that will be discussed can serve 
as theoretical and modelling tool, useful for interpreting why younger cohorts of 
people remained without children. Besides these two theories, empirical research 
has been associating several factors with the propensity to be childless. One 
plausible explanation for increasing childlessness that such research suggests is that 
an increased number of people without children is only a side phenomenon, largely 
driven by the postponement and, eventually, the rejection of parenthood. Before 
examining the two aforementioned perspectives, the next section explicates this 
latter interpretative framework.  
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3.1. Childlessness as the result of postponement syndrome.  
 
Before discussing theories that could represent valuable tools for interpreting 
childlessness, it is worthwhile to question whether the increasing childlessness 
represents a phenomenon per se, or if it is trained by other social phenomena. An 
increase in the number of people without children might indeed be the result of two 
causes that have been taking place since the mid-1960s in Western European 
countries, namely low fertility on the one hand and late fertility on the other. 
After the post II World War baby boom, fertility dropped to very low levels in 
many western European countries, and by the late 1980s and early 1990s, women 
in countries such as Germany, Spain, and Italy started having fewer children and 
fertility rates dropped far below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman 
(Morgan and Taylor, 2006). Many authors have analysed the renewed drop in 
fertility and the long-term effects (e.g. Kohler et al., 2002; Morgan, 2003; Morgan 
and Taylor, 2006) and researchers increasingly started drawing attention not only 
on the quantum, but also on the tempo of fertility (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998). 
Women were limiting the number of children, but they were also postponing births 
to older ages: the increasing mean age at first delivery – or “postponement 
transition” as later labelled by Kohler and colleagues (2002) – became one of the 
most important features of the new fertility decline.  
The postponement transition not only had a direct effect on the first age at 
motherhood, but it had also wide negative implications on the dimensions of 
families (Billari and Kohler, 2004; Billari, Liefbroer, and Philipov, 2006; Sobotka, 
2004a). Indeed, the increased motherhood age reduced higher order births at the 
beginning, but it started very soon to be also related to a decline of lower parity 
(Sobotka, 2004b; 2004a). A relatively late transition towards motherhood together 
with an unchanged biological clock implies indeed fewer available years for 
conceiving, and rising childlessness might be eventually connected to this. A 
substantial contribution to period total fertility rates comes indeed from women 
over their thirties (Gustafsson, 2001), an age that represents the moment when 
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chances of conception start to decrease (ESHRE Capri Workshop Group, 2001; Te 
Velde and Pearson, 2002). Hence, the more people postpone, the lower the chances 
that their transition to parenthood will actually happen (Kneale and Joshi, 2008). 
For this reason, childlessness has also been considered a secondary outcome of low 
fertility and postponement of first childbirth, which often paves the road to sterility.  
Similarly, processes behind childlessness have long been perceived equivalent 
to those that lead women to have fewer children. This thought has been reinforced 
by empirical evidence of an initial inverse correlation between the trend of 
childlessness and the trend of total fertility rate. According to this view, therefore, 
childlessness has been understood as an endogenous component of the fertility fall 
(Kohler et al., 2002; Poston and Trent, 1982; Rowland, 2007). However, if we 
compare rates of childlessness with rates of total fertility over time (Figure 1.1) it 
is possible to appreciate a decreasing correlation between the two trends at the 
country level: not only similar fertility levels characterise countries with different 
proportions of women without children, but this association also varies in time1. As 
already pointed out by Mencarini and Tanturri (2008), such a declining correlation 
indicates that, even if childlessness has become an important component of the 
decline in fertility that has occurred in many European countries, it remains a 
phenomenon itself, to which little attention has been given. If the two phenomena 
diverge, the underlying explanations might be different, both at the individual- and 
at the country-level.  
This evidence partially challenges a strand of research according to which the 
rationale for remaining without children should lie within the same justifications 
that discourage women from having more children, as well as, within the same 
factors that lead to postponing parenthood.  
 
 
 
1 The correlation between Childlessness and Total Fertility Rates also decreases when looking 
at it from a cross-country comparison (see Table 2 in the Appendix of Chapter 1).  
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Figure 1. 1 – Trend in the cross-country correlation between Total Fertility Rate and 
Childlessness (1983-2010) 
 
Sources: EU-LFS, Eurostat, OECD, Human Fertility Database, author’s elaboration.  
Notes: Childlessness rates are computed as the proportion of women 35-39 living without children 
and by using the European Labour Force Survey. Total fertility rate proportions refer to Eurostat for 
all countries (http://goo.gl/j7gz5j), except for OECD data retrieved for France 1982-1997 
(https://data.oecd.org/chart/4Buv). For Croatia (1983-1996), Slovakia (1983-1999), Hungary (1993-
1999), Bulgaria (1983-2000), Germany (1983-1986, only East) and Lithuania (1995-2001) data refer 
to the Human Fertility Database (http://www.humanfertility.org). 1983-2010 includes data on 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Slovakia, United 
Kingdom. 1987-2010 adds data on Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 1996-2010 adds data 
on Austria and Lithuania. 2002-2010 adds Slovenia, Romania, Cyprus, Poland, Latvia, and 
Germany.  
 
 
3.2. Childlessness as a result of economic and institutional conditions 
 
Research on fertility has highlighted the importance of economic conditions 
for childbearing behaviour.  
The significance of economic influences on fertility has often been analysed 
both with regard to mechanisms operating through individual characteristics 
(Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Gustafsson, 2001, 2005; 
Happel, Hill, and Low, 1984; Impicciatore and Dalla Zuanna, 2017; Kneale and 
Joshi, 2008; Mencarini and Tanturri, 2006; Mills et al., 2008; Rondinelli, Aassve, 
and Billari, 2010), as well as with regards to the mechanisms operating through 
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economic and institutional arrangements (Billari and Kohler, 2004; Engelhardt, 
Kögel, and Prskawetz, 2004; Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Mills, Blossfeld, and Klijzing, 2005; Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari, 2009; 
Sobotka, 2010; Comolli, 2017; Comolli and Bernardi, 2015), which in both the 
cases have been said to influence individuals’ reproductive behaviour and, as a 
consequence, macro levels of fertility.  
The majority of the studies that have been looking at the economic effects on 
fertility rely on a neoclassical microeconomic perspective of the family, under the 
banner of New Home Economics (Becker, 1981a, 1994). According to this 
perspective, the decision to have a child has to be interpreted as a rational choice 
taken in a context of limited resources. This hypothesis is supported by a vast 
literature that shows how economic factors affects fertility in a balance between 
quality and quantity (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998). To the extent that childlessness 
can no longer be interpreted solely as the result of an involuntary outcome, the 
economic perspective offers a valuable theoretical framework for understanding the 
factors involved in the lack of parenthood. By taking a microeconomic approach to 
the family, and by considering children as durable consumer goods involving direct 
and indirect costs under the limited conditions of finance and time, it can be argued 
that the decision not to have children will hang in the balance between the level of 
utility and loss related to having a child. Being childless implies indeed the 
avoidance of a series of direct and indirect costs associated with childbearing and 
childrearing (i.e., monetary investment of production and rearing, time investment 
for house and care work, (Joshi, 1990)), which would normally be translated into a 
decline in career opportunities and earning capacity, especially for women who face 
higher opportunity-costs (Balbo, Billari, and Mills, 2013; Kravdal, 1992). 
However, costs are also related to being childless, for example, as a result of social 
penalties and stigma, as well as lack of care in old age. Hence, childlessness will be 
especially attractive among those women with high human capital (i.e. high-income 
and highly-educated women), which is when the direct, indirect and opportunity 
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costs associated with parenting are more unfavourable (Baudin, De La Croix and 
Gobbi, 2017). 
The economic approach has been adopted very effectively by a body of 
empirical research directed at examining the relationship between individual 
socioeconomic circumstances and fertility. Particularly, education, career and 
wealth have received considerable attention when related to childbearing, 
especially when looking at the timing of fertility. A few studies have also 
investigated the association with socio-economic circumstances and childlessness 
stressing the important role that they play (Tanturri et al., 2015). Notably, it has 
been shown how spending more time in education and having, consequently, better 
working positions and earnings, is often associated with a postponement of 
motherhood (Bavel, 2006; Begall and Mills, 2012; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; 
Gustafsson, 2001; Gustafsson and Kalwij, 2006; Happel, Hill and Low, 1984; 
Kneale and Joshi, 2008; Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012; Rondinelli, Aassve 
and Billari, 2010). A large body of literature confirms that this relation holds true 
also among childless women, whereas it does not hold among men (Barthold, 
Myrskylä, and Jones, 2012; Rotkirch and Miettinen, 2017; Tanturri et al., 2015). 
Specifically, education, career orientation, work and occupational status, and 
income have been reported to play an essential role in shaping childless patterns 
among women, with higher levels of human capital being positively related both to 
being childless overall, as well as to being voluntary childless. For example, highly 
educated women have been shown to be more likely to remain childless than the 
lower educated in the US (Houseknecht, 1987), in Norway (Kravdal and Rindfuss, 
2008), and in Sweden (Hoem, Neyer and Andersson, 2006). Besides, a strong 
positive educational gradient has been found to be related both to having stronger 
intentions to be childless (Miettinen et al., 2015), as well as to being voluntary 
childless (Berrington, 2017 for the UK; Abma and Martinex, 2006; Frejka, 2017 
for the US). Childlessness, in all these cases, is therefore interpreted as having 
economic origins, because women have increased “their investments in education 
and job careers. The higher the level of education of women and the better their job 
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perspectives, the more they will try to postpone or even to avoid marriage and 
motherhood” (Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991: 146). Nevertheless, recent research 
shows also evidence that contrasts this perspective. For example, the rise of 
childlessness has been reported to be scarcely related to female’s growing 
educational attainment (Beaujouan, Brzozowska, and Zeman, 2016) and levels of 
definitive childlessness have been found to be higher among the least educated 
women in Scandinavian countries (Jalovaara et al., 2018), which might suggests 
that preferences and constraints have changed over the last decades.   
The economic perspective and its subsequent developments also offer a useful 
source for explaining the rise of childlessness, by interpreting this increase in terms 
of changes in the population, and in terms of the economic situation. A vast 
literature has analysed the link between economic development and family-related 
behaviour. Notably, relating to fertility many authors have focused on the macro-
level correlation between economic cycles and family formations. The underlying 
mechanisms of the association between these two phenomena have often been 
interpreted in the area of economic and labour uncertainty (Easterlin, 1976; Mills, 
Blossfeld and Klijzing, 2005; Oppenheimer, 1988, 2003), and, for this reason, they 
can be considered to stem from the neoclassical perspective. Notably, empirical 
investigation has shown how economic development and fertility are pro-cyclically 
related (Ahn and Mira, 2002; Andersson, 2000; Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov, 
2011). Particularly, economic downturn or recessions have been found to defer the 
transition to the first child (Matysiak and Vignoli, 2013; Mills and Blossfeld, 2003), 
leading to a steady decline of both fertility rates overall, and to a downward decision 
toward childbearing both among very young women and women at older 
reproductive ages (Aarssen and Altman, 2006; Engelhardt, Kögel and Prskawetz, 
2004; Myrskylä, Kohler and Billari, 2009; Tragaki and Bagavos, 2019; Sobotka, 
Skirbekk and Philipov, 2011). Research also evidence that the link between 
economic shocks and childbearing behaviour also exists in the case of childlessness, 
to the extent that women who arrive childless near the end of their reproductive 
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period are found to being permanently affected by the economic crisis (Caltabiano, 
Castiglioni, and Rosina, 2009 for Italy; Comolli and Bernardi, 2015 for the US).  
However, the extent to which economic slowdowns affect childlessness and 
the mechanisms underlying it, are unclear. It has been argued that economic shocks 
bring a delay and an abandonment of parenthood (Livi Bacci, 2015), therefore 
raising the share of childlessness, but empirical results are mixed. Arguing in terms 
of uncertainty, Comolli and Bernardi (2015) studied the effect of the economic 
downturn on childlessness in the US and found that childlessness was overall 
increased during the crisis. On the contrary, by applying the same analytical 
strategy in the Italian context, Caltabiano, Comolli and Rosina (2017) show that the 
proportion of childless women during the crisis did not increase in excess of an 
existing long-term trend. Furthermore, countries with highest levels of 
childlessness have very different economic structures. For instance, Italy and 
Greece, which represent inefficient economies and labour markets, report high and 
increasing levels of childlessness. Germany, with one of the most robust European 
economies, is also one of the countries with the most significant share of childless 
people.  
The aforementioned divergent results in analysing childlessness between 
different European assets, envisages the institutional argument of the economic 
perspectives. The institutional perspective enlightens how the different institutional 
assets that differentiate welfare regime types, and labour market regulations in 
different countries, might contribute to explaining why transition toward 
childlessness is not uniform across countries.  
In the wake of Esping-Andersen’s work (1990), a more extensive explanation 
for childlessness involves institutional influences and the constellation of policies 
that regulate labour market conditions and family services (Adsera, 2004; Sobotka, 
2017). In the light of the evidence of a negative relation between childlessness and 
female labour market participation (Miettinen et al., 2015) together with a rise in 
the relative cost of childbearing among specific social groups, welfare state 
arrangements could make having children more or less attractive, or more or less 
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difficult. The welfare state approach toward fertility has been increasing over the 
years and the role of national configurations on fertility has been widely examined 
and discussed in the literature (Barbieri and Bozzon, 2016; Mills and Blossfeld, 
2001; Mills, Blossfeld, and Klijzing, 2005). 
Vast research shows how in liberal and socio-democratic regimes there have 
typically been high levels of fertility, whereas in central and southern Europe low 
fertility has lately been a more persistent pattern (Goldstein, Sobotka, and 
Jasilioniene, 2009). In the case of childlessness, the country variation seems, 
however, to be not entirely coherent with the classifications of Esping-Andersen 
and Ferrera. Notwithstanding the need to dig deeper into this relationship, the 
intensification of competition and deregulation in the labour market that 
accompanied an increase in precarious employment (Mills, Blossfeld and Klijzing, 
2005) might suggest a detrimental effect on the formation of new families, thus 
reinforcing childlessness. This is especially true among the younger cohorts, which 
more than others suffer from these recent developments (Mills and Blossfeld, 2001) 
and in those countries – like Italy – where the welfare regime is hardly generous 
toward families with children (Barbieri and Bozzon, 2016; Bozzon and Guetto, 
2012). The fear of failing to raise and to support children might, in this situation, 
become a sufficient reason not only to postpone having children, but also to not 
having any. Nevertheless, whereas the welfare state hypothesis has been 
empirically tested in the case of fertility differentials across different countries, it 
remains unclear how this should anticipate patterns of childlessness, since empirical 
research on this topic is still relatively scarce.  
In search of a possible solution for low fertility, generous family policies which 
enable the reconciliation of work and family, have been indicated as the way 
forward since the early 1980s (Bianchi, 2000; Björklund, 2006; Gauthier, 2007; 
Hoem, 1993; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund, 2013; Lewis, 2006). But the 
understanding of the impact of policies in influencing or in determining the 
decisions of women about fertility is limited, and few studies have specifically 
analysed this effect on childlessness.  
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Some researchers have documented a weak relationship between family 
policies and fertility (Castles, 2003; Neyer, 2003), whereas others have found an 
alleviating impact of the cost of children in money transfers, parental leave, care 
services and nursing, as well as in the labour market and fiscal manoeuvrings 
(Billingsley and Ferrarini, 2014; Chesnais, 1998; Gauthier, 2007). 
Concerning childlessness, the review of the literature shows only one research 
report on the link between childlessness and family policies, which states evidence 
of a sensitivity of childlessness to family-friendly arrangements and national family 
policies (Hakim, 2005). Therefore, if quantitative research provides some 
pronatalist evidence of family-related public policies, the question about what 
effects policy have on childlessness have not been satisfactorily answered and the 
mechanisms by which these effects would operate remain unclear and untested.  
To sum up, the review of the empirical research on childlessness seeks to 
position explanation for it into discourses in line with the economic arguments. 
However, counterintuitive empirical evidence also suggests that economic factors 
alone might not be sufficient in understanding mechanisms that work behind 
childlessness. In front of the empirical evidence about how socio-economic 
conditions are linked to a decrease of high-parity births, but not much to a decrease 
in low-parity births (Bulatao, Lee, Hollerbach, and Bongaarts, 1983), rational 
motivations might not be enough for explaining childlessness. Against this 
neoclassical perspective, the concept of the Second Demographic Transition and 
several other perspectives that focus more on a cultural shift toward postmodern 
attitudes and norms (Van de Kaa, 2001) have been proposed, and are discussed in 
the next section.  
 
3.3. Childlessness as a result of socio-cultural changes and new preferences 
and values 
 
Whether a person is childless or not also depends on the preferences and values 
they have with regard to childbearing. Hence, besides institutional and economic 
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factors, a further explanation for increasing childlessness comes from theories that 
emphasize a value component and that see in the changed European socio-cultural 
contexts the reasons for recent modifications in family formation (Bernhardt and 
Goldscheider, 2006; Billingsley, 2010; Lesthaeghe, 1983; Liefbroer, 2005). A 
leading hypothesis which has been widely adopted to explain changes in family 
formations as a result of cultural changes comes from the concept of the Second 
Demographic Transition (Billari et al., 2004; Lesthaeghe, 1995, 2014; Lesthaeghe 
and Van de Kaa, 1986; Van de Kaa, 1987, 2002; Zaidi and Morgan, 2017). 
In its original wording, the drop of fertility well below the replacement levels 
is what defines this second transition, which differs from the first transition in the 
factors driving to it (for a discussion see: Zaidi and Morgan 2017). To highlight the 
contrast between the first and the second demographic transition, Van de Kaa 
argues indeed that “the first transition to low fertility was dominated by concerns 
for family and offspring”, whereas “the second emphasises the rights and self-
fulfilment of individuals” (Van de Kaa, 1987, p. 5). Highlighting how the 
contraceptive revolution, the sexual revolution and the sex revolution accompanied 
the SDT, Lesthaeghe specifies how the argument behind the concept was rooted in 
new individual value orientations and ideologies, i.e. the rejection of institutional 
control, the accentuation of individual autonomy and of personal satisfaction and 
self-realization (Lesthaeghe, 2014; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004; Van de Kaa, 
2002). Increasing childlessness can also be the result of this profound socio-cultural 
change that originated from individual values and ideas about family. Particularly, 
the lack of children can be interpreted in the light of the general weakening of 
pronatalistic values and of new socialisation experiences that have been shaping the 
individual preferences for children and family, especially among women (Gillespie, 
2001). This deep cultural change that turned out in new attitudes and values among 
people, increasingly oriented towards greater individual freedom and self-
realisation, might explain why childlessness is now more appealing than in the past.  
Empirical evidence about how childlessness might be an issue of personal 
preference comes, primarily, from qualitative samples. By analysing motivations 
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for childlessness, these investigations show how the desire for independence and 
freedom often represents the basis of the choice to voluntarily remain without 
children for women (McAllister and Clarke, 1998; Tanturri and Mencarini, 2003; 
2008). Considering high education as an indicator of less traditional attitudes 
(Lesthaeghe, 1995; Van de Kaa, 1987), also quantitative analyses reporting highly 
educated women to be more frequent within the permanent childless group or to 
have more frequent intentions to be childless go along with this interpretation 
(Burkimsher and Zeman, 2017 for Austria and Switzerland; Köppen, Mazuy, and 
Toulemon, 2017 for France and UK; Rotkirch and Miettinen, 2017 for Finland). 
Besides, childless women are usually found to be less traditional and more 
secularised than mothers (Hakim, 2005; Tanturri and Mencarini, 2008). 
This evidence is not found among childless men, who are conversely described 
as being less educated (Jalovaara et al., 2018 for Nordic countries; Kreyenfeld and 
Konietzka, 2017 for Germany). This male-female polarisation serves as an 
introduction to one of the most significant criticisms made of the SDT, which also 
applies in explanation of childlessness. Some of the most negative remarks have 
claimed the SDT has considered changes in male and female preferences to lead to 
the same consequences, and therefore has overlooked the role of gender (Billari et 
al, 2004). Several scholars then translated these criticisms into alternative or 
integrative corrections that include the new role of women (see Zaidi and Morgan, 
2017 for a review). The need of a gender-based approach is all the greater if we 
consider that, notwithstanding there are far more men than women who end their 
life without children (Jalovaara et al., 2018), when it comes to voluntary 
childlessness, the female counterpart is more significant (Buhr and Huinink, 2017).   
On these bases, Hakim’s Preference Theory (Hakim, 2003, 2005) assigns a 
prominent role to women. According to her theory, the choices toward childbearing 
depend mostly on women's preferences, which after the contraceptive and sex 
revolutions became more heterogeneous within the population, due to a new 
structure of chances and risks. Such preferences, which are based on women's new 
values and not on structural characteristics, make it possible to describe women 
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according to their preferences allocated to the family rather than to work, and to 
distinguishing between a) adaptive, b) work-centred, and c) home-centred women. 
Childlessness, therefore, would be a frequent outcome especially among those 
women who prioritise work over family. Research on this is also limited, and, thus 
far, it has only been reported that family-oriented women represent the group which 
is more likely to have more children, whereas the inverse relations have so far not 
been investigated (Vitali et al., 2009). Furthermore, the theory does not explain 
what mechanisms underlie these preferences, and, moreover, assumes that women’s 
preferences do not change over time and in different contexts, which has never been 
verified.  
Perhaps one of the main contributions of theories that underlie the change in 
values and different cultural traits is to offer an evolutionary explanation 
(McDonald, 1999) for the fertility decline and increase childlessness.  
According to this perspective, the changed composition of the population due 
to the generalised shift towards values oriented to individualism and self-fulfilment, 
in contrast to traditional family values, would explain long-term developments, 
while structural explanations would only be able to explain short-period change 
(Sobotka, 2017). In this respect, therefore, the SDT makes a valuable contribution 
to the interpretation of the increased levels of childlessness. Especially Van de Kaa, 
at the dawn of the conceptualisation of the SDT, and Lesthaeghe later, described 
the increase in the levels of voluntary childlessness as one of the essential steps in 
the SDT sequences (Lesthaeghe, 2014; Van de Kaa, 1987). Several empirical 
analyses support this role in explaining the childless uptrend. For example, albeit 
not directly analysing determinants of childless diffusion, research shows that in 
those countries which experienced a shift in public acceptance of childlessness, also 
levels of childlessness are higher (Merz and Liefbroer, 2012; Noordhuizen, de 
Graaf, and Sieben, 2010). Moreover, the link between culture and childlessness is 
also highlighted by research showing a negative relationship between childlessness 
and traditional family role (Houseknecht, 1987; Hudde, 2018; Jacobson and 
Heaton, 1991; Kaufman, 2000).  
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3.4. An integrative approach with the concept of “institutionalized gender 
inequalities”  
 
As outlined before, the culturalist and structuralist explanations are 
corroborated by a series of indicators that empirical research finds to be associated 
with the absence of children. Nevertheless, also several criticisms have been made 
to both the approaches. Beyond the massive debate on the causal chain behind the 
mechanisms of the two perspectives (see Bystrov, 2014 for a summary), 
structuralist approaches have been exposed to extensive criticism due to their 
excessive emphasis on rational actions. On the other hand, culturalist perspectives, 
and especially the SDT, have drawn criticisms because failing to take into account 
the existence of inequalities and thus mistakenly assuming that all individuals have 
the power to exercise full and uniform personal freedom in terms of fertility 
choices, regardless of the social and economic context in which they shape their 
intentions and expectations related to fertility and family (Zaidi and Morgan, 2017).  
To overcome these limitations, explanations that social scientists have been 
offering to account for fertility levels in different contexts, have been increasingly 
considering the ongoing transformations of gender roles (Anderson and Kohler, 
2015a, 2015b; Arpino, Esping-Andersen, and Pessin, 2015; Bernhardt and 
Goldscheider, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 2009; Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015; 
Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård, 2015; McDonald, 2000a, 2000b; Mills, 
2010; Mills et al., 2008). Stemming from the pioneering works of Folbre (1983), 
and Oppenheimer (1982, 1988), the contribution of McDonald goes into this 
direction with the development of the theory of gender equity-gender equality 
(McDonald, 2000a, 2000b, 2013). Particularly, the theory incorporates ideas of the 
SDT and acknowledges, at the same time, the structure of actions framed by the 
economic perspective. Furthermore, in light of the changed role and changed 
preferences of women, the theory focuses more on the indirect and opportunity 
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costs that eventually occur through the loss of earnings of the mother, therefore 
giving a special emphasis to the new role of women in society.  
McDonald’s core argument is that women are subjected to face a “conflict or 
inconsistency” (McDonald, 2000b) between the cultural and institutional context in 
which they perform their decision toward fertility. This conflict, that originates 
from institutions that lag behind new cultural orientations, arises especially in high-
income countries and contribute to rise low fertility. Specifically, to the extent that 
every system is characterised by a substantial gender stratification and gender roles 
(Mason, 2001), McDonald’s theory predicts that gender equity can occur in two 
types of institutions: a) within institutions oriented to the individual (i.e. education 
and the labour market); b) within institutions oriented to the family (i.e. division of 
household and care tasks). Hence, when institutional gender equity and family 
gender equity are unevenly related – for example when the new opportunity form 
women in the labour market are not welcomed to the same extent in the household 
– they can lead to an incoherent perception of equality, and women can recognise 
the formation of their family to be in contrast with their individual and career 
aspirations. Under these mechanisms, they will be more likely to opt for 
childlessness rather than having children. The mechanism that according to the 
theory would explain the individual choice for childlessness is, therefore, that some 
groups of women in specific contexts perceive a strong work-family conflict, which 
largely depends not only on individual preferences but also on external dimensions. 
In so doing, the theory provides an innovative framework that integrates 
together multiple dimensions of analysis, to the extent that it recognises the 
influence of ideational factors, material factors and gender structure.  
Moreover, the theory and its further developments (Anderson and Kohler, 
2015a; Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015; McDonald, 2013), are also useful in 
understanding the divergences in the pace of childless rates across countries. The 
U-shaped relationship that McDonald posits between gender equity and fertility, 
meaning that at the beginning of the female role revolution there was a period of 
low fertility and high marital instability, which persisted until gender role became 
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more egalitarian (Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015), could be also applied to 
childlessness. This means that childlessness is likely to be more common where 
women’s roles have changed, but where institutions and families have not yet 
adapted.  
For example, Arpino and colleagues (2015), exploring how attitudes in support 
of men’s and women’s equal right to paid work are associated with fertility trends 
at the country level, show how a shift from a context dominated by traditional 
gender role attitudes to a context which is more gender-symmetrical, is positively 
related to an increase in fertility. Although they conducted their analysis at a macro 
level, this has also been proved to work at a micro-level, and greater differences in 
partners’ attitudes have been showed to be associated with lower chances of 
childbirth events also (Hudde, 2018).  
Evidence on childbearing behaviour and childlessness suggests that this 
perspective can also be useful to explain the increase of childless levels, by also 
shedding some lights about past and new characteristics of the phenomenon. The 
share of childlessness started to decline among the 1940s birth cohorts of women, 
who had on average their first child during the ‘60s. They represent indeed cohorts 
of women who were socialised to a traditional gender role model, but for whom the 
extent of family-work conflict was weak. A disconnection instead characterized the 
second part of the century with traditional family and gender roles. Yet, this 
generalised trend toward gender equity within individual-oriented social 
institutions happened with different speeds – as documented by the varying 
diffusion of dual-career households (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001; Hook, 2006) – 
and was unequally sustained by gender equity in family-oriented social institutions 
(McDonald, 2000a). The reiterated rise in childlessness occurred indeed at different 
stages of this transition: in Southern European countries, for instance, childlessness 
started to increase again among the cohort of women born in 1955, while in 
Northern European countries the increase happens before and seems not to have 
stabilised (Sobotka, 2017). 
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The key element of the theory is not so much the general level of gender 
equality achieved by society, as the presence of different degrees of equity within 
different institutions of the same society and the inconsistency of how each of these 
relates to women. By and large, the theory is useful in explaining childless trend 
and differentials, which, more than other approaches seems to able to relates 
childlessness with socio-economic developments and women’s changing role. 
Nevertheless, empirical investigations of these links are still rare and focus in the 
most of the cases on transitions toward second births (Oláh and Fratczak, 2003; 
Torr and Short, 2004).  
In light of the theories discussed above, to explain the increase in the lack of 
children, we must consider the influence of ideational factors as well as material 
condition, which are not independent of the normative and structural context in 
which people choose or not to remain childless. On this, empirical research left 
ample space for the understanding of these influences and integrating the theoretical 
debate (Bloom et al., 2010). 
 
 
4. Consequences of childlessness 
 
 
Consequences of childlessness represent probably one amongst the most 
growing part of research within the field of childlessness. For a long time, studies 
concentrating in analysing the effect that primary sterility has in the life of people 
dominated the academic research on childless consequence, mainly by looking at 
consequences regarding psychological distress due to the lack of experiencing 
something desired (Greil, 1997). Nevertheless, in the past years also studies about 
the consequences of voluntary childlessness or compete childlessness have risen, 
and have been focusing primarily on the effects that being childless could have on 
mental health in mid and elderly life, as well as on the social and support network 
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of elderly individuals (Albertini and Mencarini, 2014). Moreover, although 
analyses have been much more concentrating on the consequences for individuals, 
increasing attention of rising childlessness has also been paid on the possible 
implications for the society (Bloom and Plebley, 1982). 
 
4.1. Individual consequences of childlessness 
 
By looking at the individual consequences of lacking children, literature has 
long framed the studies of childlessness within the assumption of penalties for 
childless individuals in multiple domains of life. Particularly, vast research has been 
focussing on the psychological consequences of childlessness, interpreting children 
as a source of emotional and physical support. According to this view, childless 
people are expected to suffer from worse perceive health (see Dykstra and 
Hagestad, 2007). In line with this, there is research showing that having children 
reduces psychological distress (Lechner, Bolman, and Van Dalen, 2006; Wu and 
Hart, 2002) and protects people against mental disorder like depression (Buber and 
Engelhardt, 2008; Koropeckyj-Cox, 1998) or suicidability (Shani et al., 2016).  
To the extent that children have always been described as one amongst the 
primary sources of social integration (Brody, 1985; Shanas, 1971), the distress and 
worsening conditions concerning health because of childlessness have been 
generally interpreted in light of the lack of intergenerational relationship. 
Theoretical expectation predict higher disadvantages for childless people compared 
to parents, and especially for the childless elderly sub-group because of lacking the 
social support provided or activated by offspring (Allen and Wiles, 2013; Bachrach, 
1980; Gillespie, 2001; Keizer, Dykstra, and Poortman, 2010; Schröder-Butterfill 
and Marianti, 2006). Yet, empirical research does not seems to fully support this 
interpretation, and childless people have been described to not worst-off in late life 
than parents on every dimension (Albertini and Mencarini, 2014; Gibney et al., 
2015; Hank and Wagner, 2013; Koropeckyj-Cox, 1998; Zhang and Hayward, 
2001).  
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First of all, several are the studies showing how childless people are not more 
likely than parents to suffer from isolation, and how they are better off in many 
ways. To the contrary, childlessness might also bring several beneficial effects in 
the life of individuals, both in the case of a longer period of life experienced as 
childless, as well as when looking at childlessness consequences in elderly life. In 
the domain of psychological wellbeing, despite the strong positive value that is 
traditionally attached to children, empirical research has shown that raising children 
might be negatively associated with the health status of mothers (Beckman and 
Houser, 1982), since, being without children allows people to experience more 
freedom, less stress, fewer responsibilities and worries, as well as less financial 
constraints (Mirowsky and Ross, 2003). Positive effects of childlessness have also 
been found in terms of wages and living conditions (Budig and England, 2001). Not 
only childless people do not incur the direct costs of raising children, but they also 
avoid a series of indirect costs related with the accumulation of material resources, 
job stability, and status positioning. Compared to parents, childless couples have 
been found to have higher incomes and higher accumulation of wealth over the 
course of live (Plotnick 2009, for US).  
All in all, research has shown that the consequences of childlessness should be 
taken considered in relation to the context of others aspects of life, like age, gender 
and social life (Albertini and Kohli, 2009; Albertini and Mencarini, 2014; Chappell 
and Badger, 1989; Wenger and Burholt, 2001; Wenger, Scott, and Patterson, 2000 
for Wales). Higher vulnerability due to childlessness is generally anticipated among 
elderly compared to adult people (Mahne and Huxhold, 2014; Koropecky kox 
1988). However, childless people have also been found to activate several 
substitution mechanisms to cope with childlessness, throughout their entire life 
course (Schnettler and Wöhler, 2016). This could explain why some studies find 
childless elderly people to be equally integrated into the community as well as 
parents (Kohli and Albertini, 2009; Wenger, 2009). With regard to gender, studies 
about fertility and family transitions have largely focused on women. Literature has 
investigated more in detail the characteristics associated with childlessness among 
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women, whereas relatively little is the work done about the consequences in life of 
nulliparous men specifically. To the extent that parenthood has been described to 
be a more significant transition in the life of women than in the life of men (Keizer 
and Ivanova, 2017; Letherby, 2002; Veevers, 1980), the lack of children has been 
generally assumed to be more detrimental for a childless woman than for a childless 
man. However, recent studies documented the importance of including the male 
counterpart in the analyses, not least because consequences for them might be 
different that consequences for women (e.g., Eggebeen and Knoester 2001; Keizer 
et al., 2010; Keizer and Ivanova 2017; Koropeckyj-Cox, 1998). 
Furthermore, the impact of lacking children in an individual’s life is 
particularly conditioned by the partnership status. Notably, partnering effects are 
often described as more important than parental effects for the wellbeing of people, 
and especially among men (Dykstra and Wagner, 2007; Kendig et al., 2007; 
Wenger et al., 2007; Umberson et al., 2010, Keizer and Ivanova, 2017). Keizer and 
colleagues (2010), show that the transition to parenthood in the Netherlands has 
only a moderate impact on the well-being of individuals, whereas it is largely 
attributable to other modification in the life sphere, such as partner status or 
working conditions. More on this, Keizer and Ivanova (2017) illustrate that what 
matter most for protecting for physical and mental health for men is the relationship 
satisfaction rather than parenthood. All in all, research has shown how the direct 
consequences of childlessness are limited once other factors that might play a role 
in the well-being of elderly people are taken into consideration (Keizer, Dykstra 
and Poortman, 2010; Koropeckyi-Cox, 1998; Zhang and Hayward, 2001).  
If the worst-off consequences for childlessness are not present in elderly age, 
it might be that they take place when people are still in reproductive age. Literature 
has shown indeed how there exists a strong social stigma toward childless men and 
women, who adopt several coping strategies in order to deal with stigmatisation 
(Chancey and Dumais, 2009; Letherby, 2002; Mueller and Yoder, 1999; Veevers, 
1972; 1975; 1980). Such a phenomenon, which appears to be very much 
widespread, and with no signs of abating also in industrialised countries (Sobotka 
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and Testa, 2008), suggests, moreover, little value shift of the traditional way of 
doing family. Procreation within marriage, that traditionally has been perceived as 
the norm (Veevers, 1980), parenthood, that was seen as a central development stage 
toward adulthood (Gutmann, 1975), associated with sexual competence (Veevers, 
1972) and good health (Rainwater, 1965) mostly remains the normative behaviour. 
To the contrary, childlessness is perceived as a deviant behaviour, and childless 
people are typically perceived as less socially desirable, less mature, more 
materialistic and individualistic (Sobotka and Testa, 2008). This lack of social 
acceptance of individuals, and to a greater extent of couples, who do not have 
children underlines how, under the dominant pro-natalists cultural forces, childless 
people are considered less worthy than other couples, hampering the possible 
negative consequences childless people might be exposed to.  
Overall, it is not clear whether these effects are due to social effects (i.e., 
parenting has a positive effect on mental health or on socialization) or selection 
effects related to parenthood (i.e., people with better mental health and with better 
network abilities are more likely to be parents).  
 
4.2. Societal consequences of childlessness 
 
While the persistence of fertility below the replacement rate has long been 
taught as one of the primary concerns for many advanced countries, there are no 
recent studies that have explicitly examined potential economic and societal 
implication of the enlargement of the childlessness population. As a result, we know 
little on how changes in the composition of the population due to childlessness 
affected economy, social institutions and dependency ratios. 
Stemming from the work on low and lowest-low fertility it is common to 
believe that childlessness would have negative consequences on society, since it 
might tighten up the effects of below replacement. An increased proportion of 
people who are childless might indeed exacerbate the rapid and ongoing ageing of 
society, changing not only the structure of population but also the interdependencies 
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across age. An increased proportion of older adults means that more people need 
forms of long-term care. This, therefore, confronts the broader economy with 
several challenges concerning increased government expenditure for health care 
and pensions (Coale, 1986). In the debate on health policy, the ageing of the 
population has, furthermore, a knock-on effect on the level of inequalities. Notably, 
in the face of the tendency toward increasing health care privatisation (Albreht, 
2009) inequalities might grow and be related to childlessness, with parents and 
childless people having different access and quality to health services.  
As a result of population ageing, there will also be an increasing number of 
retired workers and of resources required to pay for their pensions. This increased 
demand, in turn, will require governments to face new challenges in terms of labour 
market equilibrium and dependency ratios (Bloom et al., 2010). 
However, in a moment in which Malthusian concerns about the consequences 
of an overpopulated planet are resurgent (e.g. Gee and Gutman, 2000), there is 
research emerging that shows that childlessness, and the related decline of the 
population, not always translates into serious economic challenges. A moderate 
population decline might favour the broader material standard of living (Lee and 
Mason, 2014). Also, the strong economic interdependencies across generations 
might lead to potential positive effects. Considering indeed how during childhood 
and adolescence consumption is higher than production, a diminished part of the 
young population might also bring to diminish public expenditure for welfare states 
and national governments.  
Nevertheless, a specific attention on the societal implication of childlessness is 
still lacking, and future research should address it by investigating the changes in 
the demographic structure of countries due to childlessness, to understand the extent 
to which policymakers and government will be called upon planning new services.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
Questions about childlessness that still want an answer are several, and 
research still needs to understand better which causes underlie the second pick of 
childlessness and that distinguish the rationale of being without children, from the 
rationale of having fewer children. The analyses I present in this book are widely 
driven by these aforementioned theoretical perspectives. Namely, the present work 
seeks to gain interpretation about the changing social factors related with 
childlessness at the individual level, leaving to future research the scope of 
analysing consequences at the societal level.  
In the following chapters I will focus on the new individual characteristics and 
societal constraints that are associated with being childless, by focussing on 
intentions to be childless and their realizations (Chapter 2), on the individual and 
contextual determinants of childlessness (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), and, finally, on 
possible implications that childlessness might entail in later life (Chapter 5).  
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CHAPTER II. 
 
I’VE CHANGED MY MIND. INTENTIONS TO BE CHILDLESS, 
THEIR STABILITY AND REALISATION IN THE SHORT-TERM2 
 
 
 
Brief summary 
Childlessness has been increasing over the last decades but literature on 
childlessness mostly focuses on the involuntary component of childlessness, 
overlooking the part of the population who voluntarily decide to not have children. 
This chapter focuses on this by shedding lights on the factors related to the 
development of intentions to be childless, as well as with the stability and 
realisation of childless intentions in the short-run. The theory of planned behaviour 
(TPB) is adopted for the understanding of the link between intentions and actual 
behaviour. Data from the Generation and Gender Survey are investigated through 
multinomial logistic regressions, which model the relation between individual 
socio-demographic characteristics and both the stability and realisation of the 
intentions to be childless in the short run. Although the majority of respondents had 
stable fertility intentions, a significant proportion of prospective parents and 
childless changed their mind within three years. We show that individual attitudes 
towards parenthood and perceived social pressure to become a parent are 
important correlates of the stability and realisation of childlessness intentions, 
whereas factors concerning financial, work and housing conditions play a marginal 
role in affecting their stability and realisation. Overall, the study highlights 
the importance of adopting a dynamic and long-term perspective when studying 
childbearing intentions and their realisation. 
 
 
2 A slightly different version of this chapter is currently under review at international peer-
reviewed journal European Societies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In recent decades decreasing fertility and increasing childlessness rates in 
European societies have stimulated conspicuous research on fertility and its 
determinants (for a review see Balbo, Billari, and Mills, 2013). However, while the 
factors affecting fertility intentions and their realisation have been extensively 
explored, also shedding light on that part of involuntary childlessness connected 
with the so-called “postponement syndrome” (Kneale and Joshi, 2008), the 
determinants of voluntary childlessness have received less attention, especially in 
regard to the formation of the intention to remain childless. A specific focus on 
zero-fertility intentions and determinants is warranted also because of the 
decreasing correlation between completed cohort fertility and the prevalence of 
childlessness (Tanturri et al., 2015). This paper analyses the main correlates of 
individuals’ intentions to remain childless, the factors that explain the stability of 
these intentions and their realisation in the short term.  
The trend in the childlessness rate among cohorts of women born in the 20th 
century is a U-shaped one.3 The proportion of women without children at the end 
of their reproductive life was substantial among the birth cohorts of the beginning 
of the 1900, reached its lowest point among women born between 1935 and 1945, 
to then increase significantly among the post-WWII birth cohorts, reaching levels 
as high as 25-30% in several European countries (OECD, 2015; Rowland, 2007; 
Sobotka, 2017; Tanturri et al., 2015). Even if in many countries the proportion of 
childless women among the 1970s birth cohorts is similar to that registered among 
those born at the beginning of the century, there are marked differences in the 
composition of non-parents in terms of both the motivations for and pathways to 
childlessness. In particular, it has been suggested that among the most recent 
 
3 However, to be noted is that recently, in some countries, there have been signs of a reversal 
of this trend: see for example the cases of Germany (Destatis, 2017), UK (Berrington, 2017), Sweden 
(Persson, 2010), and Denmark (Miettinen et al., 2015).  
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cohorts a pivotal role in explaining the increasing childlessness rate has been played 
by: (i) the growing number of women who are (involuntarily) childless due to the 
postponement of their reproductive decisions (Miettinen et al., 2015); and (ii) the 
increasing amount of women who are voluntarily childless, or child-free (Tanturri 
and Mencarini, 2008). It has been argued, in other words, that “modern” causes of 
infertility are emerging and substituting more traditional ones, such as celibacy and 
sterility (Baudin, De la Croix, and Gobbi, 2017; Kohli and Albertini, 2009; Tanturri 
et al., 2015).  
There are, of course, many and various reasons for the lack of a child, and 
recent research leaves open the question of whether the increase of recent decades 
in childlessness is mainly due to the intensification of involuntary childlessness by 
postponement or to voluntary childlessness (Tanturri and Mencarini, 2008; 
Nicoletti and Tanturri, 2008). The distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
childlessness is common in the literature and important for understanding emerging 
paths to childlessness, despite being to a large extent a theoretical distinction that 
may not fully reflect the complexity of the reasons for being without children and 
their variation along individuals’ life courses (Dykstra and Hagestad, 2007; 
Houseknecht, 1987; Tanturri et al., 2015). Previous studies suggest, indeed, that 
only a small minority of women envisage a life without children as their ideal 
fertility option, i.e. less than 2% on average across OECD countries, and about 4% 
in Austria and Germany, where the level is the highest (Hakim, 2003; OECD, 
2016).  
To date, research on the absence of children has mainly treated childlessness 
as a non-event while studying the timing and quantum of childbearing (Bongaarts 
and Feeney, 1998; 2000), focusing on the factors related to fertility postponement 
and implicitly assuming greater likelihood of pregnancy (and fertility) once all the 
obstacles have been removed. In most cases, therefore, the emphasis has been on 
the “involuntary” or “accidental” component of childlessness, seeing the lack of 
children as the failure to realise desired fertility levels, rather than as an active 
choice. This “selective inattention” (Veevers, 1973) has led to the neglect of the 
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active childless group, and to less attention being paid to childlessness as a 
voluntary process. Moreover, demographic and sociological studies of 
childlessness have been more concerned to analyse the socio-economic and health 
consequences of a life without children than to explore the factors engendering the 
intention of childlessness and its realisation (Albertini and Mencarini, 2012; Allen 
and Wiles, 2013; Buber and Engelhardt, 2008; Dykstra and Wagner, 2007; Gibney 
et al., 2015; Gillespie, 2001; Hansen, Slagsvold, and Moum, 2009; Keizer, Dykstra, 
and Poortman, 2010; Kendig et al., 2007; Reibling and Möhring, 2018). As a result, 
evidence on the factors associated with the intention not to become a parent is 
relatively scant.  
In this chapter we present an analysis of the factors associated with intentions 
to be childless, and the stability and realisation of these intentions in the short term. 
The focus is therefore on individuals’ negative fertility intentions and subsequent 
behaviour; the study contributes to shedding light on people who voluntarily live 
without children. Aside analysing these dynamics on the female population, men 
are also included in the analysis. Therefore, the study also contributes to knowledge 
on male childlessness, for which much less research is available than for women.  
In the next section we describe our theoretical approach to the study of the 
formation of intentions to remain childless. Section 3 sets out our research questions 
and hypotheses, and section 4 presents the data and analytical approach adopted. In 
the two following sections we report the results of the empirical analyses and, 
finally, discuss their relevance to research on fertility and childlessness.  
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
 
Numerous mechanisms may operate in the transformation of intentions into 
actual behaviour, and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (henceforth: TPB; Ajzen, 
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1985; 1991; Ajzen and Klobas, 2013) provides a useful theoretical framework in 
which to understand and define these mechanisms and their functioning. The TPB 
has been usually employed to study fertility intentions and their realisation (e.g., 
Dommermuth, Klobas and Lappegård, 2001; 2015; Mencarini, Vignoli, and 
Gottard, 2015; Régnier-Loilier, Vignoli and Dutreuilh, 2011), but we maintain that 
it can also be effectively applied to understanding childlessness intentions and their 
realisation.  
According to the TPB, intentions to attain a behavioural goal are driven by and 
can be predicted from individuals’ (i) attitudes toward the specific action; (ii) 
subjective norms associated with the behaviour; (iii) perceived behavioural control. 
In the context of fertility research, attitudes are associated with the consequences 
of having (or not) a child as perceived by the individual (behavioural beliefs). 
Subjective norms refer to perceived social desirability and social pressure 
(normative beliefs) in regard to having or not having a child among individuals or 
groups that are important for the individual. Finally, perceived behavioural control 
(self-efficacy) relates to both the perception about the presence of factors that might 
help or impede the realisation of individual fertility intentions, and the perceived 
power of these factors in affecting the behaviour. The TPB assumes that perceived 
control also reflects past experiences; it is also commonly assumed that perceptions 
of control are a good proxy for actual control, which is influenced by actual 
conditions (Ajzen, 2005; Bandura, 1977; Klobas and Ajzen, 2015).  
The TPB considers the effect of other factors that indirectly influence the 
formation of intentions; these factors include individual and social background 
characteristics. Figure 2.1 schematizes the TPB theoretical framework when 
applied to childlessness.  
The central assumption of the TPB is that intentions “capture the motivational 
factors that influence behaviour” (Ajzen, 1985: 181), because to engage in a 
specific behaviour people perform a rational or reasoned action based on intentions 
– which are shaped through a process of reasoning. Therefore, according to the 
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TPB, the intention to pursue a specific goal is a good predictor of that particular 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1985; 2005; Dommermuth, Klobas, and Lappegård, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 – Antecedents of the intentions to be childless based on the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour 
 
 
Source: Authors’ adaptation from Ajzen and Klobas (2013), Klobas and Ajzen (2015). 
 
 
The TPB has given rise to research on different types of behaviour. For 
instance, the TPB has been applied to the study of health-related behaviours 
(Norman, Conner and Bell, 1999), leisure choices (Ajzen and Driver, 1992), 
consumption behaviour (Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006) and – most relevant to the 
present study – fertility intentions (Ajzen and Klobas, 2013; Billari, Philipov and 
Testa, 2009; Dommermuth et al., 2011; 2015; Klobas and Ajzen, 2015; Mencarini 
et al., 2015; Testa and Bolano, 2018; Testa and Stephany, 2017; Trappe and Kuhnt, 
2016). Previous studies on fertility intentions and their relation with actual 
behaviour, however, have some limitations. First, relatively little attention has been 
paid to the stability of intentions over time and an individual’s life course. Most 
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studies have focused on the mechanisms driving the formation of childbearing 
intentions, whereas they have overlooked the factors related to the stability of those 
intentions and their realisation. Second, while previous studies have provided 
consistent evidence that a significant number of individuals do not realise their 
desired fertility (OECD, 2016; Toulemon and Testa, 2005), research analysing, at 
the micro level, the link between fertility intentions and behaviour yields mixed 
results. For instance, while Trappe and Kuhnt (2016) show that in Germany fertility 
intentions are a good predictor of childbearing, Berrington and Pattaro (2014) and 
Spéder and Kapitány (2015) suggest that there are substantive differences between 
individuals’ fertility intentions and their realisation, respectively in the UK and 
Hungary. Third, the majority of previous studies on fertility intentions and 
realisation have focused specifically on positive fertility intentions and their 
consequent realisation, and on the mismatch between ideal and actual fertility 
(Bernardi, Mynarska and Rossier, 2015; Bongaarts, 2001; Bühler, 2008; 
Dommermuth et al., 2015; Miller, 2011; Thomson, 1997). Differently, the study of 
the intention to remain childless and its realisation has not attracted scholars’ 
attention. As a result, the full variability of possible fertility outcomes, which 
include voluntary childlessness, does not appear to have been satisfactorily 
addressed and analysed.  
The analysis of childlessness intentions and their realisation can contribute to 
improving our understanding of the micro-level social mechanisms that drive 
reproductive and non-reproductive behaviour. In the following analyses we 
explicitly consider the voluntary component of the phenomenon of childlessness. 
In doing so, this work contributes both to the specific literature about voluntary 
childlessness, and to the broader research on the link between fertility intentions 
and behaviour. 
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3. Research questions and hypotheses 
 
 
The main aim of the study is to analyse the extent to which the intention not to 
have children in the near future – the reference period being the three years 
following the interview – is maintained and realised. The reduced length of the 
observational window clearly limits the generalizability of our findings, especially 
with respect to the individual’s life course. On the other hand, previous studies 
adopting the TPB approach have shown that intentions that are “in close temporal 
proximity to the prospective behaviour” are more likely to be better predictors of 
the related behaviour than intentions referred to an unspecified time in the future 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1973: 49; Billari et al., 2009; Philipov, 2009). Furthermore, 
by adopting a short-term perspective we are able to use a set of variables from the 
Generations and Gender Survey which ensure that our study complies with the 
“principle of compatibility”, a necessary condition in studies adopting the TPB 
framework (Ajzen and Klobas, 2013). Besides providing a description of the main 
factors associated with the intention to remain childless in the short term, the 
analyses focus (i) on the determinants of the stability, from one wave of the survey 
to the next, of the individual’s intention to remain childless, and (ii) on factors 
associated with the realisation, in the three years following the first interview, of 
the intention to remain childless. Following the TPB approach and in light of the 
findings from previous studies, we also develop a set of hypotheses to be tested in 
the analyses. 
Previous empirical studies have consistently shown that – despite the many 
changes registered in the second part of the 20th century in the area of family-
related values (Lesthaeghe, 1995; 2010; McLanahan, 2004; Van de Kaa, 2001) – 
parenthood is still considered a key step in the individual’s transition to adulthood 
and is often perceived as a social and moral imperative (Ashburn-Nardo, 2017; 
Duvall, 1962; Gutmann, 1975; Veevers, 1972). It is not surprising, therefore, that a 
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number of studies have documented that childless men and women are subject to a 
strong social stigma. Non-parents, whether by choice or by circumstances, are 
described and perceived less favourably than parents, with the strongest stigma 
being attached to the voluntary childless (Chancey and Dumais, 2009; Koropeckyj-
Cox, Romano and Moras, 2007; Letherby, 2002; Mueller and Yoder, 1999; Park, 
2002; Sobotka and Testa, 2008). As a consequence, expressing the intention to be 
childless is in contrast with the (still) dominant social and cultural values, and it can 
be seen as a non-normative preference. To the extent that people who do not 
conform to the prevalent norm are likely to be more convinced in pursuing their 
intentions and behaviour, we expect that childlessness intentions tend to be 
stronger, and consequently, more stable and more frequently realised, than the 
intention to become a parent (Hypothesis 1).  
Three further hypotheses are developed in close connection with the TPB 
approach (Figure 2.1). First, according to the TPB if someone holds strong attitudes 
towards a specific behaviour, their intentions regarding that behaviour are more 
stable across time and, in addition, there is a higher probability that these intentions 
will be realised. Therefore, in the case of childlessness, we should expect that 
people with stronger attitudes against children and parenthood are more likely to 
maintain their preference and realise it (Hypothesis 2).  
Second, following the TPB, normative beliefs constitute a key factor affecting 
individual’s intentions, their stability and realisation. In line with this prediction, a 
number of empirical studies have documented that individuals tend to conform to 
social expectations about childbearing in order to receive the approval of, and avoid 
conflict with, their significant others, pointing to the crucial role of social 
interactions in affecting reproductive behaviour (Bernardi and Klärner, 2014; 
Billari et al., 2009; Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins, 2001). Normative pressure 
affects both the tempo and quantum of fertility (Balbo and Mills, 2011; Lois and 
Becker, 2014). Accordingly, we expect perceived social pressure and social 
desirability to exert an effect on childlessness intentions, their stability and 
realisation. We hypothesise that the perception of a stronger normative pressure to 
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have children will reinforce the intention to become a parent, while reducing the 
likelihood of maintaining the intention to be childless and realising it (Hypothesis 
3).  
Third, according to the TPB, individual’s beliefs about the 
circumstances/conditions “necessary” to have a child – in particular those regarding 
the individual’s socio-economic situation – may hamper or facilitate the transition 
to parenthood. Extant studies provide empirical support for this expectation: the 
lack of a stable partnership (e.g., Gonzalez and Jurado-Guerrero, 2006; Rutigliano 
and Esping-Andersen, 2018 for Norway and Spain.), suitable housing (e.g., Kulu 
and Vikat, 2007 for Finland; Vignoli, Drefahl and De Santis 2012 for Italy), 
financial and job stability (Barbieri et al., 2015 for Southern Europe; Berninger, 
Weiß and Wagner, 2011 for West Germany; Testa and Basten, 2014 for European 
Countries) have frequently been found to be important constraints on the decision 
whether to have a child. In accordance with both these findings and the TPB, we 
hypothesis that perceived socio-economic condition influences stability and 
reliability of intentions toward childlessness as well. Specifically, we expect that 
higher sensitivity of transition to parenthood to people’s socio-economic condition 
is related to having less favourable intentions to having a child in the short run, and 
to maintain and realise these intentions (Hypothesis 4). 
Besides perceived control, and behavioural and normative beliefs, a number of 
background factors are expected to affect the probability of developing the intention 
to remain childless, maintaining and realising this preference, as also evidenced by 
studies on the determinants of childlessness (Hoem, Neyer, and Andersson, 2006; 
Tanturri and Mencarini, 2008; Tocchioni, 2018). In particular, since the absence of 
children has been found to be associated with a lack of intensive personal care in 
later life (Albertini and Kohli, 2017), we expect that the decision to remain childless 
will be more stable and more often realised among those individuals who have more 
resources available to cope with the care needs related to old age, in particular we 
expect a positive correlation between the stability and realisation of childlessness 
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intentions and (i) having a partner, (ii) being employed and (iii) highly educated 
(and thus being more likely to enjoy a better economic situation) (Hypothesis 5). 
 
 
4. Data and measures 
 
 
4.1. Data  
 
The data used for the empirical analyses were taken from the first and second 
wave of the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS).4 The GGS is a longitudinal 
dataset specifically designed to study family dynamics; it provides high quality and 
comparable data on respondents who were aged 18-79 at the first wave. The panel 
data are collected with an interval of three years between the first and the second 
wave.5 The GGS is a valuable source for analysing the formation and stability of 
individual’s intentions in regard to childlessness, since it makes it possible to link 
subsequent behaviour with a previously stated intention. Moreover, the 
questionnaire includes an extensive set of variables concerning factors related to 
the TPB. The TPB was adopted as the theoretical framework for developing the 
core questionnaire, indeed (Vikat et al., 2007).  
At the time of the analyses, longitudinal information about childbearing 
intention and realisation was available for nine countries, namely: Austria, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania and Russia 
(Table 2.1).6 The sample utilized in the analyses comprised first wave-respondents 
who were childless at the time of the interview, excluding also individuals who 
 
4 Access to the GGS data is available at the following link: https://www.ggp-i.org 
5 In Italy the time between waves is four years. However, the period refers to 
November/December in 2003 and February in 2007, thus making minimal differences compared to 
the other countries. The sample interviewed in the second wave consisted entirely of respondents 
who had participated in the first wave, but did not include all the respondents of the first Wave. 
Between the two waves, indeed, there was a 43% dropout rate. 
6 Hungary was excluded from the analysis because of concerns about the identification of cases 
between the two waves.  
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were expecting a child and those who were sexually inactive or beyond 
reproductive age and people enrolled in education and training (i.e. men older and 
women older than 45 years). Individuals not participating in the second wave of the 
survey were also excluded from the analyses, since we could not observe these 
people’s fertility intentions and behaviour three years after the first interview. 
Moreover, we did not include in the analysis subjects lacking information on socio-
demographic characteristics, as well as those with more than one item related to the 
TPB missing. The final sample consisted of 2198 men and 1782 women aged 20-
45. 
 
 
Table 2. 1 – Years of data collection for each country in the GGS. 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 
Austria 2008/09 2012/13 
Bulgaria 2004 2007 
Czech Republic 2005 2008 
France 2005 2008 
Georgia 2006 2009 
Germany 2005 2008/09 
Italy 2003 2007 
Lithuania 2006 2009 
Russia 2004 2007 
 
 
4.2. Sample selection and variables 
 
In line with our hypotheses, the empirical analyses focused on two dependent 
variables: the first dependent variable captured the stability of intentions toward 
childlessness and matched the intention to be childless expressed during the first 
wave with the intention to be childless three years later. Respondents were asked 
about their intention to have a child in the next three years.7 The same question was 
 
7 Possible answers were “definitely yes”, “probably yes”, “probably not”, and “definitely not”. 
The responses “definitely yes” and “probably yes” were grouped to indicate intentions towards 
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asked in the second wave, and this made it possible to identify the stability of the 
intention within a short time.8 There were three possible outcomes in the stability 
of intentions (Table 2.2): 
i. Prospective parents: individuals who maintained the intention to be a 
parent in both waves; 
ii. Wavers: individuals who changed their intention between the two waves. 
This group includes both those who moved from intended parents to 
intended childless; as well as from intended childless to intended parents9; 
iii. Prospective childless: individuals who maintain a stable intention toward 
childlessness. 
 
 
Table 2. 2 – Stability of intentions toward childlessness in the short-term.  
Stability of intentions    Wave II: Do you intend to have a child in the next three years? 
   YES NO 
Wave I: Do you intend to have a child in 
the next three years? 
YES Prospective Parents 
(71%) 
Wavers 
(28%) 
NO Wavers 
43% 
Prospective Childless 
(57%) 
 
 
The second dependent variable had a similar structure and was a measure of 
the coherence between the expressed intention to be childless and subsequent 
 
parenthood, whereas responses “definitely not” and “probably not” were considered as expressing 
intentions to be childless. 
8 The GGS also collects information about long-term fertility intentions, and asks respondents 
the following question “Supposing you do not have a/another child during the next three years, do 
you intend to have any (more) children at all?” with the same possible responses available for the 
short-term question. As already pointed out, the decision to examine only short-term planned 
intentions stems from the fact that intentions that are “in close temporal proximity to the prospective 
behaviour” are more likely to be better predictors of the related behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein 1973: 
49, Billari et al. 2009, Philipov 2009) and because this enabled us to use the same time window 
when assessing both the stability of fertility intentions and their realisation.  
9 Due to the small sample size, we considered jointly groups who showed inconsistency in their 
intentions across waves (or in the intention-realisation process), whether they moved from 
prospective parenthood to childlessness or vice versa. 
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behaviour. By matching intention with outcome three years later, we distinguished 
among (Table 2.3):  
i. Voluntary parents: individuals who intended to be parents and had a child; 
ii. Inconsistent: individuals whose behaviour was inconsistent with their 
declared intention; 
iii. Voluntary childless: individuals who intended to be childless and were 
childless.  
 
 
Table 2. 3 – Realisation of intentions toward childlessness in the short-term 
Coherence of realisations   Wave II: Respondent is childless 
   NO YES 
Wave I: Do you intend to have a child in 
 the next three years? 
YES Voluntary Parents 
(27%) 
Inconsistent 
(73%) 
NO Inconsistent 
(8%) 
Voluntary Childless 
(92%) 
 
 
Questions on the factors related to the TPB constituted our main independent 
variables. In particular, three separate sets of questions gathered information about 
beliefs and attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control toward 
childlessness (Table 2.4). To maximise the number of observations, in the case of 
one missing-item within a specific set of variables, we replaced the absent 
information with the average value of the remaining non-missing questions within 
the same set. Principal component analysis was applied to extract the factors 
connected with the TPB; each measurement was rescaled from 0 to 5 so as to have 
a unitary variance among all the factors and to ease comparison and interpretability. 
Each factor was measured as follows. 
To gauge attitudes toward childbearing, we relied on questions investigating 
the individual’s expected consequences of having a child across eleven items. 
Respondents were requested to express the extent to which they thought a child 
would have better or worse consequences on their life, by using a five-point scale 
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where five represented the worst. Following Billari et al. (2009) and Dommermuth 
et al. (2011), we retained the division between positive and negative attitudes, and 
distinguished between attitudes related to the costs and attitudes regarding the 
benefits of childbearing. Seven items were included in the analysis 10 ; viz. 
respondent’s opinions on the fact that having a child would have negative effects 
on “the possibility to do what you want”, “employment opportunities”, and 
“financial situation”, were utilized to construct an index of negative attitudes 
toward childbearing (henceforth: Negative Attitudes). Similarly, we created an 
indicator of positive attitudes toward childbearing on the basis of the respondent’s 
answers to statements about childbearing consequences on “what people around 
you think of you”, “the joy and satisfaction in life”, “the closeness with partner”, 
and “the closeness with parents”.  
To measure subjective norms toward childlessness we examined the strength 
of perceived social pressure to have a child. Respondents were asked about the 
extent to which they agreed with the statement that their parents and friends thought 
that they should have a child in the next three years, with 1 representing the 
strongest agreement and 5 the lowest. We reversed the scores to obtain an index 
that provided a weighted measure of perceived social pressure toward parenthood, 
with higher scores corresponding to the stronger social pressure to become parents.  
The measurement of the perceived behavioural control was limited to the 
perceived importance of control factors, since respondents’ beliefs about being in 
control of that factor were imperfectly measured in the GGS (for a discussion see: 
Ajzen 2013: 216). This means that the PBC can only be assessed by means of 
questions investigating individuals’ perceptions of factors that they think will 
influence their decision, but without considering the extent to which they think they 
will be able to overcome difficulties related to such factors..
 
10  Items related to the effects of childbearing on sexual life, on partner’s employment 
opportunities, on the care and security that respondents expected during old age, and on certainty in 
life were also present in the questionnaire, but were excluded from the analyses since they were not 
asked in all the countries considered.  
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Table 2. 4 – Factor loadings of factors related with the TPB 
 
Factor A: 
Negative Attitudes 
(related to cost) 
Factor B: 
Positive Attitudes 
(related to 
benefits) 
Factor C: 
Norms 
Factor D:   
PBC Uniqueness 
If you were to have a child during the next three years, would it be much better (1) or much worse (5) in terms of: 
a. the possibility to do what you want 0.7703    0.3246 
b. your employment opportunities 0.7974    0.3387 
c. your financial situation 0.7867    0.3360 
If you were to have a child during the next three years, would it be much worse (1) or much better (5) 
d. what people around you think of you  0.6912   0.4516 
e. the joy and satisfaction you get from life  0.7181   0.3722 
f. the closeness between you and your partner  0.8107   0.3169 
g. closeness between you and your parents  0.7196   0.4671 
To what extent do you agree with these statements: Strongly disagree (1) strongly agree (5) 
h. most of your friends think that you should have a/another child.  0.9270  0.1064 
i. your parents think that you should have a/another child   0.9231  0.1105 
The decision on whether to have a child during the next three years depends on: (1) not at all (4) a great deal 
j. your financial situation    0.8368 0.2919 
k. your work    0.8291 0.3027 
l. your housing conditions    0.7984 0.3538 
m. your partner’s/spouse’s work     0.6625 0.5422 
n. availability of childcare    0.6622 0.5326 
Cronbach’s α 0.75 0.76 0.88 0.83  
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Note: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax Rotation, Loadings <0.03 not showed. 
 
 
 
  
 
69
In detail, GGS questions investigate whether and to what extent the decision to 
have or not to have a child depends on the following factors: “financial situation”, 
“work”, “housing conditions”, “partner’s work”, and “childcare availability”. For 
each item, responses ranged from 1 (not at all) to 4 (a great deal). 
Information on gender, age, socio-economic status, job stability and 
partnership history of respondents were included as background characteristics. 
Age was categorised into 5-year groups. Education was measured as the highest 
level of educational attainment in terms of the International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED), and we distinguished among respondents with low (ISCED 
0-2), intermediate (ISCED 3-4), or a high level of education (ISCED 5-6). 
Furthermore, we differentiated between homeowners and non-homeowners, people 
in employment and people who had a stable partner.  
Employment situation discriminates between the group of those who are 
unemployed in both the waves or move from employment to unemployment and 
vice versa (unstable or unemployed), and those who maintain an employment 
situation in both the waves (stable employed). Partnership history is also included 
in the analysis. Therefore, we distinguished between the group of those who have 
the same partner between the two waves (stable partnership), those who start a new 
relationship (new partnership), those who end their relationship and are still single 
after three years (ended partnership), and those who in both waves are without 
partners (never partnered). 
 
4.3. Analytic strategy 
 
The empirical analyses were organized into three steps. The first step 
considered the main correlates of the intention to remain childless reported by the 
respondents during the first wave of the survey. In the second step we focused on 
the stability and reliability of such intentions. To address this issue, we observed 
whether and how the intention to be childless changed between the first and the 
second wave (Table 2.2) and evaluated the extent to which the intention to be 
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childless measured in the first wave related to the fertility outcome measured in the 
second wave (Table 2.3). Finally, in the third step we applied the TPB framework 
to examine factors associated with the stability and instability of both intentions and 
realisations, and considered which factors facilitated or interfered with the 
accomplishment of the intentions. 
Multinomial logistic regression models were estimated separately for men and 
women because of different mechanisms being likely to affect childbearing 
behaviour between men and women. Although the majority of studies on 
childlessness have been carried out on women only, the few analyses that have 
taken men into account show the existence of a gendered pattern in the effects of 
socio-demographic characteristics on childlessness (Jalovaara and Fasang 2017, 
Keizer, Dykstra, and Jansen, 2008, Tocchioni, 2018).  
Models were fitted on the pooled sample of countries of the GGS, by 
controlling for the absence of significant differences between the nine countries 
considered with country dummies. Checks are provided in the dedicated section 
“sensitive analyses”. The final sample includes 2198 men and 1782 women (Table 
2.5). 
In what follows, the results from multinomial regressions are expressed as 
changes in the conditional probability of maintaining and realising both intentions 
toward parenthood and toward childlessness and presented by comparing factors 
affecting the stability of intentions with factors affecting the realisation of these 
intentions in the short run. We comment on the effects of the factors of the TPB 
first (Figure 2.3), and the effects of socio-demographic characteristics second 
(Figure 2.4). It is thus possible to avoid the partial redundancy that would have 
emerged by describing each table separately.  
Complete models are available in the appendix of Chapter 2 (Table 2.7 and 
Table 2.8). 
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Table 2. 5 – Description of the sample in the GGS.  
    Childless at Wave1 
Voluntary 
Parents Inconsistent 
Voluntary 
Childless 
   Observations 3980 520 1594 1866 
  Male 2198 283 890 1025 
  Female 1782 237 704 841 
Male   Mean age 28 33 32.2 31.6 
  % Primary education 18.1 11 10.5 9.1 
  % Secondary education 37.7 58.7 60.3 72.6 
  % Tertiary education 44.3 30.4 29.2 18.3 
  % with a stable employment 85 76.3 76.5 78.4 
  % with a partner 45 71.7 40.1 25.3 
  Mean negative attitudes 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.1 
  Mean Positive Attitude 3 3.1 3.1 2.9 
  Mean Subjective Norms 2.6 3.1 2.9 2.1 
  Mean Perceived control 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.3 
Female   Mean age 28 32.6 32.7 29.7 
  % Primary education 6.1 8 5 6.5 
  % Secondary education 57.1 54.9 51.6 62.4 
  % Tertiary education 36.8 37.1 43.5 31 
  % with a stable employment 85 81.9 83.7 87 
  % with a partner 47.3 80.6 45.7 39.1 
 Mean negative attitudes 3.2 3 3.1 3.4 
 Mean Positive Attitude 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.8 
 Mean Subjective Norms 2.7 3.3 3 2.2 
  Mean Perceived control 2,04 3 2 2.2 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Developing intentions toward childlessness 
 
We first look at factors associated with reporting the intention to be childless 
in the first wave of the GGS (Table 2.6). The characteristics associated with the 
intention of not having children are similar for men and women: age, level of 
education and partnership status play a significant role, whereas employment status 
does not show a strong association with the outcome.  
In particular, for both men and women, there is a U-shaped relationship 
between age and the likelihood to remain childless in the short term. Both men and 
women in young adulthood (20-24) are more likely than older people to express 
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intentions toward childlessness. Consequently, as we move toward older ages, the 
probability of observing negative intentions toward parenthood decreases until it 
starts to grow again over 35 for both men and women.  
 
 
Table 2. 6 – Factors associated with the intention to be childless. Logistic Regression 
(Average Marginal Effects – Wave I)  
                      Men Women 
  AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. 
Age (ref. 20-24)     
 25-29                     -0.14***       0.02         -0.13***       0.03    
 30-34                     -0.19***       0.03         -0.10***       0.03    
 35-39                     -0.15***       0.03         -0.02          0.04    
 40-45                     -0.07*         0.04          0.18***       0.03    
Level of education (ref. Intermediate) 
 Low Educated              -0.04          0.03          0.08*         0.04    
 High Educated             -0.05***       0.02         -0.03          0.02    
Partnered (ref. Not partnered)     
 Partnered      -0.15***       0.02         -0.15***       0.02    
Employment status (ref. Not employed)    
 Employed      -0.02          0.03          0.04          0.03    
Factors of the TPB     
 Negative Attitude          0.21***       0.02          0.17***       0.01    
 Positive Attitude         -0.18***       0.01         -0.18***       0.02    
 Subjective Norms          -0.16***       0.01         -0.16***       0.01    
 Perceived Control          0.03***       0.01          0.03***       0.01    
  N. of cases          2,198 1,782 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
Note: Country fixed effects not significant (Complete outcome available in the Appendix of 
Chapter 2, Table 2.6) 
 
 
Interestingly, gender differences are found in the relation between individual’s 
educational level and the intention to remain childless. Among men without 
children those with an intermediate educational level are significantly more likely 
than the highly educated to express a preference for childlessness. Among women 
who are childless, the low educated are more likely to report the desire not to 
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become a mother in the following three years than the middle educated, whereas no 
differences are found between women with a middle and a high level of education.  
There are no gender differences instead concerning the effects of the TPB 
factors. People with negative attitudes toward children are more likely to not 
express parenting intentions. This is mirrored on people who have positive attitudes 
toward children, who are instead less likely to express intentions toward 
childlessness. Finally, stronger subjective norms related to parenthood are 
negatively related with intentions toward childlessness, and people with higher 
scores on the behavioural control index are more likely than people with lower 
scores to intend to be childless. 
 
5.2. Maintaining and realising intentions toward childlessness 
 
Our main interest is in analysing which factors influence the stability and 
realisation of childlessness intentions. To examine descriptively how intentions of 
childlessness change in the short term, we looked at how previously stated 
intentions change after a period of three years among different age groups (Figure 
2.2).  
Contrary to what was suggested by our first hypothesis, on average intentions 
to be childless are less often maintained in the short-run than the intentions to 
become a parent: among those who said they did not want to have children in the 
next three years, 63% reported the same preference three years later, whereas 
among the prospective parents 69% maintained their intention at the second 
interview. Also, the likelihood of maintaining a preference for not having a child 
varies considerably among the different age groups; the prevalence of prospective 
parents, instead, seems to be less age-dependent. If on the one hand the intentions 
to be childless are less stable, on the other hand they are more often realised than 
the intentions to become a parent. Also, the realisation of parenthood plans 
decreases considerably among those who are 40 years old or older, whereas the 
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likelihood of realising childless plans seems to be less correlated with the 
respondent’s age. 
 
 
Figure 2. 2 – Share of people who maintain and realise their intentions to be a parent or to 
be childless, by age and sex. 
 
Source: GGS Wave1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. 
 
 
All things considered, the descriptive evidence provides partial support to our 
first hypothesis and suggests that fertility intentions change over individuals’ life 
courses and particularly unstable in young adulthood. Not only do people often give 
up on the desire to become a mother or a father, but they also change their mind 
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with regard to intended childlessness. Overlooking the dynamic aspect of fertility 
intentions, therefore, may undermine our understanding of the micro-level social 
mechanisms driving fertility choices and behaviour.  
Individuals’ characteristics, current situation and expectations influence the 
stability of intentions and of realisation. Therefore, we utilize multivariate analysis 
techniques to explore which are the most important factors correlated with 
maintaining and realising intentions toward childlessness.  
The results reported in Figure 2.3 provide support for the hypothesis that people 
with stronger negative attitudes toward parenthood have more stable intentions to 
be childless and less stable intentions to be parents. Moreover, they have a higher 
probability of realising childlessness intentions in the short run, while they more 
often quit their plans regarding parenthood. At the same time, people with stronger 
positive attitudes toward parenthood tend to quit their intentions to be childless 
more often and not to realise them. Thus, at the second interview, these individuals 
were more likely to have experienced a fertility outcome in contrast with their 
reproductive plans at the time of the first wave of the survey. These findings 
partially corroborate our second hypothesis: that stronger negative attitudes towards 
parenthood are positively correlated with the stability of childlessness intentions 
and their realisation.  
Next, in line with the third hypothesis, the results of the multivariate analyses 
suggest that stronger subjective norms related to parenthood are significantly 
associated with a lower likelihood of maintaining childlessness intentions and 
realising them; whereas, they are positively correlated with the stability and 
realisation of parenthood plans. This confirms that the perception of a normative 
pressure for having a child decreases the chances of maintaining and realising 
childlessness intentions.  
Finally, in support of the state hypothesis 4, we found that individuals with 
higher scores on the behavioural control index are overall less likely to maintain 
plans toward parenthood and to realise these plans in the near future than people 
with lower scores. At the same time, results show that people who give more 
  
 
76
importance to socioeconomic conditions have higher probability to maintain their 
intentions to be childless in the short run, as well as a greater probability to realise 
their plans to remain childless. Despite significant, the effect of the perceived 
controls is however low in size, indicating how once the decision to be childless has 
been taken, factors concerning financial, work and housing conditions play a 
marginal role in affecting their stability and realisation. 
 
 
Figure 2. 3 – Stability of Intentions to be childless and coherence of their realisation. 
Multinomial Logistic Regression (Average Marginal Effects). 
• Male • Female 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Note: Average Marginal Effects and 95% 
conf. int. reported. Models control for groups of age, education, partnership and working history and 
home ownership. Country fixed effect. The model about stability of intentions also controls for birth 
of a child between the waves (Complete outcome in the Appendix of Chapter 2, Table 2.8 and Table 
2.9). 
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All in all, there are no significant gender differences concerning the role that 
the attitudes related with benefits and costs brought by children, subjective norms 
and perceived control play on the probability of maintaining and realising 
individual intentions to be childless. The only observable differences concern the 
maintenance and realisation of intentions toward parenthood. Notably, the results 
show that having more favourable attitudes related with the benefits of children is 
a factor that positively correlates with the probability of maintaining the intentions 
to have children among men, while it does not affect female behavior. 
On considering the stratification of the phenomenon of voluntary childlessness 
(Figure 2.4) it is difficult to draw any firm conclusion about the relation with 
individuals’ different socio-economic characteristics. In line with recent findings 
(Kreyenfled and Konietzka, 2017), we found a negative correlation between 
education and childlessness. Highly educated people generally are less likely to 
maintain childless intentions in the short run, compared to lower educated people 
and they also have a lower probability of realising those intentions. Nevertheless, 
gender patterns appears when considering the role of education on the stability and 
reliability of intentions toward childlessness. Among women, the better educated 
are those with the lower propensity to maintain intentions toward childlessness in 
the short run, whereas no differences related to women’s education level are found 
regarding the realisation to not attain having a child. Differently, among men, are 
those with an intermediate level of education those who maintain and realise more 
often the stated intentions toward childlessness.   
Changes in family life play a role in intended childlessness and its realisation. 
Being in a stable partnership, or entering a new one, is strongly and negatively 
correlated with maintaining and realising childlessness intentions, whereas it is 
positively associated with making the transition to parenthood in the three years 
between the two waves of the GGS. This appears to be true both among women and 
among men, and it highlight the positive role of being in a couple on having 
children. 
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Differently, stable employment does not seem to be significantly associated 
with fertility intentions and outcomes in the short term, neither for women, nor for 
men. 
 
 
Figure 2. 4 – Stability of intentions to be childless and their realisation. Multinomial 
Logistic regression (Average Marginal Effects). 
• Male • Female 
 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Note: Average Marginal Effects and 95% 
conf. int. reported. Models control for groups of age, TPB factors, and home ownership. Country 
fixed effect. The first model also controls for birth of a child between the waves (Complete outcome 
in the Appendix of Chapter 2, Table 2.8 and Table 2.9). 
 
 
In consideration of the above, the relationship between socio-economic status 
and the decision to remain childless, as well as to realise the intention to be 
childless, appears more complex than expected and results are not clear enough to 
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provide support for the fifth hypothesis: that the decision to be without children is 
more stable among people with higher economic resources and opportunities.  
 
5.3. Sensitivity analyses 
 
One potential limitation of the empirical analyses reported above is that they 
include both partnered and non-partnered individuals. Fertility choices, however, 
are typically made at the couple level and looking for a partner is part of the 
decision-making process in regard to having a child (Jalovaara and Fasang, 2017), 
as it also shows our analysis. Therefore, we replicated our analyses considering only 
partnered individuals – and thus respondents who were at risk of making the 
transition to parenthood. We found small differences in the size of (some of) the 
coefficients and their significance levels; however, the overall pattern of the 
associations reported in previous sections does not change (Appendix Table 2.10 
and Table 2.11). 
A further test was conducted with regard to the age of the respondents. It may 
be argued that people in the youngest group (i.e. 20-24 years old) have a very low 
risk of making the transition to parenthood. Thus, the analyses were replicated both 
on the subsample of individuals by different age ranges. Firstly, we consider a 
sample of people aged 25 years or more, secondly, we include individuals aged 35 
and above (Appendix Table 2.14 and Table 2.15). In both the cases results did not 
change in relation to main tested hypotheses.  
However, an interesting pattern emerges in relation to how changes in the 
partnership are associated with maintaining and realising the intentions to be 
childless or parent. The analyses conducted on the sample aged 35-45 show that 
having a new partner is not significantly associated with any change in intentions 
or realization of fertility for women. Differently, men who change partner between 
the two waves have the highest chances of maintaining over time the intentions to 
have children and achieve these intentions in the short run, even more than those 
with a stable partner. Future result might address this aspect more in depth and 
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clarify whether men give a stronger priority to children compared to women, and 
whether they are willing to change partner to achieve this goal.  
Finally, a further limitation of our analytic strategy is that we pooled a quite 
heterogeneous group of countries. Despite the relatively large number of 
observations, the sample size was not sufficient to fit separately the regression 
models on each of the countries considered. However, we tried to partially address 
the issue of the heterogeneity of the countries considered by running the analyses 
on Western European countries only. The results of these latter analyses indicate 
that the signs of the associations reported above do not change when excluding 
Eastern European countries from the analyses (Appendix Table 2.12 and Table 
2.13).11  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
After reaching its lowest level among cohorts of women born between 1935 
and 1945, the childlessness rate in Europe has been on the increase among post-
WWII birth cohorts, reaching levels around or higher than 30% in several countries. 
Only in recent years there have been the first signs of a trend reversal in some 
European societies. This trend has taken place within the more general framework 
of decreasing fertility rates.  
Even if the quota of childless women among the 1970s birth cohorts is similar 
to that registered at the beginning of the 20th century, it has been argued that the 
paths to childlessness are markedly different from what they were in the past. In 
particular, scholars have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of 
women who are (involuntarily) childless due to the postponement of the decision to 
 
11 The results of sensitivity analysis are presented in the Appendix of Chapter 2, Tables from 
2.9 to 2.12.  
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become a parent and, most importantly, the proportion of women who are 
voluntarily childless. Nonetheless, most of the previous literature on the topic has 
focused on the “accidental” or “involuntary” component of childlessness. The aim 
of this paper, instead, has been to shed light on the decision to be childless, and it 
has done so by focusing on the stability and realisation of intentions to be childless, 
adopting a short-term perspective.  
The results of our analyses indicate that individuals who claim they want 
children in the short-term are more likely to keep their intentions unchanged after 
three years compare to people who say they don’t want to have children. 
Notwithstanding childbearing intentions remain less realised in the case of 
parenthood than in the case of childlessness, what is worth noting here is that both 
intentions toward parenthood and childlessness change even in the short-run, and 
particularly during young adulthood. This finding highlights the need to adopt a 
dynamic (vs. a static) perspective when studying individuals’ fertility intentions and 
their determinants.  
Next, utilizing the approach of the Theory of Planned Behaviour we have 
shown that individuals’ attitudes towards parenthood and perceived social pressure 
to become a parent – from parents and friends – are important correlates of the 
stability and realisation of childlessness intentions, whereas factors connected with 
individuals’ perceived control seem to be weakly related with our dependent 
variables. Moreover, regarding individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics our 
results suggest that one of the main factors driving the stability and realisation of 
fertility intentions is partnership status and its change. Individuals who, during the 
observation period, were in a stable partnership, or entered a new partnership, were 
less likely to maintain their intention not to have children and more likely to change 
their mind and have a child. Ending a partnership, on the other hand, seems only 
marginally to affect individuals’ fertility intentions.  
This study has a number of important limitations, especially in relation to the 
limited length of the observation period and the need to pool data from different 
countries because of small sample size. These choices, imposed by data limitations, 
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have also restricted the possibility to conduct more detailed analyses of variations 
in individuals’ childlessness intentions, and thereby gain better understanding of 
how intentions change in relation to life course events and individuals’ socio-
economic conditions.  
The results presented in this work suffer more than anything from the limitation 
given from the short time window available in the GGS data. This limitation 
prevented us from taking into account the changing nature of fertility decisions. 
More in detail, the analysis presented here does not enable to discriminate between 
effects that influence the choice of living a life without children tout court from 
postponing the arrival of a new-born. Partially, we tried to stem this problem by 
introducing sub-analyses on a subsample of the population with an age closer to the 
end of reproductive period, but shortcomings remain. By observing childbearing 
intentions over a relatively short time period there are interpretative limitation both 
regarding the validity of the measures of intentions toward parenthood and 
intentions toward childlessness, because – as the analysis shows – intentions are 
likely to vary over time in an individual’s life course.  
These shortcomings are likely to be overcome with longer panel data. Adopting 
a long-term perspective on voluntary childless plans remains an important 
challenge for future research. In contrast to motherhood, childlessness is a choice 
that remains reversible for a long time. Future studies should focus on the evolution 
of the life course of voluntary childless individuals, considering childlessness as 
both a preference and an outcome. At this point, however, we think that our results 
can improve understanding of the dynamics of the micro-level social processes 
governing childlessness intentions – and thus voluntary childlessness.  
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CHAPTER III. 
 
WOMEN’S EDUCATION AND CHILDLESSNESS.  
STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE EDUCATIONAL GRADIENT 
OF CHILDLESSNESS ACROSS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. 
 
 
 
 
Brief Summary 
There is much work documenting that women’s educational attainment relates to 
their fertility timing and fertility outcome. Fertility levels in a population have been 
often related to changes in compositions of female education, particularly giving 
attention to the expansion of women with tertiary degrees. Research also shows that 
level of education influences being childless. The increased educational attainment 
of women over time might also offer an explanation for the rapid growth of 
childlessness that has been taking place over the past decades throughout European 
counties. Drawing upon the theory of the New Home Economics and of the Second 
Demographic Transition, this work addresses this issue by analysing the extent to 
which women’s educational attainment relates to different probabilities of being 
childless over time. By making use of the data of the European Labour Force Survey 
this chapter documents increasing proportions of adult women living without 
children across nine European countries up to 2017 and considers how the 
association between education and lack of children changes over time. Results 
show that childlessness has generally risen among all educational groups, thus 
providing evidence in contrast with the assumption that the increase in women’s 
educational attainment is related to increased childlessness. However, the 
educational gradient of childlessness does not appear to have narrowed over time, 
showing how better-educated women continue to be more likely to be childless 
compared to lower-educated counterparts. I discuss these findings in relation to the 
economic and value change perspectives.   
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1. Introduction  
 
 
Education has undergone significant changes over the last decades, especially 
among women. Nowadays, women are much more educated compared to previous 
generations and tend to outnumber men both in secondary and tertiary education 
(Schofer and Meyer, 2005; OECD, 2019a)12. This is true also in Southern and 
Eastern European countries, where the proportions of women with a tertiary or 
equivalent degree are the smallest in Europe. Although in presence of a a strong 
geopolitical variation, over the last two decades the proportion of women in the age 
group 35-39 that have completed tertiary education has been steadily growing, 
while the proportion of the less-educated women has generally decreased (Figure 
3.1).  
Increasing female participation in tertiary education has important documented 
consequences on the life course of women. Educational attainment is one of the 
most influential sources to activate women into employment (Cutuli and Scherer, 
2014; Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2008; Thévenon, 2013) and the expansion of 
women in higher education has been accompanied by a simultaneous increase in 
women’s participation in the labour market across most industrialised societies 
(OECD, 2019b). As a consequence, women’s educational attainment is widely 
perceived as a powerful engine for socio-economic and demographic changes. 
The period between the end of the 20th century and the first decades of the 21st 
century also saw a generalised fall in fertility levels across western European 
countries (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene, 2009; Kohler, Billari, and Ortega, 
2002). At the same time fertility was falling until reaching previously unseen levels 
of low and lowest-low fertility across western European societies (Kohler, Billari 
 
12 If in 1985 only 20% of women had a secondary qualification, in 2010 this ratio was doubled, 
against an increase of only 15 percentage points among men. The same happened among tertiary 
degrees that especially increased among women, passing from 6% in the 1985 to 22% in the 2010, 
whereas for men from 8 to 16% (Ballarino and Scherer, 2013). 
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and Ortega, 2002), also the number of women without children saw an exceptional 
increase and the majority of advanced societies went through the highest ever levels 
of childlessness documented in contemporary society (Frejka, 2017; Rowland, 
2007). 
 
 
Figure 3. 1 – Percentage distributions of women at age 35-39 by level of education over 
time in 8 European Countries. 
 
Source: EU-LFS, author’s elaboration 
 
 
Stimulated by the coincidence of these trends, education has been extensively 
studied as an explanans to low fertility and a long tradition of research on the 
relationship between educational expansion and low fertility arisen (e.g., Axinn and 
Barber, 2001; Rindfuss et al., 1980).  
Along with this large literature focussing on the influence of education and 
both the timing and quantum of births, increasing childlessness has also stimulated 
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research interest on the link between women’s education and the likelihood to be 
childless. As well as higher education is associated to having fewer children than 
intended (Testa, 2014; Iacovu and Tavares, 2011) and fewer children than less 
educated counterparts (Yang and Morgan, 2003; Bongaarts, 2001; Quesnel-Valléè 
and Morgan, 2003), extant research shows how childlessness is usually more 
common among highly educated women (Tanturri et al., 2015).  
The present study addresses the relationship between women’s educational 
achievement and definitive childlessness over time, and does so by analysing how 
the highest level of educational attainment predicts differently the likelihood a 
woman has to live without children at 35-39 years old across different European 
countries and over different periods in time.  
Investigating how the relationship between educational attainment and lack of 
children has changed over time is important for several reasons.  
First, it could help to understand whether the increase in childlessness can be 
traced back to women’s increasing investment in higher education.  
Second, determining if the relationship between childlessness and education 
has remained stable or has changed over time – and, in case, in which direction – 
could also provide insights into the question of how costs-opportunity associated 
with motherhood evolve in societies. On the one hand, the educational gradient of 
childlessness might be decreased over time, that is, either the more educated women 
are less often childless or the less educated are more often childless. In the first case, 
it could mean that the costs associated with motherhood have decreased over time 
among the better-educated; in the second case, it could mean that childlessness is a 
new behaviour that spreads from higher toward lower educated. On the other hand, 
it could be that the educational gradient of childlessness persists, namely the most 
educated women are equally or increasingly more likely to not have children over 
time. This could mean that the costs of motherhood have not reduced over time. 
Considering the substantial investment of welfare regimes addressed to 
encouraging childbearing implicitly among college-graduated women by 
attempting to reduce the costs of motherhood and to reconcile a female career with 
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family, a closing educational gap might be an indicator of effective policies, 
whereas a stable or increasing gap might advise inefficiencies on the welfare states 
side.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section briefly 
sketches previous work and theories connected to the relationship between 
women’s educational attainment and fertility behaviour, explicitly focusing on 
childlessness. Following the approaches of the New Home Economics and the 
Second Demographic Transition, I argue that a changing pattern of the educational 
gradient of childlessness over time should be expected and I draw the main 
hypothesis concerning the direction of this change. Section 3 provides information 
about the data I use and presents the method of the analysis. Section 4 firstly 
presents a description of the trends of childlessness across nine European countries 
over time and describes how they are related to educational attainment composition; 
then, it gives the result of the analysis. Finally, Section 5 offers the concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
2. Previous work and theoretical background 
 
 
Female education is widely acknowledged to affect family formation and 
fertility behaviour. Particularly, research shows how both vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of education are related to fertility, namely the duration of the 
enrolment in education and the level of educational attainment reached in the first 
case; the field of study in the second case (Lappegård and Rønsen, 2005: Van Bavel, 
2010). This work considers the vertical dimension of education. Namely, the focus 
is on the relationship between female educational attainment and childlessness 
across countries over time. 
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2.1. The relationship between women’s education and childlessness 
 
Greater cultural and economic capital is found to be associated with a delay in 
the transition to parenthood in industrialised societies (Begall and Mills, 2012; 
Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012; Gustafsson and Kalwij, 2006; Kneale and Joshi, 
2008; Kravdal and Rindfuss, 2008, Lappegård and Rønsen 2005; Van Bavel, 2006; 
2012), as well as with an overall small family size (Skirbbekk, 2008; Yang and 
Morgan, 2003).  
Although scholars have been paying strong attention on the impact that 
education has on the timing and the quantum of births, research concerning the role 
of education on female childlessness is relatively young. In the last few years, 
however, a growing body of empirical research has focused on this relationship. 
Current evidence tends to show that childlessness in adulthood is usually more 
common among highly educated women than among lower educated women 
throughout Europe. Evidence from single countries indicates that the higher the 
level of the degree obtained, the higher the chance that a woman has not yet become 
a mother at a given age. For examples, the more educated women are documented 
to be more likely to be childless compared to lower educated women in Northern 
Europe (Kravdal and Rindfuss, 2008 for Norway, Hoem et al., 2006 for Sweden), 
in Central and Western Europe (Berrington, 2017 in the UK; Kreyenfeld and 
Konietza 2017 about West and East Germany; Liefbroer and Corijn, 1999 about the 
Netherlands and Flanders; Neyer, Hoem and Andersson 2017 in Austria and 
Sweden), as well as in the southern European context (Bagavos, 2010 about Greece; 
Mencarini and Tanturri, 2006 about Italy). Even though empirical evidence is 
relatively less developed concerning the nexus between women’s educational 
attainment and voluntary childlessness, research in this field tends to provide 
support to the evidence of a positive relationship as well. In many cases, more 
educated women are found to be more likely to develop intentions toward a 
childless life (Miettinen et al., 2015 about Europe overall; Tanturri and Mencarini, 
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2008 about Italy), although they appear to maintain less often these intentions in 
the short run (Chapter 2).  
In the large majority of previous studies, these findings have been interpreted 
in light of two very different approaches, namely the New Home Economics (NHE) 
and the Second Demographic Transition thesis (SDT), which explain a lower 
disposition to motherhood in terms of higher costs or new individuals’ values 
toward children and parenting roles.  
According to the NHE, the fact that highly educated women have fewer 
children or greater likelihood of being childless compared to their less well-
educated counterpart are interpreted as being the result of the investment women 
do in their education and their careers (Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991). To the extent 
that children may provide to parents personal or subjective benefits, as well as non-
material rewards and satisfaction throughout their life, and parents may invest on 
them according to different preferences, the NHE interprets children as durable and 
desired goods (Becker, 1960). Since to have them parents needs to carry out some 
expenditure, childbearing decision-making follows then the same principles behind 
the decision toward any durable and costly goods. Accordingly, economics theories 
argue that to decide their number of children parents make reasoned actions, which 
are contingent on costs and benefits of the children (Becker, 1981; Cigno, 1991). 
Following this paradigm, the positive association between women’s educational 
attainment and childlessness is due to the rising cost-opportunity of children in 
relation to the increase in the human capital investment by women. Educational 
investment is widely acknowledged to be one of the most important means to 
increase the individual level of human capital, which, in turn, is vastly documented 
to pave the road to better working positions, which are usually related to better 
earnings and better earnings profile over the life cycle (Becker, 1962; Becker, 
Murphy and Tamura, 1990). Therefore, the higher is the level of education achieved 
by women – being this also an indicator of better job prospects and potential earning 
– the higher will be the propensity of women to be childless, because the relative 
loss in terms of career prospects in case of non-market activities such as pregnancy 
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or childrearing of the child would be higher than the loss incurred by a women with 
a lower level of education (Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Happel et al., 1984; Walker, 
1995). This interpretation is complemented by numerous studies which highlight 
how motherhood is associated with a decrease in women’s earnings and earning 
potentials (Avellar and Smock, 2003; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Hanson, 1983) and 
with a size of motherhood penalty higher for higher skilled women (England and 
Buding, 2016; Wilde, 2010), , despite the sharp increase in women’s educational 
attainment and career aspirations (DiPrete and Buchmann, 2006).  
On the side of the SDT, childlessness among women is interpreted as a result 
of the changes in norms and values (van de Kaa, 2002), according to which a 
positive association between education and childlessness is to be expected as well. 
The theory describes the changes in value orientation that occurred during the 
1960s, and relates such changes to the demographic transformations associated with 
living arrangements and family formations that came into being during the same 
period: cohabitation started to replacing marriage, followed by an increase of 
extramarital childbirths and divorces, motherhood started to be postponed already 
in the late 1960s, and low- and lowest-low fertility rates were reached during the 
1990s (Billari and Liefbroer, 2004; Surkin and Lesthaeghe, 2004). Especially, at 
the roots of the new family forms, there was a shift toward the so-called post-
materialist attitudes and norms. That is, people became more autonomous in the 
ethical, moral and political sphere, they started to reject forms of institutional 
controls and authority, and higher-order needs of self-actualisation became rival 
priorities over doing family (Surkin and Lesthaeghe, 2004; van de Kaa, 2001; Zaidi 
and Morgan, 2017). This change of values contingent upon the transformations 
described by the SDT, has been generally embraced by the more educated social 
groups, which are often described as the “forerunners” of demographic changes 
(Aassve, Sironi and Bassi, 2011; De Fejter, 1991; Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002; 
Lestaheghe and Suryn, 2008; Tanturri and Mencarini, 2008; Thornton, Axinn and 
Xie, 2008). Hence, to the extent that more educated women are more likely to have 
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values detached from family life, more educated women might also be more likely 
to be childless compared to women with lower levels of education. 
However, given the increased women’s educational attainment and labour 
force participation in European countries, an additional issue to be considered is the 
extent to which the education-childlessness link may be changed over time. The 
directions that this association may have taken are discussed in the next section.  
 
 
2.2. The trend of women’s educational attainment and the increasing 
prevalence of childlessness. 
 
Given that the highly-educated women tend more to be childless compared to 
less well-educated counterparts, and given that there are more and more better 
educated women and less low educated women, the expansion of women in tertiary 
or equivalent levels of education could be interpreted as a road toward rising 
childlessness. Contrary to that, literature on NHE and SDT suggests that the 
educational gradient of childlessness has lessened over time, which should make 
the rising of childlessness unrelated to the expansion of women in higher 
educational levels.  
As outlined above, the literature on household economics suggests that highly 
educated women are more likely to be childless because they are faced with higher 
costs for having children. Nonetheless, the stratification of the costs for children 
may vary not only among social groups, but also over time in relation to the changed 
costs associated with motherhood. The cost of children in the labour market is 
higher for women (Budig and England, 2001) and penalties to having children are 
notably higher among the women in better positions (Budig et al., 2016). However, 
the costs for motherhood are associated to social and institutional changes (Barbieri 
et al., 2014; 2015; Barbieri and Bozzon, 2016; Blossfeld, 1995). Therefore, the 
stratification of childlessness by women’s educational level may change also in 
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response to the kind of family policies targeted at tackling motherhood costs and 
penalties in the labour market.  
On the one hand, policies might reduce the trade-off between work and family by 
providing maternity and parental leave that reduces career interruption for women, 
by favouring the continuity with the same employer, and subsiding or providing 
childcare arrangements that free mothers from their caregiver roles (Gangl and 
Ziefle, 2009). Thus, family policies may mitigate the penalties associated with 
motherhood. Accordingly, it should be expected a lessening association between 
educational attainment and childlessness over time. Namely, this reduction in the 
educational gap of childlessness should be related to a diminished likelihood to be 
childless among the women with higher degrees (Figure 3.2, panel B), as a result 
of the advancements and growing investments states made with the introduction 
and instruments addressed at making parenthood more compatible with female 
work and career (Esping-Andersen, 1999; 2009; Kalwij, 2010). In line with this are 
the works that document the loss of the traditional division of work within the 
family and the increased participation of men in care work (Poortman and Van 
Lippe, 2009), as well as the erosion of the male breadwinner model (Crompton, 
1999) in favour of the diffusion of breadwinning women (Drago, Black and 
Wooden, 2005; Vitali and Arpino, 2016).  
On the other hand, policies might keep women at work, yet without reducing 
the costs associated with motherhood. For example, if policies are designed in such 
a way that mothers return to work after long career interruptions, changing 
employers, perhaps landing in an underpaid part-time, costs associated with 
motherhood might be high, especially for better-skilled women. Under these 
circumstances, it might be hypothesised that the effect of education on the 
propensity to be childless has not changed over time, or that it has changed 
eventually exacerbating the educational gap in childlessness between highly- and 
low-educated women (Figure 3.2, panel C). Empirical analyses that show how the 
penalty associated with motherhood has not diminished over time underpin this 
option (Avellar and Smock, 2003).  
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The SDT thesis supports alternatively the idea that the rising of childlessness 
is related to the diffusion of new values. According to the theory, the better-
educated groups of individuals are those who develop new values. In this sense, 
they also represent the “forerunners” of new behaviours, that is they have new ideas 
which spreads toward lower educated groups of individuals through a process of 
diffusion, eventually triggering the social changes (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002; 
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2008; Lesthaeghe, 2010). In line with this argument, the 
association between higher education and greater childlessness may lessen over 
time as female education increases, due to the aforementioned diffusions 
mechanism. If better educated women embody the precursors of new rules of 
behaviours as much for childlessness as for other family behaviours (Ní Bhrolcháin 
and Beaujouan; Vitali et al., 2015), this is meant to happen because the more 
educated women broadcast their new values to the less well-educated counterparts, 
who, in turn, start to behave like them. The result will be an increase of childless 
also among the lower educated women, and a reduction in the educational gradient 
of childlessness (Figure 3.2, panel A).  
 
 
Figure 3. 2 – Expected dynamic of association between women’s level of education and 
childlessness according to the SDT and NHE perspectives. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Whereas a growing number of works have been focusing on analysing the 
extent to which women’s tendency to increasingly invest in education, and to do 
more so compared to men, has modified their reproductive behaviour (Blossfeld 
and Huinink, 1991; Kravdal and Rindfuss, 2008), relatively less work has been done 
concerning the changing relationships between education and childlessness among 
women over time. The body of extant empirical evidence concerning the effects of 
female educational attainment on childlessness reports generally signs of a changed 
association, but in many cases, research is based on one single country (Berrington, 
Stone and Beaujouan, 2015 for Britain; Jalovaara et al., 2018; Neyer et al., 2017; 
Persson, 2010 for Nordic Countries). Although the emergence of demographic 
changes might be similar across countries, the ability of states to answer to new 
risks related with family and childrearing intimately depends according to their very 
different national welfare system and macro-level settings. States ability to 
overcome new individual risks and needs largely depends on their economies, 
structures of the labor market, family responsibility and gender contract (Barbieri 
and Bozzon, 2016; Barbieri, Cutuli and Tosi, 2012; Esping-Andersen 1990; 2009; 
Philipov, Liefbroer and Klobas, 2015). Accordingly, macro-level conditions might 
also mediate the extent to which women can translate their human capital 
investment into advantageous positions and the size of the costs they face with the 
(potential) arrival of a child over time, and previous research has seldom accounted 
for this role. Available evidence on childlessness and parity progression by women 
level of education shows significant between-country variation in the association 
between education and fertility, and comparative perspective is of crucial relevance 
also when analysing the dynamics between childlessness and women’s level of 
education over time.  
To the best of my knowledge, there are two studies that examine the time-
varying association between education and childlessness across European countries 
explicitly. Wood and colleagues (2014) analyse educational gradients in the 
progression to first births focussing on differences across countries and cohorts of 
women born between 1940 and 1961. They find that highly educated women are 
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overall less likely to enter motherhood compared to lower educated women, but a 
limited variation across cohorts within most countries is present. Similarly, 
Beaujuouan and colleagues (2016) examine the association between trends in 
childlessness and patterns in education by focussing on birth cohorts corresponding 
to the period between 1940s and 2000s. They also find that childlessness is limitedly 
linked to growing educational attainment. Both the studies, however, cover the birth 
cohorts corresponding to the period between the 1940 and early 2000s, which may 
be a too limited or too early period to assess a potential effect of female educational 
expansion on the increasing prevalence of childlessness.  
The present work contributes to this debate by assessing to which extent the 
role of female educational attainment in affecting childlessness has changed over 
time, by using an alternative dataset that covers a more recent period, viz. 1995-
2017. As such, it allows understanding the extent to which the increase of 
childlessness might be related to massive female educational expansion.  
Consequently, the following empirical hypotheses are tested throughout the 
analysis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between education and 
childlessness, that is, the more educated women are more likely to be childless.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between education and childlessness has 
changed in the period between 1995 and 2017.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between education and childlessness 
lessened over time; that is, the propensity to be childless is overall less stratified by 
women’s level of education.  
 
 
 
  
 
96
3. Data and methods 
 
 
3.1. Data 
 
Analyses are based on the micro-data of the European Union Labor Force 
Survey (EU LFS), a large household sample survey developed for analysing labor 
force participation of people aged 15 and over.  
Although it is an unusual choice when studying childbearing behaviour, this 
dataset contains information on all people who co-reside with the respondent and 
report the relationship these people have with the reference person in the household. 
In other words, the dataset allows to know which are the persons that in certain age 
groups do not have coresident children, and to make some assumption to the use of 
this measure as an indicator of childlessness.  
Furthermore, EU-LFS contains information on the highest level of education 
achieved by respondents at the time of the interview. It is thus a valuable dataset 
that allows to reconstruct the proportion of women without children living in the 
same household across European countries, and to relate this trend to the expansion 
in higher education of women since it also provides comparable information on the 
educational attainment over time across countries. 
 
3.2. Variables and methods 
 
The EU LFS contains no variable indicating how many children each person in 
the sample ever had. Nevertheless, a proxy measurement for childlessness can be 
considered. As already said, the dataset includes information about the number of 
co-resident family members and the relationship the head of the family has with 
them. This specific design allows linking children to their mother living in the same 
household. If we assume that observing that people do not have children in their 
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family unit in specific stages of life is informative is informative of their actual 
status of childlessness, and that that these people are unlikely to have ever had 
children or to have children in the future, we can proceed to create a measurement 
for childlessness by considering women who do not have co-resident biological 
children13. The EU LFS provides the age of individuals grouped into classes of five. 
Since the implicit risk of this procedure is that it may drive to consider as childless 
those women whose children already left the household on the one side, as well as 
to consider as childless women whose children still have to born, I decided to take 
into account a relatively young range of age, i.e. 35-39. In the end, childlessness is 
measured on women aged 35-39 who do not live in same-sex unions, and it takes 
value of 1 when a woman is 35-39 and does not have co-resident children in her 
household, whereas it has value of 0 when a woman in the same age group has co-
resident children. This age selection reduces from the risk of considering childless 
someone with a child who left the household already, although it does not protect 
form considering as definitive childless people who postponed childbirth till very 
late ages14.  
Benefits of using the EU LFS outweigh limitations: the dataset provides a big 
sample – which is important when analysing childlessness – and it covers a good 
number of European countries and years. As such, it offers a reliable instrument for 
comparing trends of childlessness across countries and to relate the lack of children 
in the household to female’s education over time in several European countries.  
Educational attainment is measured as the highest level of education women 
had completed at the time of the interview. A drawback of analysing different 
numbers of countries is that of comparing educational attainment across very 
 
13  This proxy has also been used in previous studies analysing childlessness (Caltabiano, 
Comolli and Rosina, 2017). 
14 Albeit slight, transition to first births after 35 years is not null (Appendix Figure 3.8 and 3.9). 
In 2017, Around 3% of births of first children in the EU were to women aged 40 and above, with 
the highest proportions registered in Southern European countries (Eurostat, 2017). For this reason, 
in the appendix I provide a comparison between the proxy of childlessness adopted in this analysis 
and the levels of childlessness retrievable from previous studies (Table 3.3 and 3.4). The results 
show that considering 35-39 aged women who are without children in their household leads the risk 
of overestimating the true levels of childlessness by about 4%. 
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different educational systems. To minimize problem of comparisons, our measure 
of education is built by following the 1997 UNESCO International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) and groups together broad educational levels. 
In all countries, respondents with lower than secondary education are included in 
the “low” category (ISCED 0 – ISCED 2), respondents with upper secondary 
education in the “middle” category (ISCED 3 – 4), and those with tertiary education 
in the “high” category (ISCED 5 – ISCED 6). 
Because information on the type of relationship with the reference person of 
the survey is available only starting from more recent years and because valid codes 
for education are unavailable for some countries before the 1995, the analysis is 
restricted to a smaller sample of countries and time. Namely, countries included are 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and United 
Kingdom and the analysis cover the period from 1995 to 2017. 
 
3.3. Analytic strategy 
 
The first part of the analysis provides the background of this study and it 
reconstructs the trends of female childlessness across nine European countries 
throughout the period 1995-2017 (Figure 3.3). The second part of the analysis 
focuses specifically on the relationship between education and childlessness over 
time. A descriptive trend of childlessness broken down by educational level over 
time is firstly presented for women aged 35-39 from 1995 onwards (Figure 3.4). 
Then, binary logistic regressions are applied to test for the changing association of 
women’s education and the risk to be without children at 35-39 years old over time, 
by including an interaction term between education and period. Specifically, I 
investigate the education-childlessness link over time by means of three logistic 
regressions (Appendix Table 3.3 and 3.4). In a first model the likelihood of being 
childless when a woman is 35-39 is conditioned only upon time. With this 
specification I aim at explaining the variance of childlessness in terms of changes 
over time. Then I specify a second model, in which a variable indicating the level 
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of education of women is included, so as to measure the average direct role that 
education plays on childlessness. Third, an interaction term between women’s 
education and time is specified. Such an interaction term is aimed at testing whether 
the direct effect of education varies over years.  
In light of previous works documenting that women’s labour force 
participation is related to augmented costs of children (Budig and England, 2001), 
that might in turn suggest an increased propensity to be childless, as well as of 
studies showing how having a stable partner is still a prerequisite toward parenthood 
(Chapter 2), a final model that includes controls for women’s working position and 
their marital status at the time of the interview is specified, so as to grasp how much 
of the total effect of education on childlessness is a direct effect of education, and 
how it has modified over time (Appendix Table 3.3 and 3.4, M3). Thus, we control 
whether a woman was a) previously married, if she declared to be divorced, legally 
separated or widowed; b) not in a union; or c) married. To account for the economic 
activity the data allow to distinguish between women who are a) Inactive, b) 
Unemployed, or c) Employed at the time of the interview. Within this latter group 
I further discriminate allocating respondent to their class according to their current 
occupation based on the International Standard Classification of Occupation 
(ISCO-88 1 digit). Women were grouped into five classes, distinguishing by i) 
Higher-grade service class (ISCO 1 and 2); ii) Lower-grade service class (ISCO 3); 
iii) Skilled worker (ISCO 4 to 7) and iv) Unskilled workers (ISCO 8 and 9). People 
belonging to armed forces were eliminated from the sample (Oesch, 2006). 
Unfortunately, EU-LFS does not provide a satisfactory measurement of previous 
female working careers, and the role of occupation on childlessness should be 
considered with cautions. Women who are childless might be more likely to work 
compared to mothers on the one hand, as well as women who are not working or have 
lower-skilled positions more likely to make the transition to children on the other. For the 
reason that women’s allocation of working time at the time of the interview could be 
endogenous with respect to childlessness I also considered both a model 
specification with the inclusion of female occupation, as well as a model without it. 
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Finally, since I expect mechanisms being different across contexts, country 
separate models are estimated.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
 
4.1. Country differences in the trend of childlessness across Europe 
 
To deepen the understanding of the variability of the phenomenon of 
childlessness I reconstructed the evolution of the proportion of women without co-
habiting children in the age class 35-39 starting from the1995 across nine European 
regions (Figure 3.3).  
Data are not available early in the time series for all the considered countries, 
but previous research on childlessness indicates that there was a considerable 
homogeneity in the proportions of childless women across Europe until the 1990s 
(Beaujouan et al., 2016; Rowland, 2007). The presented results show instead how 
the share of women without children started to increase throughout entire Europe, 
and to vary considerably across countries both in the levels and in the speed of 
growth.  
The highest rates of increase of women aged 35-39 without children occurred 
in Greece (where the rate rose from 14% in 1995 to 31% in 2017), Italy (from 17% 
to 30%) and Spain (from 13 % to 30%). Within the Mediterranean context, only 
Portugal differs as the country that has shown a smaller increase compared to other 
countries, since it shows a rate of women without children increased by only 8 
percentage points. 
To accompany the countries of southern Europe in their primacy of high levels 
and high growth of childlessness, there are also two western European countries, 
namely Germany and Austria. In these countries the proportion of childless women 
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have increased in the last twenty years, going from levels close to 20% in 1995 to 
levels of around 30% in 2017. The trend, however, confirms previous studies 
showing that in Germany a stalemate in the growth of childless women has occurred 
in recent years (Destatis, 2017). In this context of generalized growth, only the 
countries of central Europe, such as Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, 
report a less market growth. In particular, France is confirmed as the country of 
Western Europe with the lowest increase in childlessness: if in 1995 the share of 
women aged 35-39 without children was 14%, in 2017 this had increased by only 
few percentage points (16.4%).  
 
 
Figure 3. 3 – The proportion of women who live childless at 35-39 has generally increased 
in Europe.  
Source: EU LFS, author’s elaboration. Note: Childlessness proportions are computed on women in 
the age group 35-39 who have no biological children in their household. 
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4.2. Educational differences in the trend of childlessness across Europe 
 
To test the general hypothesis of changed educational gradient of childlessness 
across European countries over the last two decades, I first present how the 
correlation between childlessness and education changed over time at an aggregate 
level.  
 
 
Figure 3. 4  –  Cross-country correlation over time between levels of childlessness and 
share of women with tertiary educational attainment, age group 35-39.  
 
Source: EU LFS, author’s elaboration. Note: Childlessness proportions are computed on women in 
the age group 35-39 who have no biological children in their household. 
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it possible to note how the association between female education and being childless 
at 35-39 changes over time. The correlation between the share of tertiary educated 
women and childlessness across European countries is negative until the end of the 
‘90s, then it becomes positive, but starts to decrease significantly till becoming 
negative around 2005. From this graph it appears therefore that the stratification of 
childlessness has changed over time. Particularly, it emerges how not only the nexus 
between education and childlessness has changed over the period between 1995-
2017, but also how it has negatively strengthened. This evidence might suggest that 
the gap between higher and lower education in the propensity to be childless has 
diminished over time, that is higher childlessness is less common in period when 
tertiary education is more widespread.  
To shine better light into this link, we can look at how the trend of childlessness 
within education levels changed over time. Thus, I reconstruct the proportion of 
childlessness at 35-39 by level of education of women over time and across 
countries, distinguishing proportions of childlessness between low, intermediate 
and highly educated women. Results presented in Figure 3.5 allow to do some 
observations.  
First, despite the heterogeneity in levels, in almost all the countries considered, 
there is a positive relationship between education and childlessness that is persistent 
over time. In line with this, the smallest proportions of childlessness are generally 
detected among women with low levels of educations, although the differences 
between low and middle educated groups are generally smaller than the differences 
between middle and highly educated ones.  
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Figure 3. 5 – Proportion of childless women by level of education over time in 9 European 
countries. 
Source: EU-LFS, author’s elaboration. Note: Childlessness proportions are computed on women in 
the age group 35-39 who have no biological children in their household. 
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This result highlights how the pattern of association between education and 
childlessness is not homogeneous across countries on the one side, and emphasises 
the importance of considering institutional differences on the other, so as to 
recognise that the role of education may be more important in certain societies than 
in others.  
Third, we can look at how the probability of being childless at 35-39 evolved 
within educational levels. In a descriptive setting, results show how it is difficult to 
assess among which level of education the most significant increase in childlessness 
took place. In some countries indeed (i.e. Germany) the childless rate among 
women with tertiary degrees in 2017 is much higher than the rate registered among 
women with the same characteristics during the 90s. In other countries instead, the 
differences in the levels of education remained more stable over time – i.e. there 
was a homogenous increase of childlessness among levels of educations (i.e., 
Greece, Italy) – or remained very subtle (i.e. Belgium, France). 
Overall, the increase of childlessness in certain countries appears to be 
generalised among all levels of education. However, a descriptive setting does not 
allow understanding the extent to which to the increase of childlessness is related 
to the increase of women in educational attainment, because the increase of women 
in higher education is not accounted for. To the extent that better-educated women 
report overall higher shares of childlessness, and considered that tertiary education 
has increased over the last decades, it is interesting to investigate whether the 
increase of female educational attainment is related to a changed likelihood to ben 
childless among levels of women’s education. 
 
 
4.3. To what extent is childlessness related to the increase in educational 
attainment of women?  
 
We are interested in analysing whether, year by year, the importance of 
education in predicting childlessness decreases or increases, that is whether the 
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educational gap remained stable or changed over time, net of the transformed 
composition of educational levels. To do this, I investigate the relationship between 
childlessness and female education through logistic regression and evaluate the 
extent to which the changed composition of the population in terms of education 
might have played a role on the time-varying relationship between women’s 
education and childlessness and test the condition of a convergence or divergence 
across educational lines. 
Figure 3.6 shows the results from logistic regression models analysing the 
association between women’s education and the probability of living without 
children at 35-39. Since in a logistic regression setting the comparison of logit 
coefficients between different groups is not feasible (Allison 1999, Mood, 2010), 
Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) and Average Partial Effects (APEs) which allow 
comparability across groups and have a straightforward interpretation are reported. 
Hence, AMEs and APEs can be interpreted as differences in the probability of being 
childless between categories of education, quantified in percentage points. Each 
graph reports the period of observation on the x-axis and the average partial effects 
of education on the y-axis. 95% confidence intervals around the estimates are 
presented so as to give a sense of the sampling uncertainty. In each model, the 
reference category is represented by women with a low level of education, which is 
compared with categories of women with a middle or high level of education. 
These outcomes are complemented with results reported in Figure 3.7. In this 
figure I plotted predicted probabilities of being childless by women’s level of 
education over time, in order to understand whether the expansion or contraction of 
differences between educational levels is due to an increased or decreased 
propensity to be childless among specific educational groups.  
In most of the countries taken into consideration, except for Belgium, there 
remains a strong educational gradient over the years, such that the most educated 
35- to 39-year-old women were more likely to live without children in 1995 and 
still are in 2017. On the contrary, women with lower levels of education were more 
likely to be mothers in 1995 and still are in 2017. Belgium stands out as the only 
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country in which the level of education reached by women at 35-39 years does not 
stratify the propensity of the latter to be a mother or to be childless, both in 2017 
and in 1995. The hypothesis 1, that is, that there is a positive relationship between 
education and childlessness such that, as the level of education increases, the 
propensity to be childless seems, therefore, corroborated. 
However, there have been over time some changes in the way in which the 
level of education achieved by women stratifies the propensity to be childless in the 
other eight countries included in the analysis. Notably, it can be observed that in 
Austria, Spain and Portugal, the educational gradient of childlessness has tended to 
remain stable over the years. In Germany and Greece, on the contrary, the 
educational gradient has intensified over time, whereas in France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom it has weakened (Figure 3.5). 
In the first group of countries it is possible to note how, despite a stable 
educational gradient over time, the composition of women without children has 
changed. In all three countries the most educated women are the most likely to have 
a childless family unit when they are 35-39 years old (Figure 3.5). However, the 
likelihood to be childless in Austria has increased especially among women with 
intermediate qualifications, whereas in Spain and Portugal, it has increased 
especially among women with higher and lower levels of education, while less 
sustained growth has been recorded among women with intermediate education 
levels. 
In the second group of countries, namely Germany and Greece, the educational 
gradient of childlessness has instead become tighter over time. Here, the level of 
women’s education has become over time increasingly strong in the stratifying 
childlessness. In both countries, indeed, the gap between those with high education 
and those with low levels of education has increased over time. The reasons for this 
changed gap, however, are different. On the one hand, in Germany this occurred 
due to an increased probability of being childless at 35-39 years among women with 
high and intermediate levels of education, whereas the propensity to be childless 
has remained stable over time among women with a low level of education. On the 
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other hand, the likelihood of being childless in Greece has increased among women 
with all levels of education but has increased especially among women with higher 
educational qualifications than women with lower education (Figure 3.6).  
Finally, in Italy, UK and France, the educational gradient has decreased over 
the last two decades (Figure 3.5).  
Looking at Italy it is possible to notice how women with tertiary level of study 
have remained the most prone to be childless over time, followed by women with 
intermediate and low level of study respectively. However, although the proportion 
of those 35-39 years old without children in the family unit has increased within all 
levels of education, this has been particularly sustained among women with 
intermediate and low educational qualifications, while the increase it was less 
sustained among women with tertiary degrees (Figure 3.6).  
In the UK and France, instead, the decrease in the educational gradient of 
childlessness appears to have been due to a lessening in the probability of being 
childless especially among women with higher levels of education. In the UK 
women with tertiary level remain the more likely to be childless over time than 
women with lower educational levels. However, the proportion of childlessness 
increases only among lower-educated women, while it remains stable among 
women with intermediate qualifications and it decreases among women with 
tertiary education (Figure 3.6). In France the gap decreases for a similar pattern: the 
propensity to be childless diminishes over time among women with tertiary 
education on the one hand, and the probability of being childless increases 
especially among women with lower educational qualifications, both primary and 
secondary, on the other.  
Differences between the more-educated and the less-educated women are 
partly explained by women’s working status and position in the labour market, as 
well as by their marital status. Yet, the highly educated appear overall more likely 
to be childless compared to the less-educated women (Appendix Table 3.3, Model 
3).  
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Figure 3. 6 – Average Partial Effects (in percentage points) and 95% confidence intervals 
from binomial logistic regression models predicting childlessness according to women’s 
education over time. 
 
Source: EU LFS, author’s calculation. Note: APEs computed on Model 3 of Appendix Table 3.3. 
Tabular results in Appendix Table 3.4. Childlessness proportions are computed on women in the 
age group 35-39 who have no biological children in their household. 
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Figure 3. 7 – Predicted probabilities of being childless according to women’s level of 
education, across European countries and over time. 
 
Source: EU-LFS, author’s elaboration. Note: Predicted probabilities computed on Model 3 of 
Appendix Table 3.3. Tabular results in Appendix Table 3.4. Childlessness proportions are computed 
on women in the age group 35-39 who have no biological children in their household. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
With the present work, I was interested in analysing in which way the increased 
proportion of childless women occurred over the last decades is linked to the 
increase in the proportion of women in tertiary levels of education. To answer this 
question, I investigated how the levels of female education are associated, year-by-
year, to the different likelihood of being childless across European countries and 
examined. In so doing, the analysis provides a deepen description of the presence 
of women who live without children at 35-39 years old between groups of women 
with different educational endowments.  
Although minimal changes in some countries, results show that the educational 
gradient of childlessness is persisting over time, Namely, the educational gap has 
decreased in France, in the UK and in Italy, whereas among all the other European 
countries included in the present analysis the educational gap between higher and 
lower educated women in childlessness remained the same as it was twenty years 
ago (Austria, Spain, and Portugal) or it has further increased (Germany and Greece).  
Following the theory of New Home Economics and the thesis of the Second 
Demographic Transition, I was expecting a change in the educational gradient over 
time, although motivated by different mechanisms.  
On the one side, according to the NHE, I was expecting a change in the 
education gradient over time motivated by the different cost of children in the 
labour market over time. To the extent that some countries have begun to develop 
family policies and set conditions targeted at integrating working mothers into the 
labour market, costs associated with children and motherhood might have changed 
and reduced through the years. Based on this, I tested the hypothesis of a reduction 
in the educational gap of childlessness due to diminished costs of children among 
the better-educated women in contexts that support work-family reconciliation, 
firstly. Likewise, I also tested the hypothesis of an increase in the educational gap 
of childlessness due to augmented costs for children in countries where the 
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conciliation between work and family is scarce, secondly. The case of Germany, 
France, Greece and the UK seems to be fully compatible with the notion of the 
NHE. On the one side, the better-educated women are increasingly likely to be 
childless over time compared to their lower educated women in countries that do 
not support maternal employment (i.e. Germany and Greece). On the other side, a 
narrowing educational gap is registered in relation to a lessening of the likelihood 
to be childless among the higher educated in countries that have been providing 
wealthy family policies, which sustain broad participation of women in the labour 
market, as well as higher fertility (i.e. UK and France) (Pailhé, Solaz and Tanturri, 
2018). 
In the other side, following the perspective of the SDT, the analysis was also 
addressed at testing the hypothesis of a lessening of the educational gap. In 
particular, insofar as more educated women are the forerunners of social changes 
portrayed by the SDT in connection with new individual values, I was expecting 
the difference between education levels to have reduced over time, because of 
women with low levels of education imitating women with higher level of 
education, and therefore low-educated women being increasingly more exposed to 
the propensity to be childless over time in front of higher educated women exposed 
to unchanged probabilities. Overall, results that directly fit this prediction are not 
found.  
However, the changes in the educational gaps found in Austria, Spain, Italy 
and Portugal seem to be composed of traits identifiable both in the prediction of 
economic theory and in that of changing values. Here, there has been a progressive 
increase in childlessness among less educated women, which could bring the path 
of these countries into line with the predictions of value theory. However, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal also show an increased risk of being childless among highly 
educated women. Considering that Austria, Spain and Italy stand out in Europe as 
a gender conservative country, results appear more likely to underly the economic 
dimension behind educational disparities in childlessness In Austria, the welfare 
state tends to support the absence of mothers from the labour market, rather than 
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their integration, and is not particularly committed to the redistribution of 
inequalities (Hoem, Prskawetz, and Neyer, 2001). Similarly, Italy and Spain are 
characterized by unfavourable policies and low public spending on family (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 2002), which might suggest increased costs of children not only 
among the better-educated women but also among women with lower levels of 
education.  
To wrap-up, the positive association between education and childlessness has 
remained over a period of twenty years in the majority of European countries and 
eventuated changes toward a reduction in the educational gaps of childlessness are 
rather minimal. All in all, the increase of childlessness shows to be poorly related 
to the expansion of women in higher education and mechanisms predicted by the 
NHE appear to predicts the European patterns better than STD does.  
However, significant differences in the final probability of being childless by 
educational levels exist across countries, thus suggesting that the process leading a 
woman to not to have children might depend on conditions traceable both at the 
micro- and at the macro-level. This is going to be the focus of the analysis in the 
following Chapter.  
There are key weaknesses of the present study that should however be 
addressed.  
First, given the scarce availability of comparative data on childlessness, this 
study uses a proxy to measure childlessness among women. Although this is an 
application already employed in previous studies (Caltabiano, Comolli and Rosina, 
2017), measuring childlessness as the absence children living in the household 
when their (potential) mothers is 35-39 can raise relevant issues connected with 
measurement errors over time, across countries, and in relation to the characteristics 
of individuals. This type of selection could lead to the risk of considering childless 
women who are not: firstly, for considering childless mothers whose children 
already left the family; secondly, for considering childless women who postponed 
motherhood at older ages. An implication of this is that part of the relationship 
between education and childlessness discussed in the paper is attributable to a 
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phenomenon of postponement of the first birth at later ages, which furthermore is 
closely related with women's level of education. However, although the transition 
to the first child after the age of 40 is not null, the proportion of women who become 
mothers after 40 is limited (i.e. in 2017, about 3% of first births occurred among 
women over 40 years old) (Eurostat, 2017). To better understand the degree of 
uncertainty of the presented results, I tried to validate the consistency of 
childlessness proxied as not having copresident children at 35-39, by comparing 
this measurement with estimates reported in previous works (Sobotka, 2009; 
Rowland 2007). The comparison highlights that considering 35-39 aged women 
who are without children in their household leads the risk of overestimating the 
“real” levels of childlessness of about 4% (Appendix of Chapter 3, Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2). Because the transition to first child occurs at very diversified ages in 
Europe and because this transition is not independent of women's level of education, 
future studies on the relationship between female education and childlessness 
should try to address the question by making use of better measurement of 
childlessness.  
A further limitation regards the impossibility of considering males into the 
analysis. Since EULFS data of this measure is that it allows considering only 
women, thus excluding men from the analyses, because the effect of age on fertility 
is much lower in men than in women.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the work helps to highlight the important 
differences that characterised childlessness according to women’s level of 
education, across European countries and over time.  
This is an important issue, because the distribution of childlessness across 
groups of education affects the distribution of newborns and children’s statuses as 
well. One direction for future research regard the possible consequences of the 
persisting educational gradient in childlessness and eventuated instruments that 
states could offer to offset these persisting risks. Giving that childlessness is much 
more related with lower level of education over time, future research should also 
paid attention at the emergence of the social risks among the weakest social groups.  
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CHAPTER IV. 
 
CHILDLESSNESS AND LOW FERTILITY IN CONTEXT. 
 EVIDENCE FROM A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS ON 20 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.15 
 
 
 
Brief summary 
The rapid and progressive fertility decline that occurred in most Western European 
countries since the mid-seventies constitutes a core element of debate in research, 
together with the growing scientific interest upon the determinants of smaller 
families. Increasing research is focussing on factors affecting childlessness and 
interprets its determinants mainly as endogenous to low-fertility. The present 
article discusses this assumption and presents a comparison between the 
determinants of low-fertility and the determinants of childlessness. The idea behind 
is that although the two phenomena are largely interpreted as being driven by the 
same determinants, childlessness might be qualitatively different from the condition 
of having fewer children. By making use of micro level data from the European 
Labor Force Survey (2005-2010) and external data sources, I approach the debate 
behind micro- and macro-determinants of fertility and childlessness by analysing 
women who live with their children when they are 35-39 years old. Through a series 
of multilevel models, I discuss the moderating role of institutional and normative 
context in the link between individual characteristics and childlessness and analyse 
the extent to which micro- and macro-level determinants of childlessness differ from 
factors driving lower-parities. Linking childlessness with fertility determinants, 
differentials in the likelihood of being childless across European societies over time 
are investigated and accounted for. Results partially confirm the necessity to 
explore childlessness as a phenomenon on its own, distinguishing its determinants 
from determinants of (low) fertility.  
 
15  A slightly different version of this chapter is currently submitted at an international peer-reviewed 
journal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Over the 20th century, families in Europe moved toward a new fertility model 
where the majority of women bear less than two children and childlessness is more 
common compared to previous cohorts of women (Esping-Andersen, 2007; 
Rindfuss, Choe and Brauner-Otto, 2016). Notwithstanding the increase of 
childlessness has been generalised throughout Europe, there is significant cross-
country variation in the reached levels of childlessness. Despite that, the analysis 
focussing on cross-country variation of childlessness is not commensurate with the 
number of studies analysing fertility, and research made lass progress in relation to 
the identification of the explanatory factors of childlessness compared to the 
identification of the factors of fertility (and low fertility especially).  
Two principal reasons can be identified to explain why research did not 
progress any further on the explanations of childlessness.  
First, the lack of children has long been considered as an intimate choice 
(Tanturri and Mencarini, 2008) and, as such, sociologically uninteresting. Rather 
than analysing its determinants, scholars have more debated about the social 
acceptance of a life-choice without children (see: Eicher et al., 2015; Merz and 
Liefbroer, 2012; Noordhuizen, de Graaf, and Sieben, 2010; Sobotka and Testa, 
2008), or about the consequences of a childless life (see: Albertini and Mencarini, 
2012; Allen and Wiles, 2013; Gillespie, 2001; Keizer, Dykstra and Poortman, 
2010).  
Second, because an inverse correlation between the trend of childlessness and 
total fertility persisted for years, processes behind childlessness have long been 
perceived equivalent to those that lead women to have fewer children (Kohler, 
Billari, and Ortega, 2002; Poston and Trent, 1982; Rowland, 2007). Hence, the 
mechanisms behind zero-parity have been often interpreted as equivalent to that of 
lower-parity, thus making childlessness endogenous to low fertility.  
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Under these circumstances, childlessness as a phenomenon on its own 
remained an overlooked and unexplained reality, and, although research on 
childlessness is increasing, there are still some essential issues to be taken into 
consideration.  
On the one hand, there is a decreasing correlation over time between childless 
and total fertility rates across European countries (Chapter 1: 29). This evidence 
suggests that childlessness is qualitatively different from low fertility and that it 
may arise through channels that are distinct from that leading to lower parity. 
On the second hand, research that to date addresses factors related to 
childlessness frames the analyses within two of the main theoretical perspectives 
that propose to explain (low) fertility: the Second Demographic Transition thesis 
(henceforth: SDT; van de Kaa, 2002; Lesthaeghe, 2010) and Becker’s New Home 
Economics approach (henceforth: NHE; Becker, 1960; 1981)16. Beyond identifying 
the individual actors as the starting point for explaining phenomena at the societal 
level, such approaches recognise also the relevance of the macro-level context 
within which individuals and families live for the understanding of their behaviour. 
In contrast to that, extant analysis concerning childlessness mostly looks at how 
people without children differ from parents in terms of socio-economic 
characteristic only relying at the micro-level. In so doing, research carried out to 
date yielded to a sort of “unspoken agreement” according to which childlessness is 
neither structured nor influenced by the institutional and normative setting in which 
individuals are embedded, and reproduced the view according to which that non-
childbearing choices in Europe constitute manly a private matter 17  (Miettinen, 
Rotkirch, Szalma, Donno, and Tanturri, 2015). This, however, is in contrast with 
research on fertility, which shows, conversely, that childbearing choices and 
preferences must be considered in relation to macro-level conditions, because they 
 
16  For a discussion of such theories see Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015); Lesthaeghe 
(2010).   
17 An exception is the work of Hakim (2005). She highlights how active policies for families 
have a negligible influence on fertility decisions, with a very limited impact, if any at all, on 
childlessness. 
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are intensely institutionally stratified (Ahn and Mira 2002; Barbieri et al., 2015; 
Billari, Liefbroer, and Philipov 2006; Billingsley and Ferrarini 2014; Liefbroer et 
al., 2015). If the reasons why people are childless are the same reasons behind of 
opting for fewer children, and if contextual aspects are vastly mentioned as crucial 
in the literature about family formation and fertility decline, why do studies about 
determinants of childlessness rely only on individual level determinants? This 
paradox constitutes the central tangles this work aims to disentangle.  
The analytic strategy to address this issue is to test whether the theoretical 
explanations offered for fertility decision-making process also hold in the case of 
childlessness. In so doing the chapter offers an exploration of different forms of 
stratification of the phenomenon of childlessness. Especially, it focuses on the role 
of individuals’ characteristics on the one hand, and the influence of the institutional 
and normative context in which people perform their childbearing decisions on the 
other. Especially, the work relates childlessness to the dimensions of gender 
equality and gender equity that have been lately suggested to increasingly 
contribute to changes in family and fertility behaviour (Brinton and Lee, 2016; 
Mason, 1995; McDonald, 2000b; Neyer, 2006). 
In so doing, the work adds contribution to the literature on childlessness by 
providing an analysis of micro-level determinants of childlessness in comparative 
perspective integrated with an analysis of macro-level determinants associated with 
childlessness on the one hand, and by discussing how micro and macro level 
institutional factors that are assumed to influence low fertility might also be related 
to childlessness on the other.  
 
 
2. Theoretical background  
 
 
According to the classic microeconomic approach, the choice of having 
children is a rational choice that is subjectively maximized based on costs and 
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benefits children bring into individual life. Therefore, any factor decreasing the cost 
of children should be considered as a potential factor enhancing fertility (Becker, 
1981; Cigno, 1991). Under this logic, the growth in women’s economic 
independence and the following conflict between family and work, represent two 
of the the key factors contributing to the demographical changes associated with 
low-fertility in Europe at a socio-economic level.  
During the “first phase” of the gender revolution (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and 
Lappegård, 2015) the increase in female labour market participation echoed in a 
delayed family formation: working women started to married less and later 
(Espanshade, 1985), to have children at greatest ages (), and to have overall fewer 
children than non-working women (Bernhardt, 1933). Furthermore, better educated 
women resulted as the group facing the wort effects of job insecurity, often 
postponing motherhood (Kreyenfeld, 2005), and suffering the greatest working 
career losses associated with motherhood (Baizan, 2005, Barbieri and Scherer, 
2008). With the process of gender revolution going on, the relationship between 
available resources to women and fertility started to decrease. One the one hand, 
women started to receive a greater involvement from the partner in the care 
activities (Aassve, Fuochi and Mencarini, 2014), on the other, states changed their 
attitudes in relation to interventions toward families and women’s economic 
autonomy.  
The cost-opportunity women experience with the arrival of a child are therefore 
different, not only because different are the groups of women who experience these 
costs, but also because countries and welfare regimes differ in the degree to which 
they are able to ease the work-family frictions (McDonald, 2000). As such, the 
opportunity costs of children are not independent of the changes introduced in the 
labor market and of the structure of gender relations that exists at the societal level 
(Ahn and Mira, 2002, Gauthier, 2007, Esping 2009). Policies targeted at families 
with children, as well as policies and institutional settings without a specific 
demographic target, have recently been listed among the causes of low and lowest-
low fertility (Ermisch, 1986; Rindfuss and Brauner-Otto, 2008; Scherer and Steiber 
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2007). Following the aforementioned literature, the same mechanisms by which 
policies and institutional settings may favour higher fertility might also contribute 
to understand why some persons remain without children and why more people 
today are exposed to such a risk than in was the past.  
 
2.1. Public policies targeted at reducing the cost-opportunity of children 
 
Institutions can compensate for the disadvantages of working women who want 
to be mothers through both social and family policies directed at promoting the de-
familization of care, thus helping in reconciling female careers with maternity. The 
capacity of policies addressed at families with children to affect fertility intentions 
and behaviour has been much discussed in the literature because evidence about 
their efficacy in fragmented and very dependent upon the policy package 
considered and the length of considered effect (see Gauthier 2007, Mills et al., 2011 
for a review). Policies might be targeted at subsidising the family income on the 
one side (i.e., through direct or indirect money transfers or tax reductions); or at 
reconciling work and family life on the other (i.e., parental leaves, childcare).  
Generally speaking, there are only few works documenting that child income 
support can favour the transition to parenthood (Laroque and Salanie, 2004) or 
higher parity births (Milligan, 2005), whereas the vast majority of studies agrees 
upon showing how policies aimed at increasing individual or family wealth have a 
minimum impact on fertility (Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997; Georgellis and Wall, 
1992 for the USA), if not null (Zhang, Quan, and Van Meerbergen, 1994 for 
Canada). To the opposite, policies aimed at reducing the costs associated with 
parenthood, have been shown to be a valuable factor in supporting birth rates 
(Björklund, 2006; Blanchet and Ekert-Jaffé, 1994; Castles, 2003; Del Boca, 2002; 
Del Boca and Repetto-Alaia, 2003; DiPrete et al., 2002; Ekert-Jaffé, 1986; Hoem, 
1993; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2005; Oláh, 2003; Walker, 1995), although the effect 
has sometimes been found to be related only to second or higher parity births (Ekert-
Jaffé et al., 2002), or to be limited in time (Buttner and Lutz, 1990). Under the 
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assumption that mechanisms underlying childlessness reflect the same mechanisms 
that influence low fertility, I will, therefore, test the hypothesis that family policies 
supporting childcare are associated with a lower propensity to be childless 
(hypothesis 1). 
 
2.2. Inadvertent policies 
 
In addition to policies directly targeted at families, there are also structural and 
institutional arrangements that can potentially affect childbearing behaviour 
(Ermisch, 1986; Rindfuss and Brauner-Otto, 2008). By working on dimensions 
related to the labour market, governments can encourage – intendedly or 
unintendedly – a more equal distribution of paid and unpaid work within couples. 
One the one side, governments can encourage men to uptake family obligations, 
consequently relieving work-oriented women from family tasks and supporting 
their fertility (Esping Andersen, 2009, Andersen 2009; Keck and Saraceno, 2013). 
On the other side, governments can regulate the incompatibilities between fertility 
and female employment by offering labour market measures that enable women to 
better organise their family time (Del Boca et al., 2009).  
The organisation of working time in different European countries by means of 
national labour contracts constitutes an example of how the institutional conditions 
may promote gender relation supportive for fertility. A lower amount of time spent 
by men on the main job (i.e. with lower average working hours) can allow men to 
uptake greater responsibilities within the household, whereas a lower amount of 
time spent by women on the main job (i.e. through part-time jobs) can allow women 
with care requirements to better reconcile family and work (Baizan, Arpino, and 
Delclòs, 2016; Keck and Saraceno, 2013; Saraceno and Keck, 2011; Anxo, Fagan, 
Cebrian, and Moreno, 2006; Barbieri et al., 2019). 
Based on these premises, it can be expected that those countries in which 
institutions support more egalitarian gender relations within the household, women 
will not only combine work and family more easily but will also be less likely to be 
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childless. I will, therefore, test the working hypothesis that childlessness is lower in 
contexts that support reconciliation of work and family (Hypothesis 2).  
 
2.3. Gender norms 
 
Besides a greater equal division of roles within the couple, even the perception 
of fairness is at least as important. There are indeed two different dimensions of 
gender egalitarianism. The first is related to the gender equity, that refers to the 
equality between genders in various institutional domains (e.g. gender quality in 
education or participation in the labour market), the second refers to the gender 
equality, that indicates how the distribution of certain resource (e.g. access to 
education, chances to employment) is perceived as fair by men and women, in a 
situation in which men and women could potentially have equal access to (but not 
necessarily equal levels of) that resource (McDonald 2000a, 2000b, 2013). 
Remarkably, McDonald argues that what matters most for fertility outcomes is not 
the equality in results (gender equality), but the perceived equality in the access 
(gender equity) is at least as important. Put differently: the involvement in care work 
might be unequal in practice, but as long as it is perceived to be fair, it should have 
no negative effect on fertility. 
Low fertility, therefore, may be interpreted as the result of frictions between 
the institutional and the normative context, in the sense that, where a normative 
perception of gender egalitarianism does not support gender equality in institutions, 
low fertility can be the result. Empirical research seems to corroborate this idea: in 
those societies where people express more egalitarian attitudes toward the division 
of gender roles and where there is a more fair division of household work and 
childcare time, fertility rates, as well as fertility intentions, are generally higher 
(Arpino, Esping-Andersen, and Pessin, 2015; Cooke, 2008; Kaufman, 2000; Mills 
et al., 2008; Oláh, 2003; Puur et al., 2008). On the other hand, in those countries 
where the gender revolution has stalled (Esping-Andersen, 2009), lower fertility 
rates are found (Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015). 
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Referring to evidence on the trend of childlessness reported in Chapter 2, it is 
possible to observe how some countries with higher childlessness rates also report 
lower scores in the gender equality indices (i.e., Italy and Germany). Yet, 
counterevidence also exists. Low levels of childlessness occur both in countries 
with a relatively high (i.e., Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg) and low gender equality 
(i.e., Portugal). Lastly, considering that institutions are interrelated with a broader 
normative context that includes different attitudes, norms and values (Boeckmann, 
Misra, and Budig, 2015), it is possible to expect that the cultural background 
interacts with the structural conditions in shaping the intentions to be childless and 
childlessness as an outcome. As in the case of fertility, in particular, it is possible 
to expect that childlessness depend on a gender imbalance that persists despite the 
revolution in women’s role (Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015; McDonald, 2000a, 
2006). I will, therefore, test the working hypothesis that the effect of gender 
egalitarian conditions in buffering the risk of being childless is stronger the more 
gender-equal society is (Hypothesis 3). 
Furthermore, the generalised increase in female labour market participation 
suggests that women across all the socio-economic groups have become more 
strongly affected in their fertility decisions by labour market equilibriums. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that employment chances, wealth and return on 
educations decline with the birth of a child, empirical research have been showing 
how women who invested more in their education are also more likely to invest 
more in their career before having children (Barbieri and Scherer, 2008). 
Accordingly, research also shows that not all women benefit the same from 
conditions that aim to reduce the constraints of fertility (Bratti and Tatsiramos, 
2012). The potential effect of policies largely depends on the opportunities and 
costs associated with motherhood, as well as on individual preferences. In societies 
that support less gender egalitarianism and that entails a strong choice between 
family and career, the decision is harder for women who invested more in their 
career and job. Considering how these socio-economic groups perceive higher costs 
associated with maternity and have often lower access for reconciling work and 
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family life, childlessness may be contained by policies. We will, therefore, assess 
the extent to which the effect of gender equality policies in affecting childlessness 
differs between social groups of women. Notably, we will investigate the extent to 
which the effect of conditions and policies that favour equal gender relations differs 
according to the opportunity cost of children and test the working hypothesis that 
the protective role of gender egalitarian policies on childlessness will be more 
significant among highly educated women as well as among women employed in 
better working positions (Hypothesis 4). 
Overall, if we consider the mechanisms behind childlessness being the same as 
those underlying low fertility, previous theoretical arguments support the 
hypothesis of an effect of the institutional and cultural context in cushioning 
childlessness. Contrarily, if mechanisms behind childlessness are different from 
those of low fertility, we should expect distinctive mechanisms or no effect at all. 
We thus test the additional hypothesis that macro-level institutional factors 
influencing childlessness rates are different from those affecting fertility 
(Hypothesis 5). 
 
 
3. Data and Method 
 
Analyses are based on the micro-data of the European Union Labor Force 
Survey (EU-LFS), which is complemented with macro-level indicators retrieved 
from the Multilinks Database on Intergenerational Policy Indicators, the European 
Value Survey (EVS), and the OECD database.  
The EU-LFS represents a large household sample survey developed for 
analysing labour force participation of people aged 15 and over. Although it is an 
unusual choice when analysing childbearing behaviour, the dataset represents a 
valuable source, because it collects information about all the members living in a 
private family roaster. This specific design allows therefore to reconstruct the 
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proportion of women living with or without children at specific ages. Furthermore, 
the data provides ample sample and harmonised information at the European level. 
The surveys are indeed conducted by the national statistical institutes, but centrally 
processed by Eurostat.  
The Multilinks Database on Intergenerational Policy Indicators collects 
empirical information about social policies and the legal framework of European 
countries for the years 2004 and 2009. Notably, it addresses explicitly how the state, 
through public policies and legal norms, defines and regulates intergenerational 
obligations within the family.  
Due to the availability of macro information, the analyses cover the time span 
between 2005 and 2010 and 20 countries are considered, namely: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, United Kingdom.  
 
3.1. Dependent variables 
 
Two dependent variables measure whether a woman is childless in her 
household or whether she is a mother, distinguishing in this latter case how many 
cohabiting children she has. The EU-LFS does not provide direct information about 
the actual number of children women have over their lifetime, but it contains 
information on the number of co-resident family members and family relationship 
with them. It is therefore possible to consider the number of children who reside in 
their mother’s household at specific ages of the mother. Accordingly, the first 
dependent variable measures whether a woman has or not cohabiting children when 
she is 35-39, whereas a second dependent variable measures how many children 
live in the household when the mother is the same years old. I assess the validity of 
these measures by comparing obtained country-year estimations with available 
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macro information on childlessness and adjusted total fertility rates.18 Overall, there 
is a high correlation between childlessness and total fertility proxied as the absence 
of cohabiting children when women are 35-39 years old and the number of children 
live together with this group of mothers. It is therefore possible to conclude that the 
measurement is representative of the actual condition also at the micro level. This 
kind of operativization has the cost of excluding men from the analyses, since the 
effect of age on fertility is much lower in men than in women, which is the 
motivation why I could not include men on the analysis.  
 
3.2. Independent variables 
 
Country-level variables collect information about institutional and normative 
conditions and are retrieved from the Multilinks Database and the EVS dataset. To 
test the influence of family policies and institutional settings, three indicators were 
considered (Table 4.1).  
To test whether policies targeted at families might mitigate childlessness, I 
considered a measure of the generosity of leaves regulations. Precisely, paid and 
unpaid parental leaves are considered as an indicator of policies designed at 
recognising the care work for children and for dependent family members. This 
information is retrieved from the Multilinks Database on Intergenerational Policies 
2011 (version 2.0)19 and it represents the total length of paid and unpaid leave 
available to both parents, expressed in months, weighted according to the income 
replacement rate of the benefit. The indicator measures the duration of paid parental 
leave weighted by payment level, hence being an indicator of both the duration and 
the quality of parental leaves. In the considered period, parental leaves are 
particularly stable and effective among the former Communist bloc. Countries like 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, report the highest level of leaves, 
 
18 Please refer to the Appendix of Chapter 4 for detail con comparison. 
19 Available at the website: https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/ 
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whereas very low levels are registered in the UK, Spain and Ireland. The indicator 
is available for 2004 and for 2009, therefore the observations that go from 2005 to 
2008 match the first value, while the observations collected in the period 2009 and 
2010 are merged with the second one.  
To the extent that inadvertent policies can also influence an equal share of 
family responsibility between partners and can support in this way a more or less 
gender equal setting, two indicators of countries’ institutional settings are 
furthermore considered.  
First, the share of women working part-time is included as an indicator of 
institutional setting that allows women to be both commodified and defamilialised. 
Specifically, this measure indicates the incidence of female part-time employment 
in the age group 25-54, based on the conventional threshold of 30 working hours in 
the main job. The Netherlands in the years that goes from 2005 to 2008 is the 
country with the highest share of female part-time, whereas Bulgaria is the country 
with the lowest levels, as it remains below the 1% along all the five years 
considered. There has not been enormous change over years, but some increases are 
observable in the Mediterranean countries such as in Spain, Greece and Italy 
together with Austria and Germany. Still, in these countries, the final levels are very 
dissimilar.  
Second, the number of hours worked by men on the primary job is included as 
an indicator of labour market conditions that encourage men to take an equal share 
of family responsibilities. Being men who work longer hours on the labor market 
less likely to engage in care and household activities, this indicator shall account 
for the capacity of policies to “familialise men”, encouraging their access into the 
private sphere and incentivising fathers to share childcare. The number of hours 
worked weekly is considered among men aged 25-54. Comparatively, the countries 
with the lowest hours worked are the Netherlands and Lithuania, where men work 
overall less than 40 hours per week, while the countries where men work the most 
are Poland, Greece and the UK.  
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Table 4. 1 – Country level policies and Gender Egalitarian Norms index 
Country Share of women Parental leave (months) (c) 
Average usual weekly hours worked Gender Egalitarian 
working part-time(a) on the main job by men (a) Norms (b) 
Year of use 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005/ 2009/ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005/ 2009/ 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Survey 2000/ 2001/ 2002/ 2003/ 2004/ 2005/ 2004 2009 2000/ 2001/ 2002/ 2003/ 2004/ 2005/ 1999 2008 year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 28.3 29.3 30.4 31.1 31.7 32.1 10.9 9.8 42.0 42.6 43.2 43.8 44.4 44.2 52.9 67.0 
Belgium 34.2 33.5 33.4 33.0 32.6 31.9 4.7 4.6 41.1 41.1 41.0 41.0 40.9 40.8 70.1 78.8 
Bulgaria 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 17.6 16.8 41.6 41.7 41.7 41.8 42.0 42.0 47.5 58.4 
Chez Rep. 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2 25.2 17.9 44.4 44.2 44.2 44.1 44.0 43.9 65.3 59.4 
Germany 36.8 37.8 38.5 39.2 39.5 39.7 6.8 12.6 41.2 41.0 40.9 40.8 40.9 40.9 55.9 65.1 
Estonia 6.8 6.8 6.5 6.7 6.7 7.2 15.3 17.6 42.0 41.8 41.7 41.6 41.5 41.2 75.5 73.1 
Spain 15.4 16.3 17.0 17.8 18.5 19.1 3.7 3.7 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.2 42.2 42.2 62.5 70.9 
France 22.4 22.1 21.8 21.6 21.4 21.3 13.3 13.0 40.5 40.7 41.1 41.5 41.6 41.6 68.3 84.5 
Greece 9.6 9.9 10.7 11.4 11.9 12.6 3.5 4.1 45.0 45.0 45.0 44.9 44.8 44.7 72.6 59.6 
Hungary 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 20.2 20.5 42.1 41.9 41.7 41.6 41.4 41.2 67.9 84.1 
Ireland 32.6 32.9 33.0 33.2 33.6 33.9 2.1 2.7 42.7 42.4 42.1 41.9 41.6 41.2 75.6 71.1 
Italy 24.4 25.5 26.7 27.9 29.3 29.6 5.5 5.5 41.6 41.7 41.8 41.8 41.9 41.7 56.8 67.6 
Lithuania 13.7 13.5 12.4 11.3 9.8 8.7 16.7 24.3 39.3 39.4 39.4 39.6 39.8 39.8 65.1 62.9 
Luxemburg 30.8 31.3 30.4 30.0 29.6 29.6 11.7 10.6 41.2 41.0 40.8 40.5 40.2 40.3 66.0 76.9 
Latvia 9.2 8.8 8.0 7.1 6.6 6.3 12.9 12.1 44.1 44.0 43.8 43.4 42.9 42.3 69.5 70.9 
Netherlands 57.1 57.4 57.5 57.2 56.8 56.3 3.7 7.0 39.3 39.2 39.1 39.1 39.2 39.2 83.4 85.3 
Poland 14.4 14.3 14.4 14.1 13.7 13.0 3.2 4.1 44.3 44.4 44.4 44.3 44.2 44.0 45.1 65.2 
Portugal 10.3 10.0 9.6 9.4 9.2 9.0 3.9 5.2 42.1 42.0 41.9 41.8 41.8 41.7 61.4 63.6 
Slovakia 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.1 8.8 11.9 42.5 42.2 42.0 42.0 42.2 42.2 54.2 54.0 
UK 37.3 36.7 36.2 35.8 35.3 35.0 2.5 3.7 45.0 44.7 44.4 44.2 44.0 43.7 66.9 79.1 
Source: Own elaboration from (a) OECD.Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FTPTC_I), (b) EVS 1999-2008 (http://zacat.gesis.org/webview), 
(c) Multilinks Database on Intergenerational Policies 2011 (version 2.0) (https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/session/new) 
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Both these indicators are derived from the OECD database. In order to consider 
that the potential effects of policies might exist not at the end of the reproductive 
period, but in the period during which women are more subjected to deciding about 
motherhood all the indicators are the average of the five years preceding the time 
of observation. To give an example, the part-time indicator for women who are 35-
39 years old in 2010 reflects the situation when these women were 30-35 years old. 
Finally, a proxy of social beliefs about gender equity norms is considered to 
investigate the extent to which the relationship between childlessness and structural 
conditions depends on the stage of gender equity reached within one country. To 
do so the rate of respondents who said to disagree with the statement “When jobs 
are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” is retrieved from the 
third and the fourth waves of the EVS.  
As before, the values from the EVS 1999 are linked to observations in years 
from 2005 to 2007, and the estimates resulting from EVS 2008 to the years 2008 
and 2010. The Netherlands is the country in which not only policies are most 
developed, but also gender-egalitarian attitudes are more diffused. Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Poland have egalitarian norms below the average in the first period, 
but a general improvement can be noticed for almost all the countries considered as 
time goes by. 
Models also include a series of individual controls. To establish the extent to 
which the structural and normative determinants are equally distributed in the 
population, an interaction effect with women’s education and working position is 
tested. In order to reduce the cross-country complexity in the different levels of 
education and allow for a comparison, the educational attainment is measured with 
three dummy variables based on the 1997 UNESCO International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED). The analyses distinguish between low 
educated (ISCED 1 – ISCED 2), middle educated (ISCED 3 – ISCED 4) and high 
educated (ISCED 5 – ISCED 6) women. Similarly, the information about the female 
working position contains evidence both about the labour status and the labour 
position, distinguishing between Inactive, Unemployed and Employed women. 
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Within this latter group, I further discriminate depending on being low-skilled blue-
collar, high-skilled blue-collar, low-skilled white collar and high-skilled white-
collar worker, according to the information provided by the ISCO-88 classification 
at one-digit level.  
Given the importance of partnership in the pathway toward childlessness 
(Keizer, Dykstra, and Jansen, 2008) models furthermore controls for relationship 
status. Hence, women are grouped in a) previously married, if they declared to be 
divorced, legally separated or widowed; b) women who are not in a union; and c) 
married women. 
By excluding non-native women and considering missing information on the 
level of education, working position or marital status, the final sample includes 
almost 720 thousand childless women and 630 thousand mothers, aged between 35-
39 years. 
 
3.3. Analytical strategy  
 
In order to examine the association between institutional, normative and socio-
demographic factors with both childlessness and total fertility, analyses applying a 
multilevel technique were conducted. Specifically, linear probability multilevel 
regression models in the case of childlessness and linear multilevel regressions 
model in the case of the number of children were performed with women (level 1) 
nested in a combination of country-year observations (level 2). In order to evaluate 
how the relationship between macro-level factors and childlessness differ by 
individual characteristics, I test whether institutional factors and societal norms are 
moderated by the level of education and working position of women by introducing 
a cross-level interactions effects.  
This method has two decisive advantages: on the one side, analysing 
childlessness and fertility jointly – i.e. using the same data, techniques, and 
predictors – allows for a comparison of the mechanisms behind the two phenomena 
and to estimate if macro-level institutional factors influencing childlessness are 
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different from those affecting fertility. On the other side, the multilevel technique 
allows to take the nested structure of the data into account and to estimate the 
proportion of the total variance that is attributable to the individual and the 
contextual level.  
Five multilevel models’ specifications are considered. After presenting a null 
model (Table 4.2) – multilevel analyses in which childlessness and parity are 
separately regressed without the inclusion of any predictors – I look at how 
individual determinants influence both childlessness and low fertility (Table 4.3).  
This second step helps in identifying the extent to which observed differences in 
the propensity to be childless between countries could potentially be due to either 
policies or institutional variations or to different population compositions of the 
considered countries. Several regressions are estimated to assess the relationship 
between the individual current level of education, working status and position, and 
partnership status with both fertility and childlessness.  
Being interested in observing whether the effect of the predictors of fertility 
differs from that of childlessness, their impact is estimated through a series of 
nested models (Columns 1a-1d), so as to account for potential different direct effect 
if each of the predictors. Accordingly, the impact of macro-indicators on fertility 
and childlessness is included in the third step of the analysis, by investigating it one 
at a time and jointly (Table 4.4). Fourth, an interaction model between macro and 
micro determinants is applied (Figures 4.1-2-3).  
This cross-level interaction seeks at revealing whether the impact of macro-
characteristics of childlessness differs significantly according to the opportunity 
cost associated with children. 
 In the final step, an interaction model of the macro relationship between 
policies and institutional assets together with the level of gender equality is 
investigated (Figure 4.4). 
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4. Results 
 
 
The variance decomposition of the null model (Table 4.2) confirms that fertility 
decisions are mainly an individual level phenomenon. Still, a part of contextual 
variation not only related to fertility, but also regarding childlessness, remains 
unexplained at the micro-level. The Intra Class Correlation – i.e. the proportion of 
the total variation at the country-year level – shows that the 3% of the variance in 
fertility is over country-years, and the remaining 97% at an individual level, 
whereas the 2% of the variance in childlessness can be attributed to differences 
between country-years.  
 
 
Table 4. 2 – Estimates of two separate two-level multilevel models for permanent 
childlessness and number of children (Beta coefficient – Standard errors in parentheses). 
Variable Number of children  Childlessness 
Constant 1.947***  0.172*** 
 (0.014)  (0.005) 
var(cy) 0.024***  0.003*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) 
var(Residual) 0.725***  0.148*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
N 626,477  719,832 
ICC 0.0325  0.0204 
Sign. Levels: * p < .05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Note: Beta coefficient. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Var(cy) is the variance of the random effect at the second level (country-year). ICC 
is the Intra Class Correlation. Source: EU-LFS 2005-2010, author’s elaboration.  
 
 
4.1. The role of individual characteristics on fertility and childlessness 
 
Models in Table 4.3 present results of individual characteristics associated with 
fertility and with childlessness among women aged 35-39. The model makes it 
possible to observe the extent to which the level of education, employment status 
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and position, and partnership history are associated with both parity (N1a-N1d) and 
childlessness (C1a-C1d). Several considerations can be made. 
First, the model illustrates that there is a significant within country-year 
variation both in fertility and in childlessness, which is in line with the increasing 
trend of childlessness and decreasing trend of fertility largely documented by the 
extant research and depicted in Chapter 3. Being the within country-year variation 
significantly different from zero in all the specifications, the models also allow to 
consider that individual determinants of fertility and childlessness significantly 
differ across countries, which further stresses the importance of consider 
characteristics of both fertility and childlessness situated in specific contexts.  
Second, the model makes it possible to observe the relationship between 
fertility and female socio-economic characteristics, as well as between 
childlessness and socio-economic characteristics, net of the heterogeneous features 
that arrive from institutional and normative context. When predicting the number 
of children, models show a consistent relationship between the level of education 
and parity: the lowest fertility appears to be present among the most educated 
women. Contrary to that, the more a woman is educated, the more she is likely to 
remain childless, as analyses suggests by showing how low educated women have 
overall a lower propensity to remain childless compared to middle and highly 
educated women, who, in turn, report the highest likelihood toward childlessness. 
Hence, education has a direct and significant negative effect on fertility, whereas it 
positively affects the likelihood to be a childless woman (models N1a and C1a). 
Also, the working status and position of women affects both their family size 
and likelihood to be childless at 35-39. Being inactive in the labour market is 
associated with a higher propensity of women to have many children, whereas 
women who participate in the labour market – weather employed or unemployed – 
have overall less chance to have large families. Especially, women employed in 
white-collar jobs have significantly higher propensity to have fewer children 
compared to women in positions with less specialisation and with less earning 
(growth) prospects (model N1b). For childlessness, the pattern is nearly 
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symmetrical: the propensity to be childlessness is higher within those women in the 
labour force than among inactive women, and it also prevails for female workers in 
white-collar jobs than in lower-skilled once (model C1b).  
 
 
Table 4. 3 – Individual level predictors. Multilevel model for Number of Children 
and Childlessness. Beta coefficient (Standard errors in parentheses). 
Variable Childlessness  Number of children 
 C1a C1b C1c C1d  N1a N1b N1c N1d 
Low Edu. -0.024***   -0.014***  0.234***   0.165*** 
 (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.003)   (0.003) 
High Edu. 0.078***   0.039***  -0.082***   -0.040*** 
 (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.003)   (0.003) 
Unemployed  0.094***  0.041***   -0.258***  -0.207*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
LS blue collar  0.061***  0.040***   -0.274***  -0.264*** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)   (0.004)  (0.004) 
HS blue collar  0.057***  0.046***   -0.180***  -0.178*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
LS white 
collar  0.090***  0.056*** 
  -0.407***  -0.355*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.003)  (0.003) 
HS white collar 0.132***  0.069***   -0.422***  -0.337*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Prev. married   0.090*** 0.091***    -0.237*** -0.227*** 
   (0.001) (0.001)    (0.004) (0.004) 
Single   0.540*** 0.533***    -0.425*** -0.421*** 
   (0.001) (0.001)    (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.155*** 0.090*** 0.060*** 0.007  1.919*** 2.237*** 2.035*** 2.254*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Var. cy level 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  0.030*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Var. explained 0 0 0 0  -25 -13 -17 -42 
Var. Ind. level 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.105*** 0.104***  0.712*** 0.696*** 0.701*** 0.669*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Var. explained 1 2 29 30  2 4 3 8 
ICC 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.031  0.040 0.037 0.038 0.048 
N 719,832     626,477 
Source: EU-LFS 2005-2010, author’s elaboration. Sing. Levels: * p < .05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
Note: N country-year: 120. ICC is the intra Class Correlation. Baseline categories: Middle educated, 
inactive, married women.  
 
 
Additionally, the analysis provides evidence about how large part of the 
variability in fertility and childlessness especially is directly accounted by the 
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marital status of women, to the extent that there is a strong association between 
marital status and both fertility and childlessness. Mothers tend to be married, 
whereas childless women tend to be not. Likewise, women who are divorced, 
legally separated or widowed, as well as women who are not in a union, tend to 
have smaller families and higher childless propensity compared to women who are 
married at the time of the interview (models N1c and C1c).  
Third, if we compare the present findings with the results for the null model 
(Table 4.2), the inclusion of individual-level characteristics reduces the amount of 
unexplained variance that is associated with the overall error term concerning 
fertility and childlessness. Furthermore, the proportion of variance explained at the 
individual level shows that the added individual predictors account for the 30% of 
variance in childlessness (C1d), whereas they only account for the 8% of the 
variance in fertility (N1d). Of course, since we are dealing with individual-level 
predictors, this represents an expected reduction and that individual characteristics 
account for some of the total variability both for fertility and for childlessness. 
A less expected result is that, when the model with individual predictors is 
compared with the unadjusted model, the unexplained variance of fertility at the 
country-year level increases, whereas it remains stable for childlessness. That is to 
say that, once the variability in the two phenomena is accounted for by means of 
individual characteristics, there is an increase in the level-2 residual variance in the 
case of fertility, whereas the proportion of level-2 residual variance for 
childlessness remains stable. This is confirmed also when we consider an index of 
the proportion reduction of the variance at level-2 and obtain negative values for 
fertility. That is to say that before controlling for individual characteristics the 
levels of fertility were much similar across country-years, whereas after having 
added individual characteristics there is a greater variation. Such increased 
differences in the outcome might be attributable to differences of composition – 
i.e., to changed characteristics of the individuals in the different country-years – 
which might be indicative of greater influence of individual characteristic on 
fertility than contextual features. The ICC showing variation from the adjusted in 
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respect to the null model shall also support this possible interpretation. In fact, once 
individual predictors are included, only a small proportion of the variance of 
fertility and childlessness appears to be explained by characteristics associated with 
the country-year level – i.e. 5% in the case of fertility – 3% in the case of 
childlessness. 
 
4.2. Is childlessness lower in contexts that favour gender egalitarian relations?  
 
Country-level predictors are now included in the analysis, seeking to 
investigate how characteristics of macro-level conditions are associated with 
fertility and childlessness. In particular, we observe how policies – explicitly or 
inexplicitly targeted at families – and gender norms influence mothers to have more 
or fewer children and argue how institutional conditions might also play a role in 
affecting the possibility to be childless. In line with the aforesaid literature, we 
expect that if the mechanisms behind childlessness are the same than those behind 
low fertility, the propensity of women to be childless will be also affected by 
institutional and normative contexts that support a more equal share of family 
responsibility. Consistent with this expectation, Table 4 displays the unconditioned 
effects of policies and norms on individual fertility and childlessness, net of 
individual characteristics (complete outcome is available in Appendix Table 8 and 
9).  
Longer and better leaves are significantly associated with both fewer children 
and a lower propensity to be a childless woman. Where and when the opportunity 
to uptake a parental leave for mothers and fathers is higher, and leaves are longer 
and of better quality, women tend to have a lower propensity to increase their family 
size (N2a). However, they tend less often to be childless (C2a). This finding seems 
to support the hypothesis that where family policies better support childcare there 
is a lower propensity to be childless. In the presence of more generous leaves, 
women tend to be mothers more often. However, their families are smaller, and it 
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appears that leaves do not have a significant role in raising fertility through mother’s 
higher order births.  
 
 
Table 4. 4 –  Unconditioned effects of policies and norms on the likelihood of being 
childless and on the number of children. Results of separate multilevel models (Beta 
coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses).  
Variables Childlessness 
 C2a C2b C2c C2d CM3 
Parental leaves -0.004***    -0.004*** 
 (0.001)    (0.001) 
Female part-time   0.001*   0.001 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Men worked hours   0.004  0.001 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Gender equity    -0.002** -0.002*** 
       (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.048*** -0.012 -0.176 0.122*** 0.152 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.143) (0.036) (0.152) 
Var. cy level 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Var. ind. level 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 719,832 
ICC 0.0244 0.0296 0.0307 0.0286 0.0208 
      
 Variables Number of Children 
  N2a N2b N2c N2d NM3 
Parental leaves -0.0002***    0.005 
 (0.003)    (0.003) 
Female part-time   0.004***   0.0036* 
  (0.001)   (0.001) 
Men worked hours   -0.012  0.018 
   (0.01)  (0.012) 
Gender equity    0.0094*** 0.008*** 
        (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 2.255*** 2.178*** 2.76*** 1.623*** 0.816 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.456) (0.103) (0.502) 
Var. cy level 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Var. ind. level 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 626,477 
ICC 0.0483 0.0439 0.0478 0.0368 0.0348 
Source: EU-LFS 2005-2010, author’s elaboration. Sing. Levels: * p < .05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
Note: N country-year: 120. ICC is the Intra Class Correlation. Models are net of level of 
education, working status and position, marital status (Complete model available in Appendix 
Table 8 and 9) 
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I also looked at how fertility and childlessness relate to female part-time and 
average men working hours, so as to test the hypothesis that fertility is higher and 
childlessness is lower in contexts that reduce the cost of a child by favour gender 
egalitarian relations through institutional settings that support gender equality. 
Results show a positive and significant association between female part-time and 
both parity and childlessness, so that the higher the share of women working part-
time, the higher is both fertility and childlessness (N2b and C2b). 
Accordingly, women who live in a context where men spend longer time on 
the primary job appear to have a lower probability of having larger families (N2c), 
and a higher likelihood to be childless (C2c). Although in line with the expectations, 
the effect is not statistically significant. Therefore, only from the link between part-
time and fertility or childlessness we can get some conclusion about the hypothesis 
of a positive effect of institutional conditions supporting egalitarian relation not 
only for fertility but also for childlessness. We were expecting to find that the higher 
the female part-time, the greater the family size, and therefore the lower is childless. 
Results, on the contrary, show that part-time does associate with higher fertility, but 
also with a greater likelihood to be childless. Although these findings appear 
counter-intuitive according to theoretical forecasts outlined above, it should be 
considered that the use of female part-time varies extensively among the countries 
examined, not only in its level but also in its quality (Del Boca, 2009). Thus, the 
structure of the labour market and the level of social protection that is attached to 
part-time very much varies across countries, and it defines the role that the part-
time work might have in affecting the costs women attach to motherhood. For 
example, in Southern European countries part-time work is scarce and often 
associated with precarious conditions. In these contexts, part-time job is also 
negatively perceived, to the extent that it is frequently related to precarious labour 
market conditions and it imposes higher career costs for women with children, who 
are therefore more often forced to working full-time or not working (Barbieri et al., 
2019). In other countries instead, like in the Nordic ones, part-time is generally a 
well-perceived condition, as well as more appreciated as an option to combine work 
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and family also among highly educated women. Therefore, to the extent that not in 
all contexts the part-time job has the power to level off the costs associated with 
motherhood, which could result in observing that where female part-time is more 
diffused, the propensity to be childless is higher.  
Lastly, in line with several recent theories in demography which have been 
suggesting that gender equality and fertility have a u-shaped relationship, I tested 
whether between gender equality and childlessness a relationship also exists. 
Overall, it is possible to see that in societies where more people think that a man 
has better right than a woman to work in presence of scarce jobs, women tend to 
limit their family size (N2d) and to be childless to a greater extent (C2d). This 
indicator about attitudes toward female employment can be considered an indicator 
of gender equality at the societal level, which leads to conclude that when and where 
women are considered as equal to men in the labour market, the level of fertility is 
higher and the level of childlessness is lower, which is in line with our expectations.  
Considering the entire picture, it appears that childlessness as well as fertility 
is associated with family-friendly institutions and the level of gender equality 
reached in societies, therefore highlighting the potential effects that institutional 
and normative context might have on childlessness too. However, the effect of 
policies, institutional settings, and normative conditions on childlessness does not 
always display the same gradient than on fertility. This evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that mechanisms leading to childlessness do not necessarily reflect 
those affecting fertility.  
Lastly, in line with several recent theories in demography that have been 
suggested that gender equality and fertility have a u-shaped relationship, we test 
whether between gender equality and childlessness a relationship also exists. 
Overall, we found that in societies where more people think that a man has better 
right than a woman to work in presence of scarce jobs, women tend to limit their 
family size (N2d) and to be childless to a greater extent (C2d). We interpret this 
indicator about attitudes toward female employment as an indicator of gender 
equality at the societal level and conclude that when and where women are 
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considered as equal to men in the labour market, the level of fertility is higher and 
the level of childlessness is lower, which is in line with our expectations.  
Considering the entire picture, it appears that childlessness as well as fertility 
is associated with family-friendly institutions and the level of gender equality 
reached in societies, therefore highlighting the potential effects that institutional 
and normative context might have on childlessness too. However, the effect of 
policies, institutional settings, and normative conditions on childlessness does not 
always display the same gradient than on fertility. This evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that mechanisms leading to childlessness do not necessarily reflect 
those affecting fertility.  
 
4.3. Which women benefit most?  
 
Policies supporting gender relations might influence the nature and strength of 
the association between women’s childbearing outcome and education, as well as 
the association between childbearing and women’s working status. This appears to 
be of particular importance because of evidence resulting from previous models 
showing that most of the variability in childlessness appears to be related to 
individual-level characteristics. Following this, the analysis looks at whether the 
relationship between gender equalising conditions and fertility, on the one side, and 
gender equalising conditions and childlessness, on the other, changes across groups 
of women who perceive different motherhood-related costs. The expectation is that 
the effect of policies and labour market conditions in reducing childlessness is 
stronger among women who perceive higher costs associated with the birth of a 
child – i.e., women better educated and in better working positions. To test this 
hypothesis a cross-level interaction between women’s socio-demographic and 
family policies and institutional arrangements is specified in the model, so as to 
evaluate whether the effect of gender-equalising conditions is different according 
to a different distribution of the costs associated with children in the female 
population. The series of multilevel modelling holding this specification is fully 
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reported in Appendix Table 8 and Table 9. The graphs plotted in Figure 1 shows 
the strength to which female socio-economic status on childlessness (left panel) and 
fertility (right panel) differs across different levels of macro-level conditions. Given 
that the parental leaves are recognised as a tool to bring mothers back into the labour 
market following childbirth and thought as an instrument for job continuity with 
the collateral effect of boosting fertility, an interaction with woman's working 
condition is introduced. The other macro-level characteristics interact with the 
female’s education, which is better suited to capturing the perceived cost associated 
with having a child. To ease the substantive interpretation of results, predicted 
probabilities are reported.  
The relationship between parental leaves and fertility varies according to the 
working position of women, whereas the inverse relationship between more 
effective leaves and childlessness remains stable across all the groups of female 
workers (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 4. 1 – Predicted probability of being without children (left) and predicted number 
of children (right) by length of parental weeks available and female level of education (90% 
Conf. Int. displayed). 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2005-2010, author’s elaboration. Predictions refer to Table 8 and Table 9, model 
C3.  
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Once the heterogeneity of female working position is considered, more effective 
parental leaves seems to play a significant and substantive role only among the 
inactive group of women, whereas the relationship disappears among the active 
group of women. To the opposite, in contexts that provide few weeks of parental 
leaves, childlessness is higher irrespective of a woman’s occupation, being lower 
among the inactive women and higher among women occupied in high skilled 
white-collar jobs. Therefore, leaves appear as instruments related with higher 
fertility only among inactive women but appear also to be related to a higher 
propensity to be mothers across all the social groups, being associated with a lower 
likelihood of living in an empty nest. 
Considering the share of women working part-time as measures of institutional 
assets that allow women to be both commodified and defamilialised, it can be 
similarly commented that in countries where a lower proportion of women works 
part-time there is a robust educational gradient in fertility (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 4. 2 – Predicted probability of being without children (left) and predicted number 
of children (right) by share of female part-time and female level of education (90% Conf. 
Int. displayed). 
Source: EU-LFS 2005-2010, author’s elaboration. Predictions refer to Table 8 and Table 9, model 
C1. 
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In these contexts, women with an intermediate or higher level of education are 
those who have fewer children, whereas lower educated women have overall larger 
families. This differential persists in contexts where female part-time work is more 
common but diminishes till becoming not significant where most women share 
part-time work. The effect of part-time in boosting fertility is, therefore, particularly 
notable among middle and high-educated women, who turns out to be the groups 
of women who profit most from its diffusion. 
To the contrary, the effect of part-time does not vary greatly among women’s 
level of education, and a significant and positive effect exists at all education levels. 
However, where the level of female part-time is remarkably low, women with the 
highest level of education are the most penalised group, showing a higher share of 
childlessness than the lower educated counterpart. Instead, where the level of part-
time is more diffused, childlessness does not decrease, but the gap between 
educational level becomes weaker and not significant anymore. In sum, the share 
of female part-time does not seem to significantly affect childlessness, while it 
positively associated with higher fertility among women with secondary or tertiary 
degrees. It seems therefore that institutional assets that allow defamilialization and 
commodification through female part-time work reduce educational inequalities in 
fertility but are unrelated to childlessness. 
Furthermore, the analysis considers the interplay between women’s 
characteristics and the average number of hours that men spend on their main job, 
which is considered to be an institutional condition that might support men to take 
up caring responsibilities (Figure 3). Results reveal that where men work longer 
hours there is a strong educational gradient in fertility, with middle and higher 
educated women having fewer children than their lower educated counterpart. 
Instead, where men work less, the effect of education on fertility weakens and 
becomes only visible between the lowest and the highest educated, who shows the 
highest and the lowest fertility levels respectively. To the contrary, the amount of 
time men spend on the main job is unrelated to fertility for low educated women. 
Similarly, lower hours that men spend in the job market help to reduce a woman’s 
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propensity to be childless among all the educational levels, although the effect is 
particularly strong among the highest educated. Therefore, it seems that a reduction 
of hours spent by men on the main job might help women who face higher 
opportunity costs to increase their fertility and to reduce their propensity to be 
childless. 
 
 
Figure 4. 3 – Predicted probability of being without children (left) and predicted number 
of children (right) by average hours worked by men on the main job and female level of 
education (90% Conf. Int. displayed). 
Source: EU-LFS 2005-2010, author’s elaboration. Predictions refer to Table 8 and Table 9, model 
C2. 
 
 
All in all, results confirm the hypothesis that family policies supporting 
childcare and a stability of mothers’ employment, through conditions that help 
women to better combine work and family, are associated with a lower propensity 
to remain childless, and that childlessness is lower in the context that favours gender 
relations, also thanks to institutional settings that support gender equality.  
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4.4. Does the effect of policies and institutional arrangements depend on 
the broader normative context?  
 
In line with the literature on low fertility, it is also relevant to analyse whether 
the extent to which gender egalitarian policies are linked to childlessness is affected 
by the level of gender egalitarianism reached within countries. To do so, I 
investigate whether the positive association between gender egalitarian conditions 
and lower childlessness is stronger the more gender equal society is. This 
hypothesis is tested through a set of macro-level interactions between indicators of 
both family policies and institutional assets concerning gender egalitarian relation 
and an indicator of gender egalitarianism at the societal level. The full outcome 
resulting from different models’ specifications is available in Appendix Table 8 and 
Table 9. In the following text, the predictive margins with 90% of confidence 
intervals that show the predicted probability of having a childless household and 
the predicted numbers of children at different levels of gender egalitarianism are 
given. Separated figures indicate the moderating role of gender equity in the case 
of effective parental leaves (Figure 4.4), female part-time (Figure 5); and average 
male working hours (Figure 4.6).  
The level of generosity in parental leaves does not appear to affect women’s 
fertility neither in traditional nor in gender equal countries, as it is shown by the 
predicted number of children to not being affected by the duration of parental leaves 
(Figure 4.4). If we look at childlessness instead, the longer and better leaves are 
associated with a lower propensity for women to have an empty nest at 35-39, which 
is even lower in societies that score higher on the gender egalitarian norm index  
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Figure 4. 4 – Predicted probabilities of being childless (left panel) and predicted number 
of children (right panel) by parental leaves duration and different levels of gender 
egalitarianism.  
 
Source: EU-LFS 2005-2010, author’s elaboration. Complete outcome in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, 
Model D3. 
 
 
Also, the role that the diffusion of female-part time has on fertility does not 
appear to be linked to the normative contexts concerning gender equity (Figure 5). 
To the contrary, the level of gender egalitarianism interacts with the level of female 
part-time available in a country in shaping the likelihood of women to be childless. 
As observed, female part-time is associated with a stronger propensity to have a 
childless household where a lower level of gender egalitarianism in diffused. 
Conversely, where women are perceived as having the same right to work as men 
in presence of scarce job – that we interpreted as women living in egalitarian 
societies – the level of part-time does not seem to be related to a different propensity 
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Figure 4. 5 – Predicted probabilities of being childless (left panel) and predicted number 
of children (right panel) by the share of female part-time and different levels of gender 
egalitarianism. 
 
Source: Own elaboration on EU-LFS 2005-2010. Complete outcome in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, 
Model D1.  
 
 
Lastly, the normative climate about gender egalitarianism modifies the 
relationship between men working hours and childbearing behaviour only when 
looking at fertility, whereas nothing changes int the case of childlessness (Figure 
4.6). In the first case, the amount of time that men spend on their main job is 
positively related to having bigger families in traditional countries. The opposite 
happens in gender egalitarian countries, where the higher the average of working 
hours the smaller the family.  
Differently for childlessness, the relationship probability of not having children 
at 35-39 years old for women is not significantly related to the amount of time men 
spend on their main job, neither in gender equal nor in traditional countries.  
 
.05
.1
.15
.2
.25
.3
.35
.4
C
hi
ld
le
ss
ne
ss
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
% female part-time
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
% female part-time
Traditional Egalitarian
  148
Figure 4. 6 – Predicted probabilities of being childless and predicted number of children 
according the number of hours worked in the main job by man and the level of gender 
equality within country. 
Source: EU LFS 2005-2010, author’s elaboration. Complete outcome in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, 
model D2.  
 
 
In short, after having found that there is an association between gender 
egalitarian condition and both fertility and childlessness, we also find that there is 
an interplay of institutional and normative conditions on the likelihood of having 
more children and to be childless for women.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
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determinants of fertility. This is especially true regarding macro-level mechanisms 
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national contexts or policies influence childlessness still needs to be enriched at the 
European level. 
Throughout the last decades, increasing research has shown how fertility 
decisions largely are influenced by national contexts in which women make their 
preferences concerning families and by institutional and normative structures that 
affect their opportunity costs. Policies, characteristics of the labour market, as well 
as social norms directed at integrating women into the labour market – which I 
referred at to “gender equalising policies” throughout the text – have been argued 
to be at the root of the below replacement fertility levels and widely examined in 
several contexts.  
The present work studied the role of macro-level factors also for childlessness 
and analysed whether the likelihood of being childless is linked to gender equalising 
policies, in the idea that the macro context modifies the role of socio-economic 
characteristics usually found to shape the likelihood of being childless. This general 
expectation was on the one side trained on by the theoretical postulates of low-
fertility research. According to this perspective, the context indirectly works on the 
balance of work and family life, through different mechanisms that rely on 
economic or cultural circumstances. On the other side, this assumption has been 
somehow neglected in the research on childlessness, which has mainly focused on 
the individual characteristics associated with childlessness without these latter 
being affected by the different institutional and normative contexts. I investigated 
this relative unexplored aspect of childlessness, by considering not only several 
policies and institutional features that are usually considered to be “gender-
equalising”, but also the level of gender norms in the society. The tested association 
is that, by alleviating the higher family cost for the more educated and more career-
oriented women, policies favouring equality within the household and the 
perception of equality might be a buffer to being childless.  
The analysis shows that generous family-friendly policies are generally 
associated with both lower childlessness and a higher number of children. More 
extended leaves, longer hours spent by men in the labour market, and a greater 
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egalitarianism are overall associated with a lower probability for a woman to be 
childless, corroborating the initial hypothesis about the role of policies and 
institutional conditions supporting egalitarian gender relations in lowering 
childlessness.  
However, results show that larger female part-time work is related to a greater 
probability of being a childless woman across all educational levels, which does not 
support the hypothesis that part-time availability reduces childlessness as an 
instrument that offers reconciliation to women who need care facilities at home. 
Some plausible explanation for this result can be given ex-post. Firstly, the use of 
part-time varies considerably across the countries included in the analysis. In some 
contexts – i.e. the Netherlands and Germany – female part-time tends to be more 
appreciated as an option to combine work and family (Booth and van Ours, 2013), 
whereas in other countries – i.e. the Mediterranean ones – part-time is often 
associated with precarious working conditions. In this latter group of countries, 
female part-time work is one of the few available instruments for women to be 
included into the labour force (OECD, 2013; Thevenon, 2013; Barbieri et al., 
2019). Accordingly, the availability of part-time work might be irrelevant as a 
strategy of reconciliation between family and work, and the availability of female 
part-time might play no role in affecting the likelihood to be a mother or having 
larger families. Furthermore, not always part-time work leads to a flattening of 
gender differences in private and public spheres. On the contrary, it often 
reproduces a specialisation via traditional gender roles, with women being 
secondary earners and primary caregivers. Consequently, part-time work might be 
less attractive for the more educated and more work-oriented women who, if forced 
to work part-time because of unavailability of better jobs, might delay having 
children till better working-position. All in all, the observed positive association 
between the share of female part-time in a country and being childless is difficult 
to causally interpret in this work and interesting to be assessed in future research. 
Such association may be due to both a large share of female part-time causing 
women to be more childless on the one hand, as well as to unobserved 
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characteristics driving jointly the propensity to not having children and women’s 
allocation of working time on the other, so that the two seems associated, but in 
facto are not causally so. 
Aside from the role of part-time, the analyses find that the effect of gender-
equalising policies, on both childlessness and fertility, depends on the level of 
education and earning potentials of women. Results corroborate the second 
hypothesis that labour market and family-friendly policies may have a stronger 
effect on childlessness when women invest more in their education or career. 
Family policies, therefore, might help in raising below replacement level of fertility, 
not only by boosting higher-parity births, but also by reducing the number of 
women who are childless.  
Furthermore, this result depends on the degree of gender egalitarianism 
reached within countries. The analysis shows that the effect of the considered 
policies importantly varies according to the degree of gender egalitarianism reached 
in the considered countries. Even though with some specificities, the effect of 
policies in reducing childlessness is stronger in gender egalitarian context, whereas 
is minimum in more traditional societies.   
Overall, the analysis contributes to the literature on childlessness by showing 
macro-factors are important when analysis childlessness and showing that 
childlessness is only partially explainable by the same determinants of low fertility. 
Therefore, childlessness and low-fertility are two distinct phenomena and further 
research is needed in order to disentangling the underlying explanations for 
childlessness, both empirically and theoretically.  
To the extent that childlessness is strongly related with postponing parenthood 
at later ages, until children is sometimes too late, future research should also assess 
the role of policies aimed at enabling parenthood at earlier ages. In this regard, there 
is resent research that has starting to put in relation childlessness and housing 
policies and that shows how there is a positive relationship between the sense of 
security provided by having a home and fertility (Vignoli, Rinesi and Mussino, 
2012). 
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CHAPTER V.  
 
IS CHILDLESSNESS A RISK FACTOR FOR SOCIAL AND 
EMOTIONAL ISOLATION IN MID- AND ELDERLY-LIFE? 
 
 
 
 
Brief summary 
The relationship between family configuration and wellbeing has gained 
increasing attention in the field of ageing and there is growing research that 
examines how having children impacts on individuals’ life. This article addresses 
the issue of the consequences of childlessness in terms of loneliness. Data from the 
GGS are used to analyse late-life social and emotional loneliness in Germany, 
France and Bulgaria, among people who are put on a continuum between those 
who never had children and parents who are in contact with children to different 
extents. Random effect linear regressions are applied. Results, based on men and 
women aged + 45, shows the following: 1) Never having had children is associated 
with higher levels of emotional and social loneliness. 2) After taking the 
heterogeneity of parenthood into account, the association between childlessness 
and both emotional and social loneliness decreases. 3) Individual characteristics 
do not fully account for the loneliness differentials of parenthood.  Overall, result 
show that ties with children, more than their presence, is a factor that affects the 
experience of loneliness in mid- and later life.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
There have been many studies in the area of consequences of family events, 
which describes family formation as a biographical break in the life cycles of 
individuals. The experience of parenthood affects the life of people and has 
documented implications on both subjective and objective realms of individual life. 
One the one side, the birth of a child increases the perceived wellbeing of parents 
(Myrskylä and Margolis, 2014; Kohler, 2005), who show higher levels of happiness 
than non-parents (Aassve, Goisis and Sironi, 2011; Kohler and Mencarini, 2016). 
On the other side, having children also implies changes concerning parents’ 
economic wellbeing. Family transitions are associated with higher poverty risks for 
households (Barbieri, Cutuli and Tosi, 2012), and motherhood especially relates to 
a lower accumulation of personal wealth and wages (Lersch, Jacob and Hank, 2017; 
Oesch, 2019).  
Much of this literature documents the consequences of family transition on 
individuals’ lives closely after the birth of a child. However, the potential 
implications of parenthood may carry on into later life as well. Particularly, the 
results of the lack of a child might be even more visible in the long-term, when the 
period spent without having children is longer.  
The study of children as a source of social and instrumental support is 
especially relevant in light of the increasingly changing composition of the elderly 
population. Life expectancy continues to rise in European countries, which have 
experienced a marked increase in the share of older individuals (Figure 5.1). 
Together with this increase, the number of people experiencing childlessness has 
also increased (Chapter 3), either by choice or as a result of postponement or 
infertility. The result of this demographic shift coupled with a changed fertility-
related behaviour is not only that the elderly population without children today is 
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higher than it was in the past, but also that there will be unprecedented numbers of 
people without children reaching oldest old age over the future years.  
 
 
Figure 5. 1 – Increasing share of elderly population across European countries since 1960. 
 
Source: OECD (2019c). Author’s elaboration on elderly population indicator. Note: The share of 
elderly population is defined as the ratio of people aged 65 and over on the total population.  
 
 
Although traditionally the elderly population without children has received 
little attention in research (Dykstra and Hagestad, 2007), much has changed since 
Rubinstein stated in 1987 that “Almost nothing is concretely known about childless 
elderly in cross-cultural perspective” (Rubinstein, 1987: 1). Indeed, the 
combination of increasing childlessness and ageing spurred research interested in 
the wellbeing of the elderly population without children. Especially, research 
focussing on the unequal distribution of wellbeing between elderly people with and 
without children has taken into consideration various expressions of wellbeing, 
such as mental health (Buber and Engelhardt, 2008; Gibney et al., 2017), 
satisfaction of life and happiness (Dykstra and Wagner, 2007), as well as healthy 
behaviours (Kendig et al., 2007). There is however little conclusive evidence on 
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the influence of children on the quality of life of older adults. On the one side, the 
literature suggests a positive relationship between children and parental wellbeing. 
For example, Dykstra and Wagner (2007) find an association between parenthood 
and life satisfaction in late-life, both in Germany and in the Netherlands. Similarly, 
Buber and Engelhardt (2008) use SHARE data at the European level to show that 
childless people over the age of 65 are in general mentally worse-off than their 
parents’ counterparts. On the other side, some research highlights that children do 
not play a significant role in the wellbeing of their parents. An example of this is 
the work of Hansel and colleagues (2009), who find that parental status does not 
influence individual wellbeing in terms of depression and loneliness in Norway. 
Also, Gibney and colleagues (2017) disconfirm the aforementioned European 
pattern, and show an increase in depressive symptoms among childless people, but 
only in Nordic countries.  
In short, empirical research on the link between parenthood and condition of 
older adults has not conclusively ruled out the possibility that childless people are 
worse-off in later life compared to parents. The lack of consistent evidence 
regarding the role of children might suggest that more than parenthood itself, other 
individual characteristics could be relevant predictors of quality of life in mid- and 
late-life. Some research has illustrated this point, by showing how the role that 
children might play on old life depends on the socio-economic status of their 
parents. After having accounted for socioeconomic status, Gibeny (2012) finds no 
causal effect of childlessness on depressive symptoms for women who are 55-75 
years old.  
Similarly, research on the relationship between family status and well-being in 
later life has generally overlooked the importance of the societal context, partly 
because of limited data available in-depth comparative analyses (Hank and Wagner, 
2013) 
The present research feeds into this particular debate and sheds light on the 
relationship between childlessness and mid- and late-life outcome in two European 
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countries, using loneliness as a wellbeing measure. Two are the main contributions 
this work adds to extant research.  
First, the vast majority of the studies on the consequences of childlessness 
confronts people with children with people without children. As recently pointed 
out (Albertini and Kohli, 2017; Albertini and Arpino, 2018), this dichotomy is 
possibly a stretch of reality because the condition of ageing without children can 
originate from numerous trajectories of life. Accordingly, in this chapter I consider 
parents as being a more heterogeneous group than what has previously been done. 
The analysis is then implemented by acknowledging that parenthood is not 
dichotomous to being childless, and considering the number of meetings with 
children as a possible source of heterogeneity within the group of the parents. The 
primary interest is to understand whether being childless, or being a parent with a 
different extent of contact with one’s children affect subjective wellbeing in terms 
of loneliness.  
Second, I investigate the bi-dimensional nature of loneliness, i.e. whether the 
condition of childlessness relates differently with perceived emotional isolation and 
with social isolation. In following this approach, the analysis offers a descriptive 
account of the prevalence of social and emotional isolation among people who are 
put on a continuum between those who never had children and parents who are in 
contact with children to different extents.  
In this sense, the analysis bridges the interest of sociology of health – interested 
in identifying predictors of diseases and mortality (Burton-Jeangros et al., 2015) – 
as well as of sociology of the family – by focussing on the family as an essential 
determinant of quality of late life (Glenn and Weaver, 1979). Since adult children 
usually care for their elderly parents, the growing proportion of the childless 
population is worrisome in term of potential care gaps old people without children 
might encounter and makes worth investigating the potential vulnerabilities of 
elderly people without children. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
 
 
2.1. The experience of loneliness and childlessness in mid- and elderly-life 
 
The experience of loneliness is defined as a subjective and negative experience 
that occurs when people evaluate their overall social network and level of social 
interaction as defective (de Jong-Gierveld, van Tilburg, and Dykstra 2006; de Jong-
Gierveld, 1987; Peplau and Perlman, 1982). Central to the concept is not only the 
discrepancy between the quality and quantity of existing relationships and the 
relationship standards of individuals, but also that loneliness is the result of lack of 
social contacts (Perlman and Peplau, 1981; de Jong-Gierlveld, Van Tilburg and 
Dykstra, 2006).  
It is widely recognised in literature that social relations and social support are 
important instruments for enhancing people’s wellbeing (Chappell and Badger, 
1989). Children are overall referred to as one of the principal sources of social 
integration (Durkheim, 1896). Parenthood is commonly described in the literature 
as an experience that triggers social interaction and prevents isolation (Dykstra, 
2006; Furstenberg, 2005). Becoming a parent is a moment in life that introduces 
new experiences: not only does it lead to greater responsibilities towards others, but 
also to greater involvement in social activities and social relations (Wenger et al., 
2007; Umberson, 1987; Umberson and Gove, 1989). Research illustrating this 
integrative role of children shows how offspring brings parents to have higher 
participation in the “outside world”, for instance fostering connections with 
schools, organisations and overall community-life (Furstenberg, 2005). The 
potential source of social integration stimulated by children has also been extended 
in the gerontological literature that depicts children as a source of social support in 
later life as well (Albertini and Kohli, 2017; Bachrach, 1980; Eggebeen and 
Uhlenberg, 1985; Koropeckyj-Cox, 1998; Mahne and Huxhold 2014; van Gaalen 
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and Dykstra 2006; Zoutewelle-Terovan and Liefbroer, 2017). In this sense, elderly 
parents are reported to profit directly from a series of benefits concerning 
instrumental, emotional and informational support that children might provide, as 
well as from indirect benefits connected with the social support network and social 
integration that the parental experience might have activated. Overall, insofar as 
children are one of the principal forms of direct and indirect social embeddedness 
in later life (Choi, 1994; Mahne and Huxhold, 2014), and that social integration is 
linked with higher physical and psychological well-being (Mette, 2005), people 
ageing without children are expected to be at a higher risk of experiencing 
loneliness compared to parents.  
In contrary to this assumption, the empirical evidence depicts a different 
scenario concerning the social integrative role of children. For example, childless 
individuals are found to compensate for the lack of a family network by adopting a 
series of strategies to cope with social isolation (Wenger, 2009). Furthermore, they 
are found to participate in charitable and voluntary work as much as parents do, and 
to have an overall extended network of friends and kin that they consider as 
potential supporters (Albertini and Kohli, 2009; Schnettler and Wöhler, 2016). To 
the extent that childless persons are reported to offset the integrating social function 
of children through broader social networks, childlessness might make people less 
isolated than expected and loneliness may be experienced in a similar way between 
parents and childless people. In line with this, there is research documenting how 
childless elderly people do not receive any less support than parents (Albertini and 
Mencarini, 2014). 
However, evidence that childless people are integrated into the community to 
the same extent as parents does not provide information on the degree of their 
emotional isolation. As suggested by Weiss (1973), in the debate about loneliness 
it has become central to make a distinction between the loneliness that arises from 
social isolation and loneliness that stems from emotional isolation (e.g., Di 
Tommaso and Spinner, 1996; Drennan et al., 2008; Dykstra and Fokkema, 2007; 
Perlman, 2004; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2001; Van Baarsen et al., 2001). More in 
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detail, social loneliness refers to the experience of lacking a wider circle of friends 
and acquaintances, whereas emotional loneliness describes a condition of missing 
intimate attachment. Although elderly without children are reported overall to have 
broad groups of contacts, (Schnettler and Wöhler, 2016) this does not necessarily 
compensate for the lack of a figure of close emotional attachment such as that of a 
child. Therefore, it is relevant to examine differences in social and emotional 
loneliness between parents and childless people.  
 
2.2. Childless, parents, and what lies in between 
 
Recent research points out that the mere dichotomisation of the population in 
childless and parents makes little sense, and that considering parenthood and 
childlessness as a duality can be misleading (Albertini and Arpino, 2018; Raab and 
Struffolino, 2019). The status of childlessness at the end of reproductive life 
includes a broad set of conditions that go beyond never having any children during 
one’s lifetime. The experience of parenthood is likely to change over the life course: 
children grow up and may leave the parental home, some parents divorce and may 
see their children less often, children may move elsewhere for studying or because 
of a job, others may die living their parents alone. These few examples illustrate 
how childlessness in later life is a condition that encompasses a wide range of 
possible scenarios where individuals who did have children in their life lost contact 
with them over the years. In line with the emerging literature, this work considers 
that “how someone ends up with no children may be more important than not 
having a child per se” (Albertini and Kohli, 2017) and that the heterogeneous 
pathways that bring people to the condition of childlessness may also be relevant 
when considering the potential consequences that childlessness has on the 
experience of loneliness. Accordingly, it is assumed that the role that the absence 
of children plays on people’s experience of loneliness depends on how people 
ended up without children. So, a more nuanced analysis of the dichotomy of parents 
versus childless is presented, considering that being childless in mid and late life 
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could be the result of different life paths. This chapter, therefore, is addressed at 
analysing if people without children and people who lost contact with them suffer 
differently from different types of loneliness.  
If differences in the level of perceived isolation between parents and childless 
are observed, the question that arises is how to interpret and explain these 
differences. The distinction within the group of the parents, between those who 
have frequent contacts with their children, and those who lost contact with them, 
could help to understand if the differences between childless and parents are due to 
the lack of the transition to parenthood or to the lack of the social experiences 
activated by parenthood. In the first case, I expect to find differences between those 
who are parents and those who never had children. In the second case, I expect to 
find differences between parents who lost contact with their children and people 
who never had children in their life. Following this idea, this work suggests that 
different pathways to childlessness could lead to various emotional and social 
consequences, and it explores whether people who lost contact with their children 
suffer more from emotional isolation than childless people, and less from social 
isolation. 
 
2.3. Loneliness across social groups and across countries 
 
The literature suggests how the levels of perceived loneliness might vary also 
in relation to other individual characteristics and experiences. In particular, the 
presence of a partner and having experienced significant life and labour market 
events are documented to affect individual subjective wellbeing (Kohler, Behrman 
and Skytthe, 2005). Although it is often described how people return to baseline 
levels after a certain period, marriage and unemployment are shown to be important 
determinants of life satisfaction also in the long run (Clark et al., 2008). As such, I 
am interested in analysing the relationship between the lack of children and 
experience of loneliness in later life, net of the presence of partner and labour 
market activation. 
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Besides, the levels of subjective wellbeing vary significantly not only across 
groups of people, but they are also heterogeneously experienced across different 
social contexts. There is research illustrating this point, that shows how individual 
characteristics are shown to not fully mediate the country-variance in perceived 
isolation (de Jong-Gierveld and Van Tilburg, 2010; Hansen and Slagsvold, 2015). 
Thus, the role of family ties on elderly wellbeing might be different in relation to 
the generalised support opinion, cultural norms, and demographic profile of each 
country (Albertini and Mencarini, 2014).  
Ageing parents have some degree of expectation about the extent to which their 
adult children should be responsible for their care (Silverstein and Giarrusso, 2010; 
Gans and Silverstein, 2006). These expectations, in turn, are described to strongly 
differ across countries according to the generalised norms of filial responsibility. 
For example, research highlights the European East-West divide in the support for 
filial norms and shows how filial obligations are stronger in Eastern Europe 
compared to Western Europe (de Jong-Gierveld and Tesch-Römer, 2012). 
In line with this, the analysis is also aimed at considering whether family ties 
relate differently with loneliness among mid and elderly adults living in countries 
characterised with different degrees of filial obligations and different levels of 
familialisation of elderly-care. To tackle this issue, the work takes a comparative 
perspective across three European countries characterised by different degrees of 
loneliness in adult and elderly population, and by different levels of normative and 
institutionalised family support to elderly people. Namely, I focus on France as a 
country providing defamilialisation of care, and on Bulgaria as a country 
characterised by familisms by default (Saraceno and Keck, 2011).  
The literature illustrates how higher or lower degrees of supported services in 
long-term care are likely to decommodify and defamilialise care work. France can 
be considered as a defamilialisation country. Here, cash provisions are directed to 
families and must be used to pay care workers under a formal contract, thus 
outsourcing elderly care. Finally, Bulgaria is one of the European countries with 
the lowest coverage through care services for frail elderly people, a situation which 
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mostly reinforces familisms by default (ibidem). Bulgaria, therefore, can be studied 
as a country in which well-being in elderly life is more dependent on having close 
children compared to France. Accordingly, I expect that experiencing childlessness 
in Bulgaria is more detrimental in terms of subjective isolation compared to France.  
 
 
3. Data and method 
 
 
3.1. Data 
 
The current study is based on data from the first and second waves of the 
Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), that collects through national surveys on 
random populations aged 18-79 demographic and social behaviour connected with 
social development on several European and non-European countries. Data were 
collected between 2004 and 2008, using face-to-face interviews. Data provide 
information on the parenting histories of respondents, as well as on the number of 
contacts parents have with their children and a measurement for loneliness was 
implemented in the national questionnaire.  
In line with the comparative aim outlined above, I use data from France and 
Bulgaria20 and select adults at the end of their reproductive period (+45) from the 
panel component of the random sample, i.e. 2195 women and 1735 men who took 
part both in the first and second wave of the GGS. 
 
 
3.2. Variables 
 
20 Moreover, France is one among the only possible Western European countries available in 
the panel component of the GGS, whereas many Eastern countries remains. Of these, I have chosen 
Bulgaria because a previous analysis shows that the two-dimensional measurement of loneliness is 
more sharply distinguished here (De Jon Gierveld, and Van Tilburg, 2010).  
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Loneliness is the dependent variable and it is measured following the short 
version of the de Jong-Giereveld Loneliness Scale (de Jong-Gierveld and Van 
Tilburg, 2006). The scale has been proven cross-national equivalence, thus 
allowing for intercultural comparison (de Jong-Gierveld and Van Tilburg, 2010). 
Namely, the scale includes six-items addressed at gathering information about the 
individual feelings of both social and emotional abandonments. More specifically, 
people are asked to answer “no” “more or less” or “yes” on a set of six items, as it 
is shown in Table 5.1. The scale allows to distinguish between the loneliness that 
emerges when someone is missing a wider social network and the loneliness that 
emerges when someone misses an intimate relationship. When processing the scale, 
I computed two measurements of loneliness, one of which pertains to the dimension 
of social loneliness (items i-iii), and one to the dimension of emotional loneliness 
(items iv-vi). After reversing the scale for positive items, I summarised the scores 
of each respondent, so as to obtain two measurements of “social loneliness” and 
“emotional loneliness” both ranging from 0 to 6, where 6 indicates the highest level 
of loneliness.  
 
 
Table 5. 1 – Record of items to measure Social and Emotional Loneliness 
Social Loneliness No More or less Yes 
i. There are plenty of people I can rely on when I have problems; 0 1 2 
ii. There are many people I can trust completely; 0 1 2 
iii. There are enough people I feel close to; 0 1 2 
Emotional Loneliness No More or less Yes 
iv. I experience a general sense of emptiness 0 1 2 
v. I miss having people around me 0 1 2 
vi. I often feel rejected 0 1 2 
 
 
Since I am interested in the consequences of loneliness due to childlessness, 
the independent variable collects information about the presence of children in the 
life of individuals. Having outlined above that childlessness should no more be 
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considered as the opposite of parenthood, I constructed a categorical measurement 
for childless-parents, that distinguishes within the group of the parents according to 
the frequency of contacts with their non-resident children. Therefore, I summarize 
information up to the fourth child about the highest number of face-to-face meetings 
that the respondent had throughout a year with their child.  I was forced to adapt 
the categories of France and Bulgaria to that of Germany, where the variable 
provides the lowest level of specificity. Considering that weekly meetings have 
been used in the literature as a cut-off point (e.g. Grundy and Read, 2012; Tosi and 
Grundy, 2018), I distinguish between the following groups of people:  
i. Childless: people reporting that they never adopted or had a natural child;  
ii. Parents who lost contact: parents who never meet their child(ren) or do so at 
best on a yearly basis;  
iii. Parents with monthly contacts: parents meeting their child(ren) monthly;  
iv. Parents with weekly contact: parents meeting at least weekly at least one of 
their children.  
 
3.3. Method 
 
The data makes it possible to have repeated observations for individuals in two 
points in time. Accordingly, to estimate the role of childlessness and contact 
frequency with children in the experience of loneliness, random effects linear 
regression models are estimated. Random effects modelling allows to maximise the 
available information in terms of sample size, and to gain insight both into the 
variance between groups of parents and childless people, as well as about the 
variation within groups21.  
 
21 Because transition for childlessness to parents after 45 is very little (i.e. on average 9.6% of 
people transit from being childless to being parent over the two points in time) as well as changes 
in parents-children contacts (i.e. on average more than 70% of contacts remains as they are) I choose 
random effects instead of fixed effects.  
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An interaction term is included between parental status and gender, because of 
conspicuous existing empirical evidence about gender differences in health 
consequences related to family ties (e.g. de Jong-Gierveld, van Tilburg, and 
Dykstra, 2006; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2001). To account for possible confounders, 
indicators of partnership status (partnered vs alone) and general health (bad vs good) 
are included. Also, given that literature has reported how higher educational 
attainment is both related to higher integration and better health all over Europe 
(Mackenback et al., 1997), analyses control for the level of education of 
respondents and distinguish between respondents having a low, intermediate, or 
higher level of education. Since loneliness is strongly related with the ageing 
process (Pinquart and Sörensen, 2001) I add a control for being in mid- or old-age. 
Thus, I differentiate people according to being part of the baby-boomers generation 
(45-59 in the sample), or the silent generation (over 60 in the sample). Models are 
estimated for each country separately, thereby accounting for a contextual impact 
of childlessness on the loneliness scores.  
Results are presented firstly by considering the dichotomy between childless 
versus parents, and then by discriminating different degrees of parenthood. The 
Appendix provides the complete tables.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the average number of loneliness-related symptoms 
experienced by people with children and people without children in France and 
Bulgaria. In line with what has been identified on the theoretical level, it is possible 
to note that France generally shows lower levels of loneliness compared to those 
experienced by people living in Bulgaria, where the levels almost double those 
observable in France. Furthermore, it is evident that on a descriptive level a 
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significant divergence emerges between people with children and people without 
children in the level of experienced loneliness. In particular, people with children 
appear to experience lower levels of loneliness than parents in France (1.1 vs 1.3). 
However, it is especially in Bulgaria that strong differences between those who 
have children and those who never had children in the perception of loneliness 
among mid- and old-aged people emerge (1.9 vs 2.8). 
 
 
Figure 5. 2 – Childless people in France and Bulgaria report higher prevalence of 
loneliness than parents on averages.   
 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. 
 
 
Following the theoretical lines outlined above, I am interested in understanding 
if the experience of solitude varies not only with the absence of children, but also 
concerning different forms of loneliness. In particular, it is relevant to considerate 
whether people who have not had children are more likely to experience emotional 
loneliness, which occurs when there is a lack of an intimate attachment, or a social 
loneliness, which occurs when a person is not connected with the community. If the 
social integration function of children is verified, social loneliness should be higher 
among those without children than among those who parent. Similarly, as the 
children may represent a form of intimate resource for parents, it can be expected 
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that people without children suffer more from an emotional deficiency compared to 
parents. The results shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 support the hypothesis of a 
double dimension of loneliness and illustrate how people without children suffer 
from higher loneliness than parents.  
 
 
Table 5. 2 – Results of a series of random effects linear regression predicting different 
scores of Emotional loneliness 
    France Bulgaria 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Parental Status       
 Childless 0.161** 0.093 0.047 0.913*** 0.612*** 0.453** 
Sex of respondent (ref. Female)      
 Male  -0.443*** -0.302***  -0.337*** -0.054 
 Male × Childless  0.173+ 0.054  0.608* 0.201 
Constant 0.936*** 1.125*** 2.261*** 1.187*** 1.338*** 3.003*** 
Observations 5,820 5,820 5,820 2,030 2,030 2,030 
n   2,910 2,910 2,910 1,015 1,015 1,015 
Sign. Levels: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p <.1 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. Note: M3 includes controls for partnership 
status, generation, educational attainment and health. Full model available in the Appendix of 
Chapter 5, Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 
 
Table 5. 3 – Results of a series of random effects linear regression predicting different 
scores of Social loneliness 
    France Bulgaria 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Parental Status       
 Childless 0.246*** 0.172* 0.151* 0.757*** 0.438* 0.491* 
Sex of respondent (ref. Female)      
 Male  -0.006 0.033  -0.027 0.107 
 Male × Childless  0.159 0.120  0.581* 0.332 
Constant 1.271*** 1.274*** 1.773*** 2.625*** 2.637*** 3.574*** 
Observations 5,820 5,820 5,820 2,030 2,030 2,030 
n   2,910 2,910 2,910 1,015 1,015 1,015 
Sign. Levels: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p <.1 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. Note: M3 includes controls for partnership 
status, generation level, educational attainment and health. Full model available in the Appendix of 
Chapter 5, Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. 
 
 
Specifically, in France people without children suffer more from social 
isolation than from emotional isolation. Therefore, part of the relationship between 
  169
childlessness and loneliness is explained by higher degrees of social loneliness 
rather than emotional loneliness experienced by childless people. Bulgaria presents 
a different result, where much of the effect of childlessness on loneliness appears 
to be driven by emotional isolation rather than social isolation (M1, Table 5.3 and 
Table 5.2). 
The specification of the model further allows to notice how there is an 
interaction effect between gender and childless status in affecting the experience of 
loneliness (M2). Being a man in France is overall associated with experiencing 
lower levels of emotional isolation, whereas no gender differences are found to be 
significant concerning social isolation. Further, the degree to which childlessness 
appears to be associated with higher emotional and social loneliness results to be 
higher among men than among women. Notwithstanding men suffer overall from 
lower emotional loneliness than women, among men being childless is associated 
with higher scores of emotional loneliness compared to fathers, whereas among 
women, mothers do no sees to worse off compared to childless women in terms of 
emotional isolation.  
Bulgaria presents a similar scenario. Like in France, being a father in Bulgaria 
is associated with experiencing lower scores of emotional loneliness. Differences 
in terms of social loneliness are instead relevant only among men, with childless 
men suffering more from social isolation than fathers, whereas no significant 
differences are found between mothers and childless women. Furthermore, lifetime 
childlessness also relates to higher scores of social loneliness both among men and 
among women, however men mid- and old-ages appear to suffer the lack of a child 
more than women do.  
Before introducing the discussion about how the heterogeneity of parenthood 
might matter to differently distribute risks of experiencing loneliness in mid- and 
elderly-ages, I am interested also in whether the direct role of childlessness in 
affecting different types of loneliness remains once controlled for possible 
confounders. Figure 5.3 complements graphically the results and charts the directs 
effects of childlessness on loneliness, social loneliness and emotional loneliness 
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estimated in the null (M1) and in the full model (M3). The full model includes 
controls related to sex and age of the respondent, their partnership status, their level 
of education and general health.  
 
 
Figure 5. 3 – The direct effect of childlessness on experiencing loneliness in mid- and 
later-life persists once controls are included 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. Note: Beta coefficients and 95 per cent 
confidence intervals. Parents are the baseline. Full model includes controls concerning sex, an 
interaction between sex and childlessness, generation, partnership status, level of education and 
general health. Complete model is available in the Appendix of Chapter 5, Table 5.4, Table 5.5 and 
Table 5.6, Model 3.  
 
 
Characteristics of individuals influence loneliness outcomes in later life. 
Particularly, the effect size of childlessness is reduced in both the countries, but 
remains unexplained in some cases. Individual characteristics are found to fully 
account for the differences between childless and parents in terms of emotional 
loneliness in France countries, whereas they only marginally explain the effect in 
terms of emotional isolation. In Bulgaria, to the contrary, individual characteristics 
account for more of the childless divide in emotional isolation than of that in social 
loneliness.  
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In sum, people without children in France are more likely to suffer significantly 
from loneliness arising from the lack of a broad social network. In France, childless 
people are more likely to suffer from loneliness arising from the lack of intimate 
persons.  
 
 
Figure 5. 4 – The role of different degrees of parenthood on experiencing loneliness in 
mid- and later-life.  
 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. Note: Beta coefficients and 95 per cent 
confidence intervals. Childless are the baseline. Full model includes controls concerning sex, an 
interaction between sex and parental status, generation, partnership status, level of education and 
general health. Complete model is available in the Appendix of Chapter 5. Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and 
Table 5.4, M4. 
 
 
It appears therefore that lifetime childlessness is associated with higher scores 
in loneliness compared to being a parent. However, I have theoretically discussed 
how people can experience different degrees of parenting. Accordingly, I am 
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interested in analysing if people without children, and parents who have different 
contacts with their children, suffer differently from isolation in mid- and later-life. 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.4, which reports the coefficients of the loneliness 
score for different degrees of parents compared to lifetime childless people.  
Having weekly meetings with children seem to preserve from the risk of feeling 
both emotional and social isolation in France as well as in Bulgaria.  
People who meet their children at least once a week are found to be less likely 
to experience both emotional social isolation than childless people. Instead, being 
a parent with less frequent contacts does not seem to automatically protect from the 
experience of isolation. To the contrary, people who lost contacts with their children 
seem to be more predisposed to the experience of loneliness compared to people 
who never had children, at least in France. 
To grasp information about the substantial role of childlessness and parenthood 
on loneliness, I computed the predicted scores of loneliness by parental status 
according to the full estimated model (Figure 5.5).  
 
 
Figure 5. 5 – Predicted scores of loneliness in mid and later-life by degrees of parenthood.  
 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. Note: Predicted scores and 95 per cent 
confidence intervals. Full model includes controls concerning sex, an interaction between sex and 
parental status, generation, partnership status, level of education and general health. Based on the 
complete model available in the Appendix of Chapter 5. Table 5.24, Table 5.4 and Table 5.4, M4. 
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Results show that being childless is overall significantly associated with higher 
scores of social loneliness both in France and in Bulgaria, whereas it only relates 
with higher relevant scores of emotional loneliness, in Bulgaria. In France, people 
are predicted to suffer more from both emotional and social isolation when they are 
childless rather than parents with frequent connections with children, but those who 
lost contact are the worst-off both. In Bulgaria lifetime childless people score higher 
than those who lost contacts with their children in emotional loneliness and show 
higher predicted scores of social loneliness than people who have weekly contacts 
with their children. 
Overall, having weekly contacts with children seems to protect from the risk of 
experiencing both social and emotional isolation.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
 
 
People in elderly life are commonly described in the literature as frail and more 
likely to experience phenomena of isolation (Hansen and Slagsvold, 2015). In a 
moment in which the Western society is confronted with rapid population ageing, 
in combination with an increase in the population without children, the issue of 
loneliness in later life is of crucial relevance. Indeed, over the coming years, there 
will be a higher share of population ageing without children.  
Loneliness has a central significance for the wellbeing and health of mid- and 
older-age adults. For example, the experience of isolation has been shown to be 
detrimental on health, and to be related with more frequent hospitalisation (Courtin 
and Knapp, 2015; Hawkley and Cacippo, 2010; Shankar et al., 2017; Tilvis et al., 
2011). Thus, experiencing loneliness represents an element of mediation in the 
causal chain that leads to examining the consequences of childlessness. It also 
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highlights the need for a better understanding of what instruments there may be for 
reducing loneliness, and for understanding who the people more at risk of 
experiencing feelings of loneliness are.  
The family is overall described in the literature as a potential source of social 
integration and instrumental support in middle and elderly life (Silverstein and 
Giarrusso, 2010; Tomassini et al., 2004). Accordingly, children may alleviate 
perceptions of social isolation because of their social integrating function, and also 
reduce feelings of emotional loneliness as a source of intimate support.  
With this work, I was interested in exploring the extent to which not having 
experienced parenthood (i.e. being childless) or having experienced it to different 
degrees (i.e. being parents with different levels of contact with their children) might 
relate to different feelings of social and emotional isolation in two different 
countries characterised by different norms concerning filial responsibility, i.e. 
France and Bulgaria.  
Results, net of other individual characteristics, show that having frequent 
contact with children is associated with lower scores of loneliness in both the 
countries, and that middle- and old-aged people who have at least weekly contacts 
with their children are overall less subjected to feelings of isolation. More frequent 
contacts with children are associated with lower perceptions of both social and 
emotional isolation.  
The theoretical predictions based on considerations related to familial 
obligations and institutionalised elderly-care suggested that mid- and older-age 
people could be more dependent on having children in Bulgaria rather than in 
France. Following this argument, I was expecting to find having never had children 
to be associated with higher scores of loneliness in Bulgaria, because this country 
tends to support familialisation of care. On the contrary, in the case of France, I was 
expecting to find never having had children to be less associated with loneliness in 
adult and old life because households are invited to outsource care for elderly 
members through forms of public benefit.  In line with this, the results confirm that 
in Bulgaria childless people are worse-off compared to parents in terms of both 
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emotional and social loneliness. In France, to the opposite, childless people are not 
always the worst-off, and it appears that the experience of loneliness is more 
attached to having lost contact with children rather than being lifetime childless.  
Before concluding, there are some shortcomings of the present research that 
should be considered for future research.   
First, the study lacks an objective dimension of isolation, which might provide 
more nuanced evidence regarding the degree to which people who never had 
children and parents to a different extent lack forms of embeddedness in their mid- 
and later-life. However, in the way that the dimension of social loneliness is 
operationalized, it could be considered a better indicator of wellbeing compared to 
more vague concepts like happiness. Indeed, it allows for disentangling both an 
objective aspect of wellbeing – i.e. people suffering from the absence of a broader 
social network – and the subjective aspects of wellbeing - i.e. people suffering from 
lack of an intimate figure.  
Second, and more importantly, the analyses do not rule out problems related to 
selection into parenthood. There is literature suggesting that an association between 
childlessness and low wellbeing exists not because of children having any (causal) 
positive effects on their parents’ wellbeing, but because people who live better are 
more likely to enter parenthood. Accordingly, people who are less isolated and less 
lonely are more likely to become parents in their life. This selection effect, for 
example, has been suggested in relation to health selection into parenthood (Buber 
and Engelhardt, 2008). Therefore, whether the prevalence of emotional loneliness 
among elderly people is to be causally linked to the lack of children or to their 
antecedent state remains an open question. Datasets collecting retrospective 
histories or, even better, panel datasets with longer design might be of help in future 
research to understand the causal link between childlessness and loneliness by 
identifying features of early life that affect late-life statuses.  
Third, intergenerational family bonds are likely to take place in a greater 
number of ways: not only through face to face meetings, but also through other 
types of interactions (Silverstein and Bengston, 1997). The present analysis limits 
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its focus on face to face meeting between children and parents, and runs the risk of 
considering parents who have new forms of contacts with their children as parents 
who lost contacts with them. The changes that have been taking place over the last 
years in relation to structural solidarity, which refers to factors that enhance or 
reduce the opportunity of interaction between generations (i.e. geographical 
distance), highlights the importance of considering multiple dimensions behind 
intergenerational bonds rather than just face-to-face meeting. Future empirical 
investigation therefore should also pay attention in analysing different forms 
through which associational solidarity takes place, i.e. phone calls, skype meetings.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the study contributes to our knowledge about 
the possible consequences of childlessness in the long-term. Notably, it shows how 
generally people who never experienced parenthood and those who have lost 
contacts with their children are more likely to experience emotional and social 
loneliness in later life compared to people who have frequent contacts with their 
offspring. Especially, results highlight how more than parenthood itself, what 
matters most for making feeling older adults less lonely is having frequent contacts 
with their children. 
Loneliness constitutes both a social issue and a policy issue and presented 
results could be helpful for policy makers by highlight that not only lifetime 
childless people are at risk of feeling lonely in later life, but also people who lost 
contacts with children are. Especially, in those countries in which care of elderly 
people is strongly familialised, people who live without children are more likely to 
feel worst in later life in terms of loneliness, whereas in countries that tend to 
outsource the care of elderly people both childlessness and not having contacts with 
children relates to worse feeling of loneliness. All in all, frequent social contacts 
with children appear as an essential instrument to contribute to healthy ageing.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Chapter 1 
 
Figure 1. 2 – Childlessness and Total Fertility Rate for women across European 
countries over different point in times. 
Sources: EU-LFS, Eurostat, OECD, Human Fertility Database, author’s elaboration.  
Notes: Childlessness rates are computed as the proportion of women 35-39 living without children 
and by using the European Labour Force Survey. Total fertility rate proportions refer to Eurostat for 
all countries (http://goo.gl/j7gz5j), except for OECD data retrieved for France 1982-1997 
(https://data.oecd.org/chart/4Buv). For Croatia (1983-1996), Slovakia (1983-1999), Hungary (1993-
1999), Bulgaria (1983-2000), Germany (1983-1986, only East) and Lithuania (1995-2001) data refer 
to the Human Fertility Database (http://www.humanfertility.org). 
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Appendix Chapter 2 
 
Table 2. 7 – Factors associated with the intention to be childless. Logistic Regression 
(Wave I) 
                      Men Women 
  Variables AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. 
Age (ref. 20-24)     
 25-29                     -0.14***       0.02         -0.13***       0.03    
 30-34                     -0.19***       0.03         -0.10***       0.03    
 35-39                     -0.15***       0.03         -0.02          0.04    
 40-45                     -0.07*         0.04          0.18***       0.03    
Level of education (ref. Middle)     
 Low Educated              -0.04          0.03          0.08*         0.04    
 High Educated             -0.05***       0.02         -0.03          0.02    
Partnered (ref. Not partnered)     
 Partnered      -0.15***       0.02         -0.15***       0.02    
Employment status (ref. Not employed)    
 Employed      -0.02          0.03          0.04          0.03    
Factors of the TPB     
 Negative Attitude          0.21***       0.01          0.17***       0.01    
 Positive Attitude         -0.18***       0.01         -0.18***       0.02    
 Subjective Norms          -0.16***       0.01         -0.16***       0.01    
 Perceived control          0.03***       0.01          0.03***       0.01    
Countries     
 Austria                    0.02          0.06          0.01          0.05    
 France                    -0.01          0.07         -0.04          0.05    
 Germany                    0.02          0.08          0.03          0.08    
 Eastern Countries      -0.03          0.06         -0.06          0.05    
  N. of cases          2,198 1,782 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
  179
Table 2. 8 – – Results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the stability of intentions to be parents and to be childless (Average Marginal 
Effects). 
Men  Women 
  Prospective Fathers Wavers Prospective Childless  Prospective Mothers Wavers Prospective Childless 
 Variables AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err.  AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. 
Age (ref. 20-24)              
 25-29                      0.12*** 0.02       0.02    0.03      -0.13*** 0.02        0.11*** 0.03      -0.02    0.03      -0.09*** 0.02 
 30-34                      0.15*** 0.03      -0.04    0.03      -0.11*** 0.03        0.00    0.03      -0.02    0.04       0.01    0.03 
 35-39                      0.08**  0.03      -0.00    0.04      -0.07**  0.03       -0.06    0.04      -0.05    0.04       0.10*** 0.04 
 40-45                     -0.01    0.04      -0.08*  0.04       0.09**  0.04       -0.25*** 0.03      -0.12*** 0.04       0.37*** 0.04 
Level of Education (ref. Intermediate)  
 Low Education       0.02    0.03       0.05   0.04      -0.07**  0.03       -0.03    0.04      -0.06    0.05       0.09**  0.04 
 High Education       0.07*** 0.02      -0.02    0.02      -0.05*** 0.02        0.05**  0.02       0.01    0.03      -0.06*** 0.02 
Partnered (ref. Unpartnered) 
 New partnership            0.10*** 0.03       0.02    0.03      -0.11*** 0.03        0.09*** 0.03       0.07*   0.04      -0.16*** 0.03 
 Ended partnership          0.04    0.04      -0.03    0.04      -0.01    0.03        0.10**  0.04      -0.11**  0.05       0.01    0.04 
 Stable partnership         0.18*** 0.03      -0.02    0.03      -0.16*** 0.02        0.17*** 0.03      -0.02    0.03      -0.15*** 0.03 
Employment status (ref. Unstable, unemployed, inactive) 
 Stable employed           -0.01    0.02       0.03    0.02      -0.02    0.02       -0.02    0.03       0.04    0.03      -0.02    0.03 
Factors of the TPB              
 Negative Attitude         -0.16*** 0.02       0.00    0.02       0.15*** 0.01       -0.12*** 0.01       0.01    0.02       0.11*** 0.01 
 Positive Attitude          0.15*** 0.02      -0.03    0.02      -0.12*** 0.01        0.16*** 0.02      -0.05*** 0.02      -0.11*** 0.01 
 Subjective Norms           0.11*** 0.02       0.00    0.01      -0.11*** 0.01        0.12*** 0.01      -0.01    0.01      -0.11*** 0.01 
 Perceived Control         -0.03*** 0.01       0.01*   0.01       0.02**  0.01       -0.03*** 0.01       0.01    0.01       0.01    0.01 
Home owner      -0.01    0.02       0.00    0.02       0.00    0.02        0.00    0.02      -0.01    0.03       0.00    0.02 
Childless                  0.01    0.02      -0.07**  0.03       0.07**  0.03        0.03    0.03      -0.09*** 0.03       0.07**  0.03 
Country (ref. Italy)              
 Austria                   -0.02    0.05       0.07    0.06      -0.05    0.07        0.02    0.04      -0.01    0.06      -0.01    0.05 
 France                     0.02    0.06       0.06    0.07      -0.08    0.08        0.08    0.05       0.01    0.06      -0.09    0.06 
 Germany                   -0.08    0.05       0.07    0.09       0.01    0.09        0.04    0.08      -0.04    0.09      -0.01    0.08 
 Eastern Countries       0.05    0.05       0.12*   0.06      -0.18**  0.07        0.05    0.04       0.08    0.06      -0.12**  0.05 
  N. of cases          2,198  1,782 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 2. 9 – – Results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the realisation of intentions to be parents and to be childless. (Average Marginal 
Effects) 
Men  Women 
  Voluntary Fathers Wavers Voluntary Childless  Voluntary Mothers Wavers Voluntary Childless 
 Variables AMEs Std. 
Err 
AMEs Std. 
Err 
AMEs Std. 
Err 
 AMEs Std. 
Err 
AMEs Std. 
Err 
AMEs Std. 
Err Age (ref. 20-24)              
 25-29                      0.02          0.02          0.11***       0.03         -0.13***       0.02           0.04*         0.02          0.10***       0.03         -0.14***       0.03    
 30-34                      0.05**        0.02          0.13***       0.03         -0.18***       0.03           0.03          0.03          0.08**        0.04         -0.11***       0.03    
 35-39                     -0.00          0.02          0.18***       0.04         -0.18***       0.03          -0.07***       0.02          0.10**        0.04         -0.03          0.04    
 40-45                     -0.02          0.03          0.12***       0.04         -0.10***       0.04          -0.13***       0.02         -0.06*         0.03          0.19***       0.03    
Level of Education (ref. Middle) 
 Low Educated               0.02          0.02          0.04          0.03         -0.06**         0.03           0.02          0.03         -0.05          0.05          0.03          0.04    
 High Educated              0.01          0.01          0.05**         0.02         -0.06***       0.02          -0.01          0.02          0.03          0.02         -0.01          0.02    
Partnership status (ref. No Partner) 
 New partnership            0.19***       0.02         -0.02          0.03         -0.17***       0.03           0.15***       0.02         -0.02          0.03         -0.13***       0.03    
 Ended partnership          0.02*          0.01          0.07**         0.04         -0.10***       0.04           0.02          0.02          0.10**        0.04         -0.12***       0.04    
 Stable partnership         0.23***       0.02          0.03          0.03         -0.26***       0.02           0.19***       0.02          0.03          0.03         -0.21***       0.03    
Employment status (ref. Unstable, Unemployed or Inactive) 
 Stable employed           -0.02          0.02          0.03          0.02         -0.00          0.02          -0.01          0.02         -0.01          0.03          0.02          0.03    
Factors of the TPB              
 Negative Attitude         -0.05***       0.01         -0.14***       0.02          0.19***       0.02          -0.04***       0.01         -0.12***       0.02          0.16***       0.01    
 Positive Attitude          0.04***       0.01          0.12***       0.02         -0.16***       0.01           0.00          0.01          0.15***       0.02         -0.16***       0.02    
 Subjective Norms           0.06***       0.01          0.09***       0.01         -0.15***       0.01           0.05***       0.01          0.10***       0.01         -0.15***       0.01    
 Perceived Control         -0.01**        0.01         -0.01          0.01          0.03***       0.01          -0.03***       0.01         -0.01          0.01          0.05***       0.01    
Home Owner       0.01          0.01         -0.04*        0.02          0.03          0.02           0.02          0.02         -0.04          0.02          0.02          0.02    
Country (ref. Italy)              
 Austria                   -0.04          0.03          0.00          0.07          0.04          0.07          -0.12***       0.03          0.11**        0.05          0.01          0.05    
 France                     0.04          0.04         -0.06          0.08          0.02          0.08          -0.01          0.04          0.06          0.05         -0.04          0.06    
 Germany                   -0.03          0.04         -0.04          0.09          0.07          0.09          -0.08*         0.05          0.08          0.08          0.01          0.08    
 Eastern Countries       0.00          0.03          0.07          0.07         -0.07          0.07          -0.06**        0.03          0.17***       0.05         -0.10**        0.05    
  N. of cases          2275   1782 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 2. 10 – Results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the stability of intentions to be parents and to be childless only among people 
in union at Wave 1 (Average Marginal Effects) 
Men   Women 
   Prospective Fathers Wavers Prospective Childless   Prospective Mothers Wavers Prospective Childless 
 Variables AMEs Std. 
Err. 
AMEs Std. 
Err. 
AMEs Std. 
Err. 
 AMEs Std. 
Err. 
AMEs Std. 
Err. 
AMEs Std. 
Err. Age (ref. 20-24)              
 25-29                      0.14***       0.04         -0.02          0.04         -0.12***       0.03          0.11***       0.04         -0.03          0.04         -0.07**        0.03    
 30-34                      0.17***       0.05         -0.10**        0.05         -0.07          0.04         -0.00          0.05         -0.05          0.05          0.05          0.04    
 35-39                     -0.04          0.05          0.03          0.06          0.02          0.05         -0.13**        0.05         -0.06          0.06          0.19***       0.05    
 40-45                     -0.02          0.06         -0.10*         0.06          0.12**        0.05         -0.35***       0.04         -0.09          0.05          0.44***       0.05    
 men > 46                  -0.31***       0.05         -0.13          0.09          0.44***       0.09                                                                                        
Level of Education (ref. Middle)             
 Low Educated               0.11**        0.05         -0.01          0.05         -0.09**        0.04          0.02          0.06         -0.07          0.06          0.05          0.05    
 High Educated              0.07**        0.03         -0.02          0.03         -0.05**        0.03          0.06*         0.03          0.01          0.03         -0.07***       0.03    
Partnership (ref. Stable partner)             
 Ended partnership         -0.12***       0.04          0.00          0.04          0.12***       0.03         -0.08*         0.04         -0.07          0.04          0.15***       0.04    
Employment status (ref. Unstable, unemployed, inactive)           
 Stable employed            0.02          0.04         -0.01          0.04         -0.01          0.03          0.00          0.04          0.02          0.04         -0.03          0.03    
Factors of the TPB              
 Negative Attitude         -0.14***       0.03         -0.02          0.03          0.16***       0.02         -0.16***       0.02          0.03          0.02          0.13***       0.02    
 Positive Attitude          0.15***       0.02         -0.02          0.03         -0.13***       0.02          0.20***       0.02         -0.04*         0.03         -0.16***       0.02    
 Subjective Norms           0.09***       0.01          0.01          0.01         -0.10***       0.01          0.09***       0.01         -0.00          0.02         -0.09***       0.01    
 Perceived control         -0.07***       0.01          0.06***       0.01          0.01          0.01         -0.05***       0.01          0.03**        0.01          0.02          0.01    
Home Owner      -0.02          0.03         -0.01          0.03          0.03          0.02          0.01          0.03          0.00          0.03         -0.02          0.02    
Childless       0.01          0.03         -0.11***       0.04          0.10***       0.03          0.03          0.03         -0.11***       0.04          0.08**        0.03    
Country (ref. Italy)              
 Austria                   -0.03          0.07          0.06          0.07         -0.03          0.07          0.00          0.05          0.02          0.06         -0.02          0.05    
 France                    -0.01          0.07          0.04          0.08         -0.03          0.07          0.02          0.06          0.02          0.06         -0.04          0.06    
 Germany                   -0.07          0.09          0.12          0.10         -0.05          0.08          0.04          0.09         -0.04          0.09         -0.00          0.07    
 Eastern Countries       0.03          0.06          0.05          0.07         -0.08          0.07         -0.01          0.05          0.05          0.06         -0.05          0.05    
  N. of cases          1021   962 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 2. 11 – Results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the realisation of intentions to be parents and to be childless only among people 
in union at Wave 1 (Average Marginal Effects) 
Men   Women 
   Voluntary Fathers Wavers Voluntary Childless   Voluntary Mothers Wavers Voluntary Childless 
 Variables AMEs Std. 
Err. 
AMEs Std. 
Err. 
AMEs Std. 
Err. 
 AMEs Std. 
Err. 
AMEs Std. 
Err. 
AMEs Std. 
Err. Age (ref. 20-24)              
 25-29                      0.03          0.03          0.13***       0.04         -0.16***       0.04          0.07**        0.04          0.05          0.04         -0.12***       0.03    
 30-34                      0.08*         0.04          0.09*         0.05         -0.16***       0.04          0.05          0.04          0.08          0.05         -0.13***       0.05    
 35-39                     -0.02          0.04          0.16***       0.05         -0.14***       0.05         -0.11***       0.04          0.10*         0.06          0.01          0.05    
 40-45                     -0.04          0.05          0.13**        0.06         -0.08          0.06         -0.20***       0.03         -0.07          0.05          0.26***       0.05    
 men > 46                  -0.11*         0.06         -0.12          0.09          0.23***       0.09                                                                                        
Level of Education (ref. Middle)             
 Low Educated               0.00          0.04          0.10*         0.06         -0.11**        0.05          0.03          0.05         -0.04          0.06          0.01          0.05    
 High Educated              0.00          0.03          0.05          0.03         -0.05*         0.03         -0.02          0.03          0.04          0.03         -0.02          0.03    
Partnership (ref. Stable partner)             
 Ended partnership         -0.21***       0.02          0.05          0.04          0.16***       0.04         -0.18***       0.02          0.08*         0.04          0.10**        0.04    
Employment status (ref. Unstable, unemployed, inactive)           
 Stable employed            0.01          0.03          0.09**        0.04         -0.09***       0.04          0.02          0.03         -0.01          0.04         -0.01          0.04    
Factors of the TPB              
 Negative Attitude         -0.05**        0.02         -0.13***       0.03          0.18***       0.03         -0.07***       0.02         -0.11***       0.02          0.18***       0.02    
 Positive Attitude          0.07***       0.02          0.07***       0.03         -0.14***       0.02         -0.01          0.02          0.20***       0.02         -0.19***       0.02    
 Subjective Norms           0.09***       0.01          0.04***       0.02         -0.13***       0.01          0.07***       0.01          0.06***       0.01         -0.13***       0.01    
 Perceived control         -0.03***       0.01         -0.00          0.01          0.03***       0.01         -0.05***       0.01         -0.00          0.01          0.05***       0.01    
Home Owner       0.02          0.02         -0.06*         0.03          0.04          0.03         -0.01          0.02         -0.01          0.03          0.02          0.03    
Country (Ref. Italy)              
 Austria                   -0.05          0.05         -0.00          0.08          0.05          0.07         -0.18***       0.05          0.13***       0.05          0.04          0.05    
 France                     0.07          0.06         -0.11          0.08          0.03          0.08         -0.05          0.05          0.03          0.06          0.02          0.06    
 Germany                   -0.01          0.07         -0.06          0.10          0.07          0.10         -0.13*         0.07          0.10          0.09          0.03          0.08    
 Eastern Countries      -0.01          0.05          0.07          0.07         -0.06          0.07         -0.11**        0.05          0.17***       0.05         -0.06          0.05    
  N. of cases          1021   962 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 2. 12 – Results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the stability of intentions to be parents and to be childless without considering 
Eastern European countries (Average Marginal Effects) 
 Men  Women 
                      Prospective Fathers Wavers  Prospective Childless  Prospective Mothers Wavers  Prospective Childless 
 Variables AMEs Std.  
Err. 
AMEs Std.  
Err. 
AMEs Std.  
Err. 
 AMEs Std.  
Err. 
AME Std.  
Err. 
AMEs Std.  
Err. Age (ref. 20-24) 
 25-29                      0.11**        0.04         -0.01          0.05         -0.10**        0.04           0.12***       0.04         -0.05          0.04         -0.07**        0.03    
 30-34                      0.11**        0.05         -0.01          0.06         -0.11**        0.05           0.07          0.05         -0.06          0.05         -0.01          0.05    
 35-39                      0.04          0.05         -0.01          0.06         -0.03          0.06          -0.02          0.05         -0.05          0.06          0.07          0.05    
 40-45                     -0.01          0.05         -0.08          0.06          0.09*         0.05          -0.21***       0.04         -0.19***       0.05          0.40***       0.05    
 men > 46                  -0.25***       0.04         -0.07          0.11          0.31***       0.11                                                                                      
Level of educaiton (ref. Middle)             
 Low Educated               0.03          0.05         -0.01          0.06         -0.02          0.05           0.00          0.05         -0.09*         0.06          0.09*         0.05    
 High Educated              0.05          0.04         -0.01          0.04         -0.04          0.04          -0.00          0.03          0.06*         0.04         -0.06**        0.03    
Partnered (ref. Not partnered) 
 New partnership            0.09*         0.05          0.07          0.06         -0.16***       0.05           0.05          0.06          0.15**        0.07         -0.20***       0.05    
 Ended partnership          0.15**        0.06         -0.07          0.07         -0.08          0.07           0.03          0.07         -0.01          0.08         -0.02          0.07    
 Stable partnership         0.22***       0.04          0.05          0.05         -0.26***       0.05           0.18***       0.05          0.05          0.05         -0.22***       0.05    
Employment status (ref. Unstable, unemployed, inactive) 
 Stable employed            0.05          0.04          0.00          0.05         -0.05          0.04          -0.02          0.04          0.04          0.05         -0.02          0.04    
Factors of the TPB 
 Negative Attitude         -0.18***       0.03         -0.06*         0.03          0.24***       0.03          -0.16***       0.02          0.03          0.03          0.13***       0.02    
 Positive Attitude          0.14***       0.03          0.02          0.03         -0.16***       0.03           0.18***       0.02          0.00          0.03         -0.18***       0.02    
 Subjective Norms           0.07***       0.01          0.04***       0.02         -0.12***       0.01           0.11***       0.01         -0.01          0.02         -0.10***       0.01    
 Perceived control         -0.07***       0.02          0.05***       0.02          0.01          0.02          -0.03**        0.01          0.01          0.02          0.02          0.01    
Home owner      -0.04          0.03         -0.02          0.03          0.06*         0.03          -0.01          0.03          0.03          0.03         -0.02          0.03    
Childless                 -0.01          0.04         -0.13***       0.05          0.14***       0.05          -0.02          0.03         -0.12**        0.05          0.14***       0.04    
Country (ref. Italy) 
 Austria                   -0.05          0.06          0.09          0.06         -0.04          0.08           0.07          0.04         -0.03          0.06         -0.04          0.06    
 France                    -0.04          0.07          0.08          0.07         -0.03          0.08           0.11**        0.05         -0.03          0.07         -0.07          0.07    
 Germany                   -0.10          0.08          0.07          0.08          0.03          0.09           0.07          0.07         -0.05          0.09         -0.02          0.08    
 N. of cases          806       905      
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 2. 13 – Results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the realisation of intentions to be parents and to be childless without considering 
Eastern European countries (Average Marginal Effects) 
Men  Women 
                       Voluntary Fathers Wavers Voluntary Childless  Voluntary Mothers Wavers Voluntary Childless 
 Variables AMEs Std. Err AMEs Std. Err AMEs Std. Err  AMEs Std. Err AMEs Std. Err AMEs Std. Err 
Age (ref. 20-24)              
 25-29                      0.04          0.04          0.11**        0.05         -0.15***       0.04           0.08**        0.03          0.06*         0.04         -0.14***       0.04    
 30-34                      0.12***       0.04          0.04          0.06         -0.15***       0.06           0.07*         0.04          0.11**        0.05         -0.18***       0.05    
 35-39                      0.03          0.04          0.16***       0.06         -0.18***       0.06          -0.08**        0.04          0.20***       0.06         -0.12**        0.05    
 40-45                      0.01          0.04          0.10          0.06         -0.11*         0.06          -0.16***       0.03         -0.01          0.05          0.17***       0.04    
 men > 46                  -0.02          0.05         -0.23***       0.06          0.25***       0.07                                                                                      
Level of educaiton (ref. Middle)             
 Low Educated              -0.02          0.03          0.11*         0.06         -0.09*         0.06           0.00          0.04         -0.03          0.06          0.03          0.05    
 High Educated              0.01          0.03          0.03          0.04         -0.04          0.04          -0.00          0.02         -0.02          0.03          0.02          0.03    
Partnered (ref. Not partnered)             
 New partnership            0.08**        0.04          0.01          0.06         -0.09*         0.05           0.06          0.03          0.06          0.06         -0.12**        0.05    
 Ended partnership          0.02          0.02          0.11          0.07         -0.13*         0.07           0.06*         0.03          0.06          0.07         -0.12*         0.07    
 Stable partnership         0.16***       0.02          0.08          0.05         -0.24***       0.05           0.19***       0.01          0.02          0.05         -0.21***       0.05    
Employment status (ref. Unstable, unemployed, inactive)           
 Stable employed           -0.04          0.03          0.08*         0.04         -0.04          0.04           0.04          0.03         -0.02          0.04         -0.02          0.04    
Factors of the TPB              
 Negative Attitude         -0.07***       0.02         -0.18***       0.03          0.26***       0.03          -0.06***       0.02         -0.12***       0.02          0.17***       0.02    
 Positive Attitude          0.07***       0.02          0.10***       0.03         -0.16***       0.03           0.01          0.02          0.21***       0.03         -0.22***       0.02    
 Subjective Norms           0.08***       0.01          0.04**        0.02         -0.12***       0.01           0.05***       0.01          0.09***       0.01         -0.14***       0.01    
 Perceived control         -0.05***       0.01         -0.00          0.02          0.05***       0.02          -0.04***       0.01         -0.01          0.01          0.04***       0.01    
Home owner        0.01          0.02         -0.08***       0.03          0.08**        0.03           0.02          0.02         -0.03          0.03          0.00          0.03    
Country (ref. Italy)              
 Austria                   -0.02          0.04         -0.08          0.08          0.10          0.08          -0.14***       0.04          0.15***       0.04         -0.00          0.05    
 France                     0.06          0.04         -0.15*         0.09          0.09          0.09          -0.04          0.05          0.10*         0.05         -0.05          0.06    
 Germany                   -0.02          0.05         -0.09          0.10          0.11          0.09          -0.11*         0.06          0.13*         0.08         -0.02          0.07    
  N. of cases          806  905 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 2. 14 – Results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the stability of intentions to be parents and to be childless on people in the age 
group 35-45 (Average Marginal Effects) 
                       Men  Women 
                       Prospective Fathers Wavers Prospective Childless  Prospective Mothers Wavers Prospective Childless 
                       AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err.  Women Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. 
Age ref. (35-40)              
 40-45                     -0.11**        0.05         -0.06          0.05          0.16***       0.04          -0.22***       0.04         -0.01          0.04          0.24***       0.04    
Educational Level (ref. Intermediate)             
 Low Educated              0.02          0.07          0.03          0.08         -0.04          0.06           0.10          0.09         -0.21***       0.07          0.12          0.09    
 High Educated       0.10*         0.05         -0.05          0.05         -0.05          0.05           0.12***       0.04         -0.07          0.05         -0.05          0.04    
Partnership (ref. Stable partner)             
 New Partnership            0.20**        0.08         -0.09          0.08         -0.11          0.07           0.07          0.08          0.08          0.09         -0.15*         0.08    
 Ended partnership         -0.01          0.09          0.05          0.10         -0.04          0.08          -0.03          0.07         -0.16**        0.07          0.20**        0.08    
 Stable partnership         0.10*         0.06          0.00          0.06         -0.11*         0.06           0.06          0.05          0.02          0.06         -0.07          0.05    
Employment status (ref. Unstable, not working)            
 Stable employed           -0.06          0.06         -0.01          0.06          0.07          0.05           0.05          0.05         -0.05          0.06         -0.01          0.06    
Factors of the TPB              
 Negative Attitude         -0.21***       0.04         -0.01          0.04          0.22***       0.04          -0.07**        0.03         -0.09***       0.03          0.16***       0.03    
 Positive Attitude          0.15***       0.04          0.02          0.04         -0.17***       0.04           0.09***       0.03          0.08**        0.03         -0.17***       0.03    
 Subjective Norms           0.09***       0.02          0.04*         0.02         -0.13***       0.02           0.09***       0.02          0.06***       0.02         -0.15***       0.02    
 Perceived Control         -0.04*         0.02          0.06***       0.02         -0.02          0.02          -0.02          0.02          0.02          0.02          0.00          0.02    
Home Owner       0.01          0.05         -0.07          0.06          0.06          0.04           0.05          0.04         -0.09*         0.05          0.04          0.05    
Childless                  0.11*         0.05         -0.12*         0.06          0.02          0.06           0.12**        0.05         -0.28***       0.08          0.16**        0.08    
Country (ref. Italy)              
 Austria                    0.01          0.10          0.06          0.09         -0.07          0.09           0.05          0.07          0.12*         0.07         -0.17**        0.07    
 France                    -0.21*         0.11          0.14          0.12          0.06          0.12          -0.01          0.08          0.13          0.10         -0.12          0.10    
 Germany                   -0.11          0.12          0.20          0.13         -0.09          0.12           0.08          0.17         -0.00          0.14         -0.08          0.14    
 Est                        0.01          0.10          0.12          0.09         -0.12          0.10           0.03          0.07          0.17**        0.07         -0.19**        0.08    
  N. of cases              403      395    
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 2. 15 – Results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the realisation of intentions to be parents and to be childless on people in the 
age group 35-45 (Average Marginal Effects) 
                       Men  Women 
                       Voluntary Fathers Inconsistent Voluntary Childless  Voluntary Mothers Inconsistent Voluntary Childless 
                       AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err.  Women Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. AMEs Std. Err. 
Age (ref. 35-39)              
 40-45                     -0.02          0.03         -0.06          0.05          0.08*         0.04          -0.08***       0.02         -0.13***       0.05          0.21***       0.05    
Level of Eduation (ref. Intermediate)              
 Low Education             -0.07**        0.04          0.09          0.08         -0.01          0.07           0.02          0.05          0.02          0.09         -0.04          0.09    
 Higher Education           0.02          0.04          0.08          0.05         -0.10**        0.05           0.03          0.02          0.04          0.05         -0.07          0.05    
Partnership (ref. Unpartnered)             
 New Partnership            0.23***       0.07         -0.05          0.09         -0.18**        0.08           0.02          0.03          0.09          0.09         -0.11          0.08    
 Ended partnership         -0.01          0.01          0.12          0.09         -0.12          0.09           0.02          0.03         -0.03          0.09          0.01          0.09    
 Stable partnership         0.20***       0.03          0.02          0.06         -0.22***       0.05           0.08***       0.03          0.06          0.06         -0.15***       0.06    
Employment status (ref. Unstable, Not working)            
 Stable employed           -0.04          0.04          0.05          0.06         -0.02          0.05           0.04*         0.02          0.02          0.06         -0.06          0.06    
Factors of the TPB              
 Negative Attitude         -0.04          0.03         -0.22***       0.04          0.26***       0.04          -0.00          0.02         -0.13***       0.03          0.13***       0.03    
 Positive Attitude          0.01          0.03          0.18***       0.04         -0.19***       0.04           0.01          0.02          0.13***       0.04         -0.14***       0.04    
 Subjective Norms           0.07***       0.02          0.06***       0.02         -0.13***       0.02           0.02          0.01          0.13***       0.02         -0.15***       0.02    
 Perceived Control         -0.00          0.02          0.00          0.02         -0.00          0.02          -0.03**        0.01          0.02          0.02          0.00          0.02    
 Home Owner      -0.04          0.04          0.02          0.06          0.02          0.05           0.01          0.02         -0.05          0.05          0.04          0.05    
Country (ref. Italy)              
 Austria                   -0.06          0.06          0.11          0.11         -0.05          0.10          -0.05          0.04          0.20***       0.08         -0.15*         0.08    
 France                     0.01          0.07         -0.17          0.12          0.16          0.12          -0.08**        0.04          0.14          0.10         -0.06          0.11    
 Germany                   -0.01          0.08         -0.03          0.14          0.04          0.13          -0.09***       0.03         -0.05          0.15          0.14          0.15    
 Est                       -0.02          0.06          0.10          0.11         -0.08          0.10          -0.03          0.05          0.18**        0.08         -0.15*         0.08    
  N. of cases              403.00         395.00    
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, authors’ calculation. Sign. Levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Appendix Chapter 3 
 
 
Figure 3. 8 – Total Fertility Rates by women’s age across European countries, over 
time. 
 
Source: Eurostat, fertility rates by age (indicator demo_frate) 
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Figure 3. 9 – Mean age of women at first childbirth across European countries, 
over time.  
 
Source: Eurostat, fertility rates by age (indicator demo_frate) 
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Table 3. 1– Childlessness among women, selected cohorts (1900–1972), by country 
and region 
Cohort 1960 1965 1968 1970 1972 
Austria 16 17 18 19 19 
Belgium 16 16 16 - - 
Germany 18 22 23 - - 
Spain 12 15 17 19 21 
France 13 - 14 - - 
Greece  11 16 - - - 
Italy 14 18 20 21 21 
Portugal 11 13 12 - - 
England and Wales 19 20 18 18 - 
Source: Sobotka, T. (2017).  
 
 
Table 3. 2– Proportion of women who live without children at 35-39 years old, by 
country and period 
Cohort 1995 2002 2005 2007 2009 
Austria 20 21 23 24 24 
Belgium 15 18 19 19 21 
Germany 21 24 29 29 26 
Spain 13 22 25 26 26 
France 14 16 16 17 18 
Greece  14 18 21 24 23 
Italy 17 24 27 27 29 
Portugal 11 13 14 15 17 
UK 19 23 22 22 24 
Source: EU-LFS, author's elaboration    
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Table 3. 3– Results a series of logistic regressions predicting the likelihood of being childless (1) rather than mothers (0) in several European 
countries (Logit coefficients – Standard Errors in parenthesis)  
 Austria  Belgium Germany 
VARIABLES M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Year 0.021*** 0.012* 0.009 -0.009 0.006 0.004 0.011 -0.028** 0.019*** 0.017*** -0.005 -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Level of education (ref. Low)             
Intermediate  0.189* -11.528 13.463  0.041 12.274 31.610  0.218*** -52.769*** -20.792* 
  (0.079) (24.674) (27.611)  (0.077) (23.191) (25.453)  (0.028) (8.729) (9.944) 
High  0.787*** 5.313 13.857  0.184* 21.725 32.572  0.636*** -46.633*** -39.412*** 
  (0.091) (27.660) (31.453)  (0.075) (22.330) (24.687)  (0.031) (9.502) (10.974) 
Level of education × Year             
Intermediate × Year   0.006 -0.007   -0.006 -0.016   0.026*** 0.010* 
   (0.012) (0.014)   (0.012) (0.013)   (0.004) (0.005) 
High × Year   -0.002 -0.007   -0.011 -0.016   0.024*** 0.020*** 
   (0.014) (0.016)   (0.011) (0.012)   (0.005) (0.005) 
Working status and class (ref. Inactive)             
Unemployed    0.625***    -0.048    0.672*** 
    (0.183)    (0.146)    (0.054) 
Higher-grade service class    0.835***    -0.009    1.381*** 
    (0.132)    (0.113)    (0.045) 
Lower-grade service class    0.752***    0.087    1.114*** 
    (0.124)    (0.138)    (0.040) 
Skilled workers    0.578***    0.137    1.045*** 
    (0.109)    (0.098)    (0.037) 
Unskilled workers    0.430**    0.235+    0.658*** 
    (0.137)    (0.123)    (0.050) 
Marital Status (ref. Previously married)             
Single    1.483***    1.377***    1.748*** 
    (0.103)    (0.102)    (0.036) 
Married    -0.896***    -1.089***    -0.752*** 
    (0.100)    (0.101)    (0.034) 
Constant -42.795*** -24.558** -19.252 17.088 -13.300 -9.357 -22.637 55.062** -39.729*** -35.356*** 8.585 35.173*** 
 (8.759) (9.001) (21.518) (24.069) (8.533) (8.681) (17.877) (20.021) (2.893) (2.910) (7.827) (8.892) 
Observations 108,472 108,472 108,472 108,472 60,019 60,019 60,019 60,019 220,696 220,696 220,696 220,696 
AIC 7627 7536 7539 6172 7853 7849 7852 6537 69898 69352 69318 54741 
BIC 7647 7575 7597 6297 7871 7885 7906 6654 69919 69393 69380 54875 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00296 0.0154 0.0155 0.196 0.000244 0.00122 0.00134 0.171 0.00256 0.0104 0.0109 0.219 
Standard errors in parentheses Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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 Spain France Greece 
VARIABLES M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Year 0.045*** 0.030*** 0.045*** -0.005 0.011*** 0.004* 0.014*** -0.021*** 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.029* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) 
Level of education (ref. Low)             
Intermediate  0.435*** 42.942*** 35.624**  0.004 8.641 14.340  0.413*** 11.536 -2.203 
  (0.035) (10.863) (12.744)  (0.033) (10.241) (11.148)  (0.068) (21.208) (28.333) 
High  0.905*** 45.784*** 8.047  0.405*** 40.342*** 24.411*  0.850*** 1.713 -9.538 
  (0.029) (9.128) (10.808)  (0.033) (10.158) (11.173)  (0.073) (22.708) (30.937) 
Level of education × Year   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Intermediate × Year   -0.021*** -0.018**   -0.004 -0.007   -0.006 0.001 
   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.011) (0.014) 
High × Year   -0.022*** -0.004   -0.020*** -0.012*   -0.000 0.005 
   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.011) (0.015) 
Working status and condition (ref. Inactive)             
Unemployed    0.380***    0.446***    0.282* 
    (0.054)    (0.058)    (0.126) 
Higher-grade service class    0.567***    0.557***    0.276* 
    (0.055)    (0.054)    (0.131) 
Lower-grade service class    0.667***    0.383***    0.277+ 
    (0.063)    (0.053)    (0.158) 
Skilled workers    0.616***    0.362***    0.252* 
    (0.047)    (0.045)    (0.100) 
Unskilled workers    0.319***    0.378***    0.213 
    (0.058)    (0.055)    (0.162) 
Single    2.044***    1.406***    4.438*** 
    (0.055)    (0.050)    (0.181) 
Married    -0.904***    -0.902***    -0.753*** 
    (0.053)    (0.053)    (0.116) 
Constant -91.28*** -62.43*** -92.22*** 7.504 -23.62*** -10.78** -29.99*** 39.11*** -111.38*** -94.53*** -99.86*** -60.96** 
 (3.812) (3.968) (6.975) (8.161) (3.720) (3.838) (8.156) (8.993) (8.064) (8.260) (17.319) (22.940) 
Observations 132,875 132,875 132,875 132,875 116,640 116,640 116,640 116,640 155,650 155,650 155,650 155,650 
AIC 41431 40439 40416 30079 43414 43177 43161 36079 9300 9161 9165 5640 
BIC 41451 40478 40475 30207 43434 43216 43219 36204 9320 9201 9224 5770 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0137 0.0374 0.0380 0.284 0.000806 0.00635 0.00682 0.170 0.0203 0.0354 0.0354 0.408 
Standard errors in parentheses Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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 Italy Portugal United Kingdom 
VARIABLES M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Year 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.036*** 0.004 0.035*** 0.016*** 0.029*** -0.018* 0.010*** -0.001 0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Level of education (ref. Low)             
Intermediate  0.378*** 28.259*** 28.896**  0.543*** 64.175** 76.754**  0.239*** 36.821*** 39.198*** 
  (0.024) (7.541) (9.088)  (0.079) (24.297) (27.704)  (0.031) (9.871) (10.666) 
High  0.866*** 52.285*** 37.159***  0.963*** 29.897 29.789  0.673*** 34.941*** -7.648 
  (0.029) (9.190) (11.256)  (0.071) (21.751) (25.565)  (0.030) (9.231) (10.098) 
Level of education × Year             
Intermediate × Year   -0.014*** -0.014**   -0.032** -0.038**   -0.018*** -0.019*** 
   (0.004) (0.005)   (0.012) (0.014)   (0.005) (0.005) 
High × Year   -0.026*** -0.018**   -0.014 -0.014   -0.017*** 0.004 
   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.011) (0.013)   (0.005) (0.005) 
Working status and class (ref. Inactive)             
Unemployed    0.527***    -0.103    0.537*** 
    (0.053)    (0.163)    (0.073) 
Higher-grade service class    0.632***    -0.243    1.390*** 
    (0.049)    (0.153)    (0.043) 
Lower-grade service class    0.638***    -0.072    1.284*** 
    (0.045)    (0.160)    (0.049) 
Skilled workers    0.642***    -0.125    0.825*** 
    (0.035)    (0.116)    (0.040) 
Unskilled workers    0.589***    -0.148    0.637*** 
    (0.049)    (0.137)    (0.059) 
Marital Status (ref. Previously married)             
Single    1.965***    2.251***    1.237*** 
    (0.047)    (0.123)    (0.037) 
Married    -1.094***    -1.007***    -0.760*** 
    (0.043)    (0.119)    (0.036) 
Constant -68.703*** -50.244*** -73.823*** -8.628 -71.929*** -35.099*** -59.755*** 34.802* -21.393*** -0.180 -26.870*** 26.148** 
 (3.226) (3.308) (5.744) (6.910) (9.141) (9.509) (14.518) (16.613) (3.527) (3.666) (7.407) (8.078) 
Observations 349,971 349,971 349,971 349,971 86,225 86,225 86,225 86,225 90,208 90,208 90,208 90,208 
AIC 56589 55710 55681 41096 7603 7423 7420 5485 48197 47629 47616 41081 
BIC 56611 55753 55745 41236 7621 7460 7476 5607 48216 47667 47673 41203 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00781 0.0233 0.0239 0.280 0.00784 0.0319 0.0328 0.287 0.000674 0.0125 0.0129 0.149 
Standard errors in parentheses Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 3. 4– The Average Marginal Effects and Average Partial Effects from the logit analyses on being childless (1) rather than mothers (0) in several European 
countries (Standard Errors in parenthesis). 
 Austria Belgium Germany 
VARIABLES M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Year 0.004*** 0.002* 0.002** -0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Level of education (ref. Low)             
Intermediate  0.030* 0.031* -0.011  0.006 0.004 0.001  0.038*** 0.040*** -0.024*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
High  0.147*** 0.150*** 0.041*  0.028* 0.027* 0.021+  0.122*** 0.124*** -0.010+ 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Working status (ref. Inactive)             
Unemployed    0.080**    -0.006    0.080*** 
    (0.025)    (0.017)    (0.007) 
Higher-grade service class    0.111***    -0.001    0.189*** 
    (0.018)    (0.013)    (0.006) 
Lower-grade service class    0.099***    0.011    0.145*** 
    (0.016)    (0.017)    (0.005) 
Skilled workers    0.073***    0.017    0.134*** 
    (0.013)    (0.012)    (0.004) 
Unskilled workers    0.053**    0.030+    0.078*** 
    (0.017)    (0.016)    (0.006) 
Marital status (ref. Previously married)             
Single    0.331***    0.298***    0.388*** 
    (0.020)    (0.019)    (0.007) 
Married    -0.122***    -0.128***    -0.111*** 
    (0.016)    (0.015)    (0.006) 
             
Observations 108,472 108,472 108,472 108,472 60,019 60,019 60,019 60,019 220,696 220,696 220,696 220,696 
Source: EU LFS, author’s elaboration. Sign. Levels: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10  
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 Spain France Greece 
VARIABLES M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 
year of survey 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001* -0.003*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Level of education (ref. Low)             
Intermediate  0.067*** 0.063*** 0.031***  0.001 -0.002 -0.006  0.062*** 0.062*** 0.023** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
High  0.159*** 0.158*** 0.086***  0.058*** 0.059*** 0.035***  0.145*** 0.144*** 0.048*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Working status and class (ref. Inactive)             
Unemployed    0.043***    0.049***    0.024* 
    (0.006)    (0.007)    (0.011) 
Higher-grade service class    0.066***    0.063***    0.024* 
    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.012) 
Lower-grade service class    0.079***    0.041***    0.024+ 
    (0.008)    (0.006)    (0.014) 
Skilled workers    0.072***    0.039***    0.021* 
    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.008) 
Unskilled workers    0.036***    0.041***    0.018 
    (0.007)    (0.006)    (0.014) 
Marital status (ref. Previously married)             
Single    0.445***    0.245***    0.750*** 
    (0.010)    (0.007)    (0.018) 
Married    -0.117***    -0.073***    -0.094*** 
    (0.008)    (0.005)    (0.018) 
Observations 132,875 132,875 132,875 132,875 116,640 116,640 116,640 116,640 155,650 155,650 155,650 155,650 
Source: EU LFS, author’s elaboration. Sign. Levels: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10 (Standard errors in parentheses) 
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 Italy Portugal United Kingdom 
VARIABLES M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Year 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003*** 0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Level of education (ref. Low)             
Intermediate  0.067*** 0.064*** 0.018***  0.067*** 0.070*** 0.045***  0.035*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
High  0.171*** 0.175*** 0.070***  0.137*** 0.136*** 0.088***  0.113*** 0.110*** 0.052*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Working status and class (ref. Inactive)             
Unemployed    0.064***    -0.010    0.058*** 
    (0.007)    (0.015)    (0.009) 
Higher-grade service class    0.078***    -0.022    0.188*** 
    (0.006)    (0.014)    (0.006) 
Lower-grade service class    0.079***    -0.007    0.170*** 
    (0.006)    (0.015)    (0.007) 
Skilled workers    0.079***    -0.011    0.097*** 
    (0.004)    (0.011)    (0.004) 
Unskilled workers    0.072***    -0.014    0.071*** 
    (0.006)    (0.013)    (0.007) 
Marital Status (ref. Previously married)             
Single    0.441***    0.466***    0.253*** 
    (0.009)    (0.020)    (0.007) 
Married    -0.169***    -0.092***    -0.101*** 
    (0.008)    (0.014)    (0.005) 
Observations 349,971 349,971 349,971 349,971 86,225 86,225 86,225 86,225 90,208 90,208 90,208 90,208 
Source: EU LFS, author’s elaboration. Sign. Levels: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10 (Standard errors in parentheses) 
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Table 3. 5– Adjusted predictions of Childlessness and 95% confidence intervals for each 
predicted probability (Results based on the Model 3 of Appendix-Table 3.2)  
Austria  Belgium 
Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval  Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval 
Low 1995 17% 0.02 14% 20%  Low 1995 16% 0.01 13% 18% 
  2017 20% 0.02 15% 25%    2017 19% 0.02 15% 23% 
Intermediate 1995 19% 0.01 17% 21%  Intermediate 1995 17% 0.01 14% 20% 
  2017 24% 0.01 22% 27%    2017 18% 0.01 16% 21% 
High 1995 32% 0.03 26% 37%  High 1995 20% 0.01 17% 23% 
  2017 35% 0.02 31% 39%    2017 20% 0.01 17% 22% 
             
Germany  Spain 
Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval  Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval 
Low 1995 21% 0.01 20% 23%  Low 1995 10% 0 9% 11% 
  2017 19% 0.01 18% 21%    2017 23% 0.01 22% 25% 
Intermediate 1995 20% 0 19% 21%  Intermediate 1995 18% 0.01 16% 20% 
  2017 29% 0.01 28% 30%    2017 27% 0.01 25% 29% 
High 1995 28% 0.01 27% 30%  High 1995 27% 0.01 25% 28% 
  2017 37% 0.01 36% 39%    2017 38% 0.01 36% 39% 
             
France  Greece 
Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval  Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval 
Low 1995 13% 0.01 12% 14%  Low 1995 10% 0.01 8% 11% 
  2017 17% 0.01 15% 18%    2017 24% 0.02 20% 28% 
Intermediate 1995 13% 0 12% 14%  Intermediate 1995 15% 0.01 13% 17% 
  2017 16% 0.01 15% 17%    2017 31% 0.01 28% 34% 
High 1995 22% 0.01 20% 23%  High 1995 20% 0.02 17% 23% 
  2017 20% 0.01 19% 21%    2017 42% 0.02 38% 46% 
             
Italy  Portugal 
Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval  Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval 
Low 1995 14% 0 13% 15%  Low 1995 8% 0.01 7% 10% 
  2017 27% 0.01 25% 28%    2017 15% 0.01 13% 17% 
Intermediate 1995 22% 0.01 21% 23%  Intermediate 1995 19% 0.02 15% 23% 
  2017 31% 0.01 30% 33%    2017 18% 0.02 15% 21% 
High 1995 35% 0.01 33% 37%  High 1995 22% 0.02 18% 26% 
  2017 40% 0.01 39% 42%    2017 28% 0.02 25% 31% 
             
The UK        
Level of Education Pr. Childless Std. Err.  Conf. Interval        
Low 1995 15% 0.01 14% 16%        
  2017 19% 0.01 17% 20%        
Intermediate 1995 21% 0.01 20% 22%        
  2017 19% 0.01 18% 20%        
High 1995 29% 0.01 27% 30%        
  2017 27% 0.01 26% 28%        
Source: EU LFS, author’s elaboration. 
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Appendix Chapter 4 
 
 
Table 1 – The proportion of women aged 35-39 without cohabiting children slightly overestimates the 
share of childlessness across country.  
  % women aged 35-39 without cohabiting children (a)   % childless women 
(b) 
Survey Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010   
1965 1968 1970 1972 
Birth cohort 1966-70 
1967-
1971 
1967-
72 
1969-
74 
1970-
74 
1971-
75   
Austria 17.90 19.12 19.29 20.35 20.03 21.08   17.20 18.40 18.50 19.00 
Belgium 18.30 18.03 19.21 19.02 19.54 19.03   16.00 16.10 – – 
Bulgaria 11.31 12.84 13.03 17.12 16.55 15.79   7.90 7.80 9.30 9.90 
Chez Rep. 8.06 9.44 9.96 8.99 9.03 9.55   6.60 7.80 7.70 9.40 
Germany 28.28 29.24 27.90 26.53 28.99 -   21.80 23.10 – – 
Estonia 7.95 10.84 9.40 9.12 9.30 9.06   10.60 11.10 11.50 – 
Spain 20.48 20.92 22.72 21.34 23.19 25.34   14.50 16.50 18.60 20.70 
France 15.33 16.21 17.16 17.29 17.73 16.89   – 14.30 – – 
Greece 20.70 21.08 22.38 23.19 22.20 23.36   16.40 – – – 
Hungary 11.60 11.82 11.96 13.69 14.92 15.97   9.30 10.90 – – 
Ireland 18.92 19.86 18.69 20.11 19.58 0.00   18.00 18.80 – – 
Italy 23.72 24.55 25.40 25.86 27.89 28.92   18.40 19.80 20.60 20.90 
Lithuania 8.67 8.15 9.55 9.57 10.72 11.78   8.90 9.30 – – 
Netherlands 17.06 18.10 18.22 19.43 17.60 18.02   18.10 17.70 – – 
Poland 9.09 8.46 9.94 10.75 10.40 11.92   8.00 – – – 
Portugal 14.29 14.20 14.07 16.40 16.55 16.56   12.90 12.30     
Slovakia 9.73 10.95 14.17 14.86 14.50 15.19   11.00 11.30 11.80 12.30 
UK 21.10 22.20 20.89 22.82 23.26 22.19   20.00 18.00 18.00 – 
Sources: (a) EU LFS, author’s elaboration. (b) Sobotka, 2017.  
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Table 2 – The number of cohabiting children in the household when women are 35-39 reflect 
women’s total fertility rate. 
  
Average number of cohabiting children when 
 mother is 35-39 years old   Adjusted Total fertility rate 
  2006 2008 2010   2006 2008 2010 
Austria 1.96 1.92 1.95   1.63 1.64 1.66 
Belgium 2.13 2.08 2.05   1.77 1.86 1.85 
Bulgaria 1.66 1.57 1.55   1.53 1.70 1.73 
Chez Rep. 1.97 1.92 1.88   1.67 1.76 1.79 
Germany 1.79 1.81 1.87   1.51 1.59 1.62 
Estonia 2.12 2.05 2.10   1.95 1.85 1.90 
Spain 1.75 1.77 1.70   1.33 1.39 1.40 
France 2.08 2.08 2.09   2.02 2.07 2.13 
Greece 1.93 1.87 1.86   1.49 1.52 1.52 
Hungary 2.03 2.02 2.00   1.76 1.75 1.65 
Ireland 2.35 2.24 2.26   2.22 2.17 2.08 
Italy 1.78 1.77 1.74   1.41 1.48 1.47 
Lithuania 1.97 1.90 1.85   1.66 1.68 1.75 
Luxemburg 1.99 1.99 2.01   1.83 1.82 2.05 
Latvia 1.87 1.84 1.82   1.56 1.59 1.61 
Netherlands 2.09 2.08 2.10   1.82 1.82 1.79 
Poland 2.12 2.02 1.97   1.64 1.58 1.50 
Portugal 1.80 1.75 1.71   1.8 1.65 1.56 
Slovakia 2.08 2.01 1.87   1.6 1.66 1.66 
UK 2.06 2.06 2.05   1.85 1.98 2.07 
Sources: (a) EU LFS 2005-2010, (b) EUROSTAT, (c) European Demographic Data Sheet 2006, 2008, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Comparison of a single-level model with a multilevel model 
  Childlessness  Number of children 
Log Likelihood 2 level model -333,556.88  -788,466.19 
Log Likelihood 1 level model -341,259.56  -797,401.67 
Likelihood ratio test statistic (LR) -15,405.36 (1df)  17,870.96 (1df) 
 
To verify whether a multilevel model with two levels is better than a simple model, I compared 
the specified model with the equivalent single-level model. Bearing in mind that the 5% point 
of a chi-squared distribution on 1 degrees of freedom is 3.84, Table 2 reports an overwhelming 
evidence of country-year effects on childlessness. It is possible therefore revert to the multilevel 
model with country-year effects for both childlessness and total fertility rate and begin the 
analyses.
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Table 4 – Estimations of a series of linear probability multilevel models regressing the propensity to live without cohabiting children at 35-39 
years old on various individual and contextual characteristics. 
    A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3  
Education               Low -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.004* 0.063* -0.014*** 0.003 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 High 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.043*** -0.096*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
Working position              
 Unemployed 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 LS blue-collar 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 HS blue-collar 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 LS white-collar 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 HS white-collar 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.081*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
Marital status              
 Previously married 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
 Single 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 
Part-time  0.001*    0.001 0.001**    0.005**   
 X Low Education       -0.001***      
 X High Education       -0.000**       
Men working hours   0.004   0.001  0.004    -0.023  
 X Low Education        -0.002**      
 X High Education        0.003***      
Parental leaves    -0.004***  -0.004***   -0.003***    0.000 
 X Unemployed         -0.001***     
 X LS blue-collar         0.000     
 X HS blue-collar         0.001     
 X LS white-collar         -0.001***     
 X HS white-collar         -0.001***     
Gender Egalitarian Norms     -0.002** -0.002***    -0.002** -0.002* -0.016 -0.001 
 X Low Education          -0.000**    
 X High Education          0.000    
Macro-level interaction              
 PT × GE           0.000   
 MWH × GE            0.000  
  PL × GE                         0.000 
Constant 0.007 -0.01 -0.176 0.048*** 0.122*** 0.152 -0.014 -0.151 0.041*** 0.118*** 0.087 1062 0.133* 
var(cy) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
var(Residual) 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
ICC 0.031 0.03 0.031 0.024 0.029 0.021 0.03 0.031 0.024 0.029 0.024 0.028 0.021 
N of women: 719832; N of country-year combinations: 120. Beta coefficient. Weighted estimations. Sign. Levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Note: var(cy) indicates 
the variance of the random effect at the second level (country-year). PT is Part time, GE is Gender egalitarianism within the country, MWH is the average men working hours, 
PL is the level of Parental Leaves ICC is the intra Class Correlation. Baseline categories: Middle education, inactive, married women. Source: own elaboration based on EU-
LFS 2005-2010 
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Table 5 – Estimations of a series of ordinary least square multilevel models regressing the number of children cohabiting with their 35-39 years 
old mother on individual and contextual characteristics.  
    A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3  
Education               Low 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.278*** -0.467*** 0.167*** 0.071*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 
 High -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.074*** 0.812*** -0.046*** -0.161*** -0.040*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
Working position              
 Unemployed -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.210*** -0.208*** -0.110*** -0.208*** -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.207*** 
 LS blue-collar -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.265*** -0.264*** -0.149*** -0.265*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264*** 
 HS blue-collar -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.177*** -0.184*** -0.182*** -0.005 -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178*** 
 LS white-collar -0.355*** -0.355*** -0.355*** -0.355*** -0.355*** -0.355*** -0.352*** -0.354*** -0.222*** -0.354*** -0.355*** -0.355*** -0.355*** 
 HS white-collar -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.335*** -0.336*** -0.181*** -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.337*** 
Marital status              
 Previously married -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.225*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** 
 Single -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.424*** -0.420*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.421*** 
Part-time  0.004***    0.004* 0.004***    -0.001   
 X Low Education       -0.005***      
 X High Education       0.002***       
Men working hours   -0.012   0.018  -0.009    0.211**  
 X Low Education        0.015***      
 X High Education        -0.020***      
Parental leaves    0.000  0.005   0.013***    -0.017 
 X Unemployed         -0.012***     
 X LS blue-collar         -0.014***     
 X HS blue-collar         -0.020***     
 X LS white-collar         -0.016***     
 X HS white-collar         -0.017***     
Gender Egalitarian Norms     0.009*** 0.008***    0.009*** 0.008** 0.135*** 0.007* 
 X Low Education          0.001***    
 X High Education          0.002***    
Macro-level interaction              
 PT × GE           0.000   
 MWH × GE            -0.003**  
  PL × GE                         0.000 
Constant 2.254*** 2.178*** 2.760*** 2.255*** 1.623*** 0.816 2.166*** 2.645*** 2.149*** 1.670*** 1.711*** -7.228** 1.781*** 
var(cy) 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
var(Residual) 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.668*** 0.669*** 0.667*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 
ICC 0.048 0.044 0.048 0.048 0.037 0.035 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.036 0.036 0.039 0.037 
N of women: 719832; N of country-year combinations: 120. Beta coefficient. Weighted estimations. Sign. Levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Note: var(cy) indicates 
the variance of the random effect at the second level (country-year). PT is Part time, GE is Gender egalitarianism within the country, MWH is the average men working hours, 
PL is the level of Parental Leaves ICC is the intra Class Correlation. Baseline categories: Middle education, inactive, married women. Source: own elaboration based on EU-
LFS 2005-2010
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Appendix Chapter 5 
Table 5. 4 – Results of a series of random effects linear regressions predicting different scores of loneliness in mid and later life in France and 
Bulgaria. 
    France Bulgaria 
  VARIABLES M0 M1 M2 M3 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Parental Status         
 Childless 0.200*** 0.127* 0.097+  0.823*** 0.523*** 0.472***  
 Lost-contacts    0.238**    -0.054 
 Monthly-contacts    -0.018    -0.485** 
 Weekly-contacts    -0.237***    -0.563*** 
Sex of respondent (ref. Female)        
 Male  -0.226*** -0.139** -0.037  -0.179* 0.027 0.288+ 
 Male × childless  0.170+ 0.101   0.575** 0.262  
 Male × Lost-contacts    -0.224+    -0.430+ 
 Male × Monthly-contacts    -0.170    -0.121 
 Male × Weekly-contacts    -0.053    -0.298 
Partnership status  (ref. Alone)        
 Partnered   -0.330*** -0.311***   -0.752*** -0.724*** 
Generation (ref. Silent)         
 Baby boomers   0.081+ 0.098*   -0.267*** -0.281*** 
Level of eucaiton (ref. Low)        
 Intermediate   -0.087+ -0.093+   0.018 0.008 
 High   -0.238*** -0.259***   -0.334*** -0.359*** 
Health (ref. Bad)         
 Good   -0.592*** -0.590***   -0.821*** -0.812*** 
Constant 1.104*** 1.201*** 1.960*** 2.043*** 1.908*** 1.988*** 3.282*** 3.760*** 
Observations 5820 5820 5820 5820 2030 2030 2030 2030 
n   2910 2910 2910 2910 1015 1015 1015 1015 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. Sign. Levels: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p <.1 
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Table 5. 5 – Results of a series of random effects linear regressions predicting different scores of Emotional loneliness in mid and later life in 
France and Bulgaria. 
Emotional loneliness France Bulgaria 
    M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Parental Stats         
 Childless 0.161** 0.093 0.047  0.913*** 0.612*** 0.453**  
 Lost-contacts    0.194*    0.005 
 Monthly-contacts    0.075    -0.422* 
 Weekly-contacts    -0.187**    -0.553*** 
Sex of respondent (ref. Female)        
 Male  -0.443*** -0.302*** -0.248**  -0.337*** -0.054 0.147 
 Male × Childless  0.173+ 0.054   0.608* 0.201  
 Male × Lost-contacts    -0.074    -0.595* 
 Male × Monthly-contacts    -0.216+    -0.061 
 Male × Weekly-contacts    0.018    -0.185 
Partnership status  (ref. Alone)        
 Partnered   -0.507*** -0.488***   -1.051*** -1.027*** 
Generation (ref. Silent)         
 Baby boomers   0.028 0.044   -0.252** -0.262*** 
Level of eucaiton (ref. Low)        
 Intermediate   -0.209*** -0.212***   -0.028 -0.034 
 High   -0.401*** -0.417***   -0.272** -0.286** 
Health (ref. Bad)         
 Good   -0.789*** -0.782***   -1.054*** -1.042*** 
Constant 0.936*** 1.125*** 2.261*** 2.288*** 1.187*** 1.338*** 3.003*** 3.452*** 
Observations 5820 5820 5820 5820 2030 2030 2030 2030 
n   2910 2910 2910 2910 1015 1015 1015 1015 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. Sign. Levels: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p <.1 
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Table 5. 6 – Results of a series of random effects linear regressions predicting different scores of Social loneliness in mid and later life in Germany, 
France and Bulgaria. 
Social Loneliness France Bulgaria 
    M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Parental Status         
 Childless 0.246*** 0.172* 0.151*  0.757*** 0.438* 0.491*  
 Lost-contacts    0.328**    -0.101 
 Monthly-contacts    -0.113    -0.543* 
 Weekly-contacts    -0.311***    -0.576** 
Sex of respondent (ref. Female)        
 Male  -0.006 0.033 0.154  -0.027 0.107 0.437+ 
 Male × childless  0.159 0.120   0.581* 0.332  
 Male × Lost-contacts    -0.373*    -0.285 
 Male × Monthly-contacts    -0.108    -0.180 
 Male × Weekly-contacts    -0.082    -0.417 
Partnership status  (ref. Alone)        
 Partnered   -0.163** -0.143**   -0.455*** -0.421*** 
Generation (ref. Silent)         
 Baby boomers   0.138* 0.157**   -0.278** -0.298** 
Level of eucaiton (ref. Low)        
 Intermediate   0.036 0.026   0.049 0.038 
 High   -0.074 -0.103   -0.401*** -0.436*** 
Health (ref. Bad)         
 Good   -0.516*** -0.513***   -0.599*** -0.592*** 
Constant 1.271*** 1.274*** 1.773*** 1.911*** 2.625*** 2.637*** 3.574*** 4.079*** 
Observations 5820 5820 5820 5820 2030 2030 2030 2030 
n   2910 2910 2910 2910 1015 1015 1015 1015 
Source: GGS Wave 1 and Wave 2, author’s elaboration. Sign. Levels: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p <.1 
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